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1 
 
ecclesia reformata sed semper reformanda—“a church reformed but always needing 
reformation.” 
 
“And the Church must be forever building and always decaying, and always being restored.” 
T.S. Elliot 
 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
As this project is being written, the third largest “religion” in the world has become no 
religion at all.  More importantly, the most recent national survey reports suggest the largest 
religious category in the United States is now the religion of Nones, those that identify as having 
no religious affiliation.1  The number of those who self-identify as having no religious affiliation 
has hit an all-time high in America since Pew Research Center has been measuring this metric.  
The recent rapid increase of those who have been called religious “Nones” in America has been 
consistently evidenced in data in all major national polls. In a nation that has for so long self-
identified as a “Christian” society, this seismic shift in the American religious landscape has 
been called by Time Magazine one of the ten most significant trends changing American 
society.2  
Some contend America is on the same trajectory of religious decline as major European 
countries.3 The 1960s and 1970s was a moment, especially in Europe where there was an 
                                               
1 “The 2017 study, polling 3,000 Americans, found that 34 percent of Americans now identify as 'nones': 
atheists, agnostics or 'nothing in particular', overtaking Protestants (33 per cent) and Catholics (21 per cent) as a 
social group.” See Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy at Brigham Young University. “National 
Survey Examines Marriage, Family, Immigration, Health care and Technology in the Age of Trump,” Deseret News, 
2017. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/national-survey-examines-marriage-family-immigration-health-
care-and-technology-in-the-age-of-trump-300557068.html (Accessed February 25, 2019). 
 
2 Amy Sullivan, “The Rise of the Nones,” in 10 Ideas That Are Changing Your Life,. Time Magazine, 
March 12, 2012. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2108054,00.html Accessed February 20, 
2019). 
 
3 Simon Brauer, “The Surprising Predictable Decline of Religion in the United States.” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion (2018): 0:1–22. 
 
2 
acceleration of the numbers of people choosing to disaffiliate from religion.  This is significant 
given the latest survey data in the UK suggesting a less than one percent religious service 
attendance in the Church of England and a greater than fifty percent of the population self-
identifying as religiously unaffiliated.4  The religiously unaffiliated population in the UK has 
surpassed the population that identifies as Christian to become the majority religious identity in 
the country.  
Overall, global levels of religious affiliation declined during the Twentieth Century,5 with 
some suggesting this trend appears to be slowing and global religion is experiencing a significant 
season of growth.6 Though it can be argued there is a global resurgence of Christianity 
specifically7 and a resurgence of Evangelical expressions of Christianity is certainly not the case 
in the United States. As such, this project focuses entirely on the American religious context.   
Currently, there are a handful of countries where religiously unaffiliated are the majority 
“religion.”8  China has the largest population, per capita, of religious Nones.  Britain is not far 
                                               
4 Now, the Church of England churches are no longer required to hold religious services on Sunday. 
Commenting on the change of the over 400 year old law, the Reverend Rose Hudson-Wilkin stated, “Times are 
changing- it is not just about a shortage of clergy but also the fact that people work on Sunday.” See, “Churches no 
longer have to hold Sunday services,” BBC News, February 22, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-47326993 
(Accessed February 27, 2019). 
 
5 According to the World Christian Database, nearly one hundred percent of the global population 
identified with a religion in 1910.  This number has fallen to eighty seven percent in 2010. 
 
6 Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project, “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth 
Projections 2010-2050,” April 2, 2015. http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/11/2015/03/PF_15.04.02_ProjectionsFullReport.pdf (Accessed January 2, 2019).  
 
7 The World Christian Database reports the global population of those identifying with no religion 
declining by three percent by 2050 and the global population of those identifying as Christian as growing by 
approximately three percent by 2050. https://www.worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/#/results/1747 (Accessed 
February 20, 2019). 
 
8 See “The Global Religious Landscape,” Pew Research Center December 18, 2012, 
https://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-unaffiliated/ (Accessed August 29, 2019). “The 
largest populations of the religiously unaffiliated outside China are in Japan (6% of all unaffiliated), the United 
States (5%), Vietnam (2%) and Russia (2%). There are six countries where the religiously unaffiliated make up a 
3 
behind with half of the nation’s population identifying as religiously unaffiliated. Importantly 
now, thirty four percent of Americans reported no religious affiliation9 in the 2017 American 
Family Value Survey and only twenty eight percent reported being “born again” Evangelical 
Christian.10  Pew Research reports that the number of unaffiliated totaled 36 million adults in 
2007 and grew to 47 million in 2012.11 General Social Survey data from 1972–2008 showed an 
increase in the percentages of Americans who never attend religious services from about thirteen 
percent in the early 1990s to twenty two percent in 2008.  
Regarding traditional religious beliefs, currently, about one-third of Americans strongly 
believes churches “have their best interest at heart,” and one in four (twenty five percent) are not 
confident in pastors’ insights on the issues of the day.12  Only fourteen percent of Americans 
report using the Bible on a daily basis and thirty five percent of Americans admit to never 
picking up a Bible.13 Most Americans claim some belief in God; however, fewer Americans than 
in the past are certain about their belief. Those who are absolutely sure God exists dropped from 
sixty six percent of adults in 2003 to fifty four percent in 2013 in Harris Poll surveys.14  These 
                                               
majority of the population: the Czech Republic (76% are religiously unaffiliated), North Korea (71%), Estonia 
(60%), Japan (57%), Hong Kong (56%) and China (52%).” 
 
9 Defined as Atheistic, Agnostic, or Nothing in particular. 
 
10  Christopher F. Karpowitz & Jeremy C. Pope. The American Family Values Survey: 2017 Summary 
Report: Marriage and Family in the Age of Trump. 2017, 46-47. http://csed.byu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/AFS-Report-2017_Full_Embargoed.pdf (Accessed January 29, 2019). 
 
11 Pew Research Center, Polling and Analysis, “Nones on the Rise.” October 9, 2012. 
https://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/ (Accessed January 29, 2019). 
 
12 Ibid. 
 
13 LifeWay Research: Americans Are Fond of the Bible, Don’t Actually Read It.  April 25, 2017. 
https://lifewayresearch.com/2017/04/25/lifeway-research-americans-are-fond-of-the-bible-dont-actually-read-it/ 
(Accessed on January 16, 2019). 
 
14 “What do Americans Believe?” The Harris Poll, November 2013.  
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statistics highlight a shift toward less religious activity and belief in the past two decades.  These 
churchless people becoming the nation’s largest “faith" category leads Simon Brauer to state, 
The United States and Europe appear to be on a similar trajectory of religious decline, 
with some variation in the rate and expected maximum size of the fuzzy middle. While 
the United States has traditionally been thought of as an exception to this process, it 
might better be described as being comparatively early in it. Despite its placement 
relative to European countries, the United States appears to be in a transitional state in 
which the fuzzy population has reached a critical mass. It is ultimately unknown whether 
these majority-fuzzy cohorts will change this trend. But if in the 21st century, the United 
States experiences the same changes that majority-fuzzy European nations did during the 
20th century, the United States will be decidedly more secular by its close.15 
 
The fuzzy middle comprised of the moderately religious is not only shrinking, but the 
vortex-like decline is also draining the number of intensely religious.  Brauer’s fuzzy middle is a 
synonymous concept with what Pew has identified as the “spiritual but not religious” population, 
the majority of who are more closely mirroring the beliefs and actions of those who confidently 
identify as Nones.16 The spiritual but not religious are more highly educated and lean Democrat 
more than Republican, politically.  Moreover, this religious middle ground has been shrinking 
over the recent decades providing further evidence for the widening gap between the devout and 
spiritually indifferent where it is clear empirically that “the religious beliefs and practices of the 
affiliated and unaffiliated have become more dissimilar since 2000.”17 
                                               
15 Simon Brauer, “The Surprising Predictable Decline of Religion in the United States,” 20. 
 
16 Religious service attendance is lower among this group compared to the general population with many of 
the spiritual but not religious, saying religion is not too or not at all important in their lives. Of note here, GSS data 
shows that only 8.1% of Americans attended a religious service more than once a week. That has dropped to 6.6% in 
2016, see Voas and Chaves. “Even Intense Religiosity is Declining in the United States,” Sociological Science, 
(November 15, 2018), 698. 
 
17 Aaron Gullickson, "The Diverging Beliefs and Practices of the Religiously Affiliated and Unaffiliated in 
the United States," Sociological Science 5 (06, 2018): 362. 
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Typically, patience is required when analyzing and measuring these changes in religious 
belief as shifts in primary beliefs and practices take time and are frequently quite minimal.18  
That is, unless one is examining recent shifts in religious affiliation in the west. Even until the 
early ‘90s, trends in religious affiliation were relatively stable and predictable, evidencing 
minimal change.  Since 1991, the population of those identifying as religiously unaffiliated has 
dramatically increased.19 Because a primary concern of this project is the decline in Evangelical 
affiliation, it is significant to note that though Evangelicalism experienced a surge of growth in 
the ‘80s it has experienced a steady decline since as has the population of those who hold what 
Voas and Chaves term “intensely religious”20 beliefs such as viewing the Bible as the literal 
word of God and frequent church attendance.21   
While some argue that the general population of Protestants is getting smaller, others 
argue the core, represented by those who attend religious services regularly and hold what can be 
                                               
18 Voas and Chaves. “Even Intense Religiosity is Declining in the United States,” Sociological Science, 
(November 15, 2018), 5:969. 
 
19 Gallup, "Religion", Gallup.Com, Last modified 2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx. 
Accessed January 20, 2019. See also, Frank Newport, “5 Things to know about Evangelicals in America,” Gallup, 
May 31, 2018.  See also, ARIS, “Americans Who Don’t Identify with a Religion No Longer a Fringe Group,” 
American Religion Survey (ARIS) in the Media, September 22, 2009. “The 1990s was the decade when the “secular 
boom” occurred – each year 1.3 million more adult Americans joined the ranks of the Nones. Since 2001 the annual 
increase has halved to 660,000 a year.” 
 
20 Voas and Chaves define intense religiosity as identifying as strongly religiously affiliated, frequent 
prayer, biblical literalism, and frequent church attendance. Voas and Chaves. Even Intense Religiosity. 695. 
However, religious service attendance is a less reliable metric for determining religious affiliation as it does not 
necessarily reflect religious belief(s) or lack thereof.  With the “unchurched” being defined as Pasquale does 
provides a much higher percentage of the American population as, “all who report that they do not affiliate with 
religious institutions or have not regularly attended formal services for a period of time (such as six months or a 
year), regardless of beliefs. The category is therefore quite broad, including both religious believers and unbelievers. 
Depending upon definitions, year of study, and sampling techniques, estimates of the unchurched range from 35 to 
50 percent of the US population.” See,  Empirical Study and Neglect of Unbelief and Irreligion. Excerpted from The 
New Encyclopedia of Unbelief, Tom Flynn (Ed.) Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007. Pages 760-766. Entry by 
Frank L. Pasquale. 762.  A substantial majority of the unchurched in the United States, for example, pray, believe 
that Jesus Christ was the son of God, and desire religious training for their children. 762. 
 
21 Voas and Chaves. “Even Intense Religiosity is declining in the United States,” 697. 
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considered traditional Evangelical beliefs, is getting stronger;22 however, research from Barna 
Group reveals that paralleling the rise of the Nones is a diminishing popularity of traditional 
Evangelical faith values and beliefs among those that might identify as Evangelical. Where 
Barna research reveals more than half of American Christians embrace at least one foundational 
element of the postmodern epistemology regarding the relativity of truth and the percentage of 
Americans that described themselves as Christian fell eight percentage points from 2007 to 
2014.23  
The relatively recent interest with Nones has led to studies on the genesis of unbelief, 
disbelief, and misbelief in attempts to identify not only sociological causes but also formulations 
useful for predicting unbelief.24 Identifying as unaffiliated could be just more about identity than 
beliefs since a majority of the unaffiliated still report having religious beliefs in general and 
some traditional Christian beliefs in particular.  This could indicate Nones simply prefer to cease 
identifying with an established religion rather than cease believing in God or some form of 
higher power.  Although the number of atheists and agnostics are growing, they do not make up 
a substantial number of the None population.25 Instead of completely renouncing belief in a 
                                               
22 Sarah Wilkins-Laflamme, “Protestant and Catholic Distinctions in Secularization,” Journal of 
Contemporary Religion, (2016) 31:2, 165. 
 
23 “Competing Worldviews Influence Today’s Christians,” Barna Research Group, May 9, 2017. 
https://www.barna.com/research/competing-worldviews-influence-todays-christians/ (Accessed December 18, 
2018). 
 
24 G. Pennycook, et al.”Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief” Cognition, 123 
(2012), pp. 335-346. See also, Will M. Gervais and Ara Norenzayan. "Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious 
Disbelief." Science 336, no. 6080 (2012): 493-96. See also, Shenhav, Amitai,Rand, David G.,Greene, Joshua D. 
“Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, Vol 
141(3), Aug 2012, 423-428. 
 
25 Thirteen percent of religiously unaffiliated Americans claim the label “atheist”; fourteen percent define 
themselves as “agnostic.” Jones, Cox, Cooper, and Lienesch. “Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving Religion— and 
Why They’re Unlikely to Come Back,” Public Religion Research Institute, September 22, 2019, 11. See also Will 
Gervais who suggests the number of atheists in America could be as high as twenty six percent of the population. 
Some would suggest the significantly lower number of reported atheists in America is due to the still-present social 
7 
higher power, religious Nones still hold beliefs regarding a higher power with varying degrees of 
personability.26 Those that have left the church (disaffiliated) have not inoculated the beliefs of 
the Nones, instead there is a quickly growing gap between the beliefs in God, belief in the 
afterlife, and frequency of prayer where these beliefs are strengthening in the declining 
population of the affiliated and quickly weakening amongst the growing number of Nones.  
The recent tipping point for the widening chasm in beliefs between the affiliated and 
unaffiliated appears to have occurred around the turn of the millennium. With, the affiliated and 
unaffiliated becoming “more like each other in beliefs and practices before 2000. After 2000, the 
affiliated and unaffiliated became less like each other in beliefs and practices.”27 
It is not just the general population that is becoming less religious, the share of those who 
used to be considered to be intensely religious is also declining.  As mentioned, some would 
argue that the increasing distance in similarity of beliefs between the religious and unaffiliated is 
a consequence of the lessening of belief among the unaffiliated and a strengthening of belief 
among the intensely religious; that religiosity as a whole is not in decline in America but rather 
“only moderate religion is on the decline in the United States;”28 however, Voas and Chaves 
                                               
stigmatism surrounding the general, negative opinion of atheists; a perpetual cycle where poor/inaccurate 
perceptions of atheists is caused by the relatively low number of atheists in a population. When, conversely, the 
more prevalent atheism is the more favorable perception of atheism in general. Will M. Gervais. “Finding the 
Faithless: Perceived Atheist Prevalence Reduces Anti-Atheist Prejudice.” Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 37(4) 543–556.  Atheists are included in Nones data but are more accurately defined as irreligious. Pasquale 
delineates the definition of Nones vs Nots by stating, “In other words, “nones” include, but are not equivalent to, 
“nots” (the affirmatively irreligious).” See, Frank L. Pasquale, “Empirical Study and Neglect of Unbelief and 
Irreligion,” Excerpted from The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief, Tom Flynn (Ed.) Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 
2007, 765. 
 
26 Robert P. Jones, Daniel Cox, Betsy Cooper, and Rachel Lienesch. “Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving 
Religion— and Why They’re Unlikely to Come Back,” 11. has fifty nine percent of unaffiliated believing in a 
personal God (twenty two percent) or impersonal force (thirty seven percent). 
 
27 Gullickson, “The Diverging Beliefs and practices of the religiously unaffiliated in the United States,” 
367. 
28 Schnabel, Landon, and Sean Bock. 2017. “The Persistent and Exceptional Intensity of American 
Religion: A Response to Recent Research.” Sociological Science 4:686. 
8 
provide conclusive evidence that a characteristic of the None population is their rapid conversion 
rates from affiliated to unaffiliated,   
In 1983, 67% of Britons identified as some kind of Christian. In 2015, it was 43%. Over 
the same period, members of Non-Christian religions have more than quadrupled.  In the 
UK, conversion rate of nones from Christianity is astonishingly greater than the 
conversion rate of Nones to Christianity with “every one person brought up with No 
religion who has become a Christian, twenty-six people brought up as Christians now 
identify as Nones.29   
 
This appears to be the case in America as well.  The conversion rates of “Nonverts” as Stephen 
Bullivant calls them, are significantly greater than conversions from the None population to 
Christianity in general and Evangelical expressions of faith in particular.  A point Bullivant 
confirms in stating, “for every person brought up in a non-religious household who becomes 
religious, 26 people raised as Christians became non-religious.”30 
So, it is not that Nones never had religion or were raised without religion. In fact, many 
were raised in religiously affiliated homes, but they later chose to de-convert and some argue 
convincingly that these deconverts are “unlikely to come back.”31 Interestingly, not only is the 
population of Nonverts increasing, but there is also a corresponding increase in the retention rate 
of the None population. Nones appear to stay Nones longer than deconverts raised in Evangelical 
homes. Pew admits that the retention rate is still lower than other major world religions, with the 
majority of Nones raised in unaffiliated households still identify as Nones.  Additionally, the 
retention rate is even greater among Millennials compared to all other religions listed on the 
                                               
29 Stephen Bullivant. “The No Religion Population of Britain.” Recent data from the British Social 
Attitudes Survey (2015) and the European Social Survey (2014) Catholic Research Forum Reports, 3. 
 
30 Ibid. 
 
31  Robert P. Jones, Daniel Cox, Betsy Cooper, and Rachel Lienesch. Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving 
Religion— and Why They’re Unlikely to Come Back. Washington D.C.: Public Religion Research Institute 
September 22, 2019. 
 
9 
survey.32  “Nearly one in five Americans switched from their childhood religious identity to 
become unaffiliated as adults, and only three percent of Americans who were raised unaffiliated 
are joining a religious tradition. This dynamic has resulted in a dramatic net gain—16 percentage 
points— for the religiously unaffiliated.”33 This is “one important reason,” according to the 
Public Religion Research Institute, “why the unaffiliated are experiencing rising retention rates is 
because younger Americans raised in nonreligious homes are less apt to join a religious tradition 
or denomination than young adults in previous eras."34 Furthermore, this phenomenon is growing 
most immediately by conversion rather than biological growth due to religiously unaffiliated 
individuals having fewer children than those who identify with a religion.35 In addition, 
conversion processes are often a symptom, and a function of the public resurgence of religion.  
As has been seen thus far, sociologists have been unable to agree upon a single, 
significant cause for the rapid increase of Nones in America.  Historically, attributing secularism 
as the primary catalyst for the significant growth in the population of those identifying as 
religiously unaffiliated has been a common argument among sociologists.  This is why Berger, in 
a 1968 interview in the New York Times, confidently predicted that, by “the twenty-first century, 
religious believers are likely to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a world-
                                               
32 Pew Forum. America’s Changing Religious Landscape. http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-
changing-religious-landscape/. Accessed January 16, 2019. 
 
33 Jones, Cox, Cooper, and Lienesch. “Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving Religion— and Why They’re 
Unlikely to Come Back,” Public Religion Research Institute, September 22, 2019, 4. 
 
34 Ibid., 5. 
 
35 See Michael Lipka and David McClendon, “Why people with no religion are projected to decline as a 
share of the world’s population,” Pew Research Center, April 7, 2017 https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/04/07/why-people-with-no-religion-are-projected-to-decline-as-a-share-of-the-worlds-population/ 
(accessed January 20, 2019) “This relative decline is largely attributable to the fact that religious “nones” are, on 
average, older and have fewer children than people who are affiliated with a religion.” 
 
10 
wide secular culture.”36  Nearly thirty years later, Berger redacted his proclaimed certainty as a 
result of the global religious landscape he saw before him and stated, “the world today … is as 
furiously religious as it ever was … the body of literature by historians and social scientists 
loosely labelled ‘secularization theory’ is essentially mistaken.”37   
It is the newness of this phenomenon that has posed a precarious question which has been 
hard to answer with any significant amount of forceful significance, namely, what is causing 
such a rapid increase of Americans choosing to not identify with any religion? One might 
assume recent sexual scandal within the Catholic church would be a significant contributing 
factor for the surge in religious unaffiliation but this only accounts for a relatively small number 
of those.38 According to Public Religion Research Institute, the top two reasons that young adults 
list for leaving the church is that “they stopped believing in the religion’s teachings (60 percent)” 
and their families were “never that religious when they were growing up (32 percent).”39  In the 
Public Religion Research Institute survey, which mirrored the most recent Pew research,40 
among the reasons Americans identified as important motivations in leaving their childhood 
                                               
36 Peter Berger, “A Bleak Outlook is Seen for Religion,” New York Times, 25 February 1968. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1968/02/25/archives/a-bleak-outlook-is-seen-for-religion.html (Accessed January 2, 
2019.) 
 
37 Peter L. Berger, “Secularism in Retreat” The National Interest. .46 (Winter 1996): p3. 
 
38 Worth noting here, the Catholic church is also experiencing a significant decline in those that identify as 
Catholic. With “Catholics suffering the largest decline among major religious groups: a 10-percentage point loss 
overall.” Where thirty one percent of Americans report a childhood Catholic affiliation thirteen percent of those 
leave by switching to another religion or report no current religious affiliation. See Jones, Cox, Cooper, and 
Lienesch. “Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving Religion— and Why They’re Unlikely to Come Back,” Public 
Religion Research Institute, September 22, 2019, for full report on retention rates of major religious categories in 
America. 
  
39 Jones, Cox, Cooper, and Lienesch. “Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving Religion— and Why They’re 
Unlikely to Come Back,” 6. 
 
40 Becka Alper, “Why America’s Nones do not identify with religion,” Pew Research Center, August 8, 
2018. Accessed January 29, 2019. 
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religion are: they stopped believing in the religion’s teachings, their family was never that 
religious when they were growing up, and their experience of negative religious teachings about 
or treatment of gay and lesbian people.41  The Nones’ experience of negative religious teachings 
about the treatment of LGBTQ people is a relatively new phenomena.  Interestingly, this latter 
reason was cited as a much more important factor for disaffiliation than the clergy sexual abuse 
scandal in the Catholic church.  
Need and Purpose of this Study 
This study is needed as there exists no investigation of the current rapid rise in religious 
unaffiliation while comparing it to past major historical periods of American religion for the 
focused purpose of identifying those mechanisms that sparked periods of resurgence of interest 
in Evangelical-esque expressions of Christianity out of periods of significant religious 
disinterest.  
Greg Smith, Associate Director of the Pew Research Center, removes doubt concerning 
the significance of a shifting tide in religious affiliation by certainly stating, “I think it goes 
without saying these are pretty significant changes in the American religious landscape.”42 The 
Nones phenomenon in the U.S. has gone from two percent of adult Americans in 1950 to twenty 
one percent, 2014, according to Pew Research and some surveys put one in five adults as having 
left the church and one in three Millennials have self-identify as unaffiliated.  As alarms are 
sounding for the Evangelical church due to the rapid increase of religious unaffiliation there is a 
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42 Daniel Burke, “Religious leaders respond to the rise of the ‘Nones’,” Religion News Service, October 10, 
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glint of hope for the church in understanding  “people stop being religious more quickly than 
they start being wholly secular.”43 This means the total abandonment of religion is not imminent 
and the Evangelical church still has time to respond, albeit, how much time is not clear since 
religious decline has been at play throughout much of the 20th century; however, to be clear, 
something is evolving in America's perception of religion generally and Evangelicalism 
specifically and there are significant cultural consequences.  
As households are becoming increasingly unaffiliated the youth of America are losing 
their religion and identifying as Nones at a much faster rate than their elders.44  Every generation 
is becoming more religiously unaffiliated with a majority of those who leave their childhood 
faith do so before their eighteenth birthday.45 A staggering ninety percent of those who leave 
their childhood faith do so before their 30th birthday putting these individuals squarely in the 
Millennial demographic.46  Nearly half (forty six percent) of teens, on par with Millennials, say 
“I need factual evidence to support my beliefs”47  The 2016 Cooperative Institutional Research 
Program Freshman48 survey revealed the number of college freshmen with no religious 
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Unlikely to Come Back,” Public Religion Research Institute, September 22, 2019, 9.  
 
45 Ibid., 6.  
 
46  Ibid., 13. 
 
47 David Kinnaman, Roxy Lee Stone, and Brook Hempell, “Atheism Doubles Among Generation Z,” 
Barna Group, January 24, 2018, https://www.barna.com/research/atheism-doubles-among-generation-z/ (Accessed 
January 16, 2019). 
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affiliation more than tripled since 1986, up thirty one percent from ten percent.49  The most 
recent survey thirty five percent of the incoming freshmen in the United States picked atheist, 
agnostic or nothing in particular. The percentage of college graduates who identify with 
Christianity has declined by nine percentage points since 2007 with twenty four percent of all 
college graduates identifying as Nones.50 With atheists making up the fastest growing population 
within the Nones; the number nearly doubling from 2007 to 2014.51 More than double the 
population identified as Gen Z52 self-identify as atheist compared to 6% of the general US adult 
population.53  
Significance Of Study 
The number of those that identify as Christian is quickly shrinking in the United States 
with the religiously unaffiliated making up nearly a third of the population in the country.54 The 
population of those who do not identify with any religious category being the primary or second 
largest religion in seventy six percent of the 50 states in America, with the religiously 
unaffiliated becoming the largest group in forty six percent of the nation’s states.55  
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This is a monumental shift in the religious landscape of a country that has been 
considered a “Christian” nation for nearly two and a half centuries and it is possible that this 
national identity could cease to exist in the lifetime of those reading this project. Several in the 
fields of sociology and religion are studying this religious de-evolution and the most recent 
reports indicate a budding but dramatic increase in the number of individuals who are 
comfortable with not identifying with any particular religion.  The consequences of this massive 
shift have yet to be fully explored in the social sciences and it is a huge shift which has not been 
fully realized yet.  Nonetheless, there are significant identifiable cultural consequences resulting 
from a rapid decrease in religiosity in general and American Evangelical identification 
specifically.  
Beyond the immediate impact on religious institutions, religious affiliation has significant 
individual and societal impact through the influence of politics, the economic impact of religious 
establishments,56 and the relationship between religious affiliation, and mental health 
consequences.  PRRI’s Director of Research Dan Cox is quoted as saying, “The U.S. religious 
landscape is undergoing a dramatic transformation that is fundamentally reshaping American 
politics and culture.”57 Religion is woven into the founding fabric of the American nation.  
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Addressed in the First and Fourteenth Amendments and in Article 6, the nation and its leaders 
cannot impose any particular form or preference of religion on the American people;58 the 
government cannot interfere with anyone’s religion,59 nor can it require a religious test of any 
sort as a prerequisite for holding public office.  With Pasquale arguing, “‘Rational choice’ and 
economic or market theories of religion stress the prevalence and benefits of religious belief and 
affiliation,”60 the strong relationship between religion and a nation’s policy begins to become 
evident.  
Politics determines policy and as voters determine politicians, with “the role of political 
authorities in supporting/discouraging religion is a significant factor in the flourishing of a 
religion.”61 As such, religiously affiliated and unaffiliated voters significantly determine national 
policy and the trajectory of a nation, religiously and politically. If this is true, the rise of the 
Nones has political, policy, and cultural implications.62  With religious resurgence illustrated by 
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the Moral Majority in the 1980’s shaping national policy and politics, so too do current  surges in 
religious unaffiliation have the potential to significantly influence public policy that has far 
reaching consequences for those that hold traditional Evangelical beliefs.  A great majority of 
Americans hold the opinion that if more Americans were religious it would be positive for 
American society;63 however, only a slim majority still believe religion can answer most of life’s 
problems.64  As Chaves highlights, 
Actively religious Americans are more politically and socially conservative than less 
religious Americans. Active participants support more restrictions on legal abortion, 
endorse more traditional gender roles, and vote Republican more often than less religious 
people. These differences have existed at least since the 1970s, but some of them have 
increased since then, creating a tighter link between religiosity and some kinds of 
political and social conservatism.65 
 
Writing for the Guardian, Jason Wilson speaks to the potentially dire implications of an 
ever shrinking Christian majority in stating, “After accounting for eight out of 10 Americans in 
1976, white Christians are now a minority...The political implications could be profound.”66  
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These implications are compounded when one realizes the college educated, white, male is the 
fastest growing demographic in the American None population.67 Add to this general profile of 
the American None the political profile is Independent or Democrat68 and twice as likely to be 
politically liberal (forty one percent) as they are to be conservative (twenty one percent).69 
CEO of the Public Religion Research Institute, Robert P. Jones recently wrote regarding 
the declining trajectory of a diminishing white Christian America saying it is “remarkable how 
fast” the trend is moving. In 2008, “white Christians were still 50% of the population, so that 
there’s been an 11-point shift since Barack Obama’s election.”70 According to Jones, there is an 
obvious reason for this shift, namely, “the disaffiliation of young people in particular from 
Christian churches.”71 That is, especially among the young, there are proportionally fewer 
Christians. If this trends continue, that means that there will be fewer and fewer Christians72 and 
the political implications are revealed in a recent presidential election.  
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72 Jones cites the 2012 Pew and ARIS data that respectively found that thirty two percent of young 
Americans have no religious affiliation, while the 2008 ARIS survey revealed twenty nine percent of Americans 18–
29 years old professed no religion. See Robert P. Jones, The End of White Christian America, New York: Simon & 
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According to the Pew Research Center, on election day, 2012 exit polls conducted by the 
National Election Poll found that seventy nine percent of white Evangelical Protestants voted for 
Romney over Obama.73 Conversely, the same exit poll found that, “that 70% of religious 
“nones” voted for Obama over Romney.”74 Prior to the 2016 election, “more than one-quarter 
(26%) of unaffiliated Americans report they were not registered to vote, a significantly higher 
rate than among white Evangelical Protestants (10%).”75  With the a strong majority of Nones 
strongly favoring Hillary Clinton (sixty two percent) over Donald Trump (twenty one percent), 
the Nones were a significant, and perhaps underrated, voting coalition for Clinton compared to 
Trump’s (thirty percent vs thirteen percent).76  This underutilized voting block will most likely 
be a much more significant influence in the 2020 election.  Compare this to those with 
Evangelical beliefs, “among Evangelicals who voted, more than half of Evangelicals by belief 
(58 percent) and self-identified Evangelicals (53 percent) cast their ballot for Trump,”77 and, “a 
majority of non-Evangelical voters (53 percent) voted for Clinton, while 36 percent voted for 
Trump.”78 
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 However, more than religious beliefs alone appear to influence political affiliation.  It is 
possible race and generational cohort significantly influences how those with Evangelical beliefs 
vote. Lifeway Research contrasts the vast differences in how those who hold Evangelical beliefs 
vote based on their race and generational cohort identification:  
African-American voters with Evangelical beliefs overwhelmingly voted for Clinton (86 
percent), while more than three-quarters of white voters with Evangelical beliefs voted 
for Trump (77 percent). Around half of younger voters with Evangelical beliefs cast their 
ballot for Clinton—47 percent of those 18 to 49. A majority of voters 65 and over who 
have Evangelical beliefs voted for Trump (72 percent).79 
 
As there are political implications of religious affiliation there are, conversely, influential 
ramifications of unbelief regarding morality and beliefs concerning basic human rights.  With 
those considered to be more religiously conservative being “especially concerned about the 
ungodliness and moral decay of U.S. society and its alleged abandonment of family values.”80 
“The issue of abortion has been the most pivotal political issue mobilizing religious 
constituencies to political action in the United States during the four decades since the Roe v. 
Wade Supreme Court decision which legalized abortion in 1973.”81 Religious Nones are 
significantly less likely to hold that belief in God is necessary for morality and good values, or 
their own moral decision making.82  An interesting position given the views of Nones concerning 
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LGBTQ equality stemming from arguments for basic human rights. Perhaps even more alarming 
is the only slight majority (fifty nine percent) of white Protestants who hold that belief in God is 
a precondition for moral behavior.83 
There is also a growing body of research addressing the coadjutant relationship between 
levels of religiosity and corresponding impacts on mental health.  Religious beliefs and practices 
are related to greater life satisfaction, positive affect and higher morale.84  Specifically, belief in 
God, but not religious affiliation, has been associated with better psychiatric treatment 
outcomes.85  Individuals with a positive and accepting image of God demonstrate fewer anxiety 
and depressive symptoms.86  Similarly, belief in a benevolent God is associated with less social 
anxiety, paranoia, obsession, and compulsion.87 Some argue that religious beliefs affect 
individual and societal happiness.88  Of the thirty five studies in the past two decades that have 
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investigating the relationship between Christian affiliation and levels of happiness there is a 
more than sixty five percent positive correlation89 providing strong evidence that religious 
affiliation positively affects the quality of one’s life.  Additionally, the data seem to indicate that 
those that are unaffiliated are nearly as happy as those that identify with a Christian religion. A 
Canadian survey provided a very clear correlation between religiosity and happiness suggesting 
spirituality forms the strongest predictor of happiness.90   
While the majority of correlation studies regarding Christian affiliation and happiness 
have been positive, studies investigating Muslim affiliation have been overwhelmingly 
positive,91 but, this could be attributed to what Opfinger and Gundlach found that individuals that 
were either highly or unremarkably religious reported higher levels of happiness. Whereas those 
who were identified to be moderately religious were the ones self-reporting the lowest levels of 
happiness.92 And self-reporting Muslims were “more religious and happier compared to believers 
of other religions.”93  
                                               
psychological well-being in older adults findings from three national surveys.” Journal of Aging and Health, 10(4), 
504–531. 
 
89 Mohd Ahsan Kabir Rizvi and Mohammad Zakir Hossain, “Relationship Between Religious Belief and 
Happiness: A Systematic Literature Review.” Journal of Religion and Health (2017) 56:1561–1582. 
 
90 Mark D. Holder, Ben Coleman, and Judi M. Wallace, “Spirituality, religiousness, and happiness in 
children aged 8–12 years,” Journal of Happiness Studies (2010): 11, 131–150. 
 
91 Ahmed M. Abdel-Khalek and David Lester, “Religiosity, health, and psychopathology in two cultures: 
Kuwait and USA,” Mental Health, Religion and Culture (2007): 10(5), 537–550. See also, Ahmed Abdel-Khalek 
and David Lester, “A significant association between religiosity and happiness in a sample of Kuwaiti students,” 
Psychological Reports (2009): 105(2), 381–382. 
 
92 Erich Gundlach and Matthias Opfinger, “Religiosity as a determinant of happiness,” Review of 
Development Economics, (July 2013): 17(3), 523–539. 
 
93 Mohd Ahsan Kabir Rizvi and  Mohammad Zakir Hossain. “Relationship Between Religious Belief and 
Happiness: A Systematic Literature Review,” 1573. 
 
22 
Additionally, the relatively recent increase in acceptance of full-normalcy of 
homosexuality has produced research that suggests sexual minority individuals who are affiliated 
with a gay-affirming, Christian denominations experience less perceived discrimination and 
overall lower levels of depression compared to their peers that identified as secular, and those 
sexual-minorities who are affiliated with denominations that oppose homosexuality.  This 
research indicates religious affiliation for sexual minorities can be a risk factor or protective 
factor regarding mental health in general and discrimination and depression in particular.94 
Interestingly, committed atheists are found to enjoy the best mental health among the 
Nones population similar to those possessing strong religious beliefs.95 In fact, “convinced 
atheists may derive consolation from a certainty of belief in their own solidly-held worldview, 
leading to similar mental health to the highly-religious.”96 The spiritual but not religious 
population generally has greater numbers of depression and substance abuse. With one English 
study concluding, “People who have a spiritual understanding of life in the absence of a religious 
framework are vulnerable to mental disorder.”97 
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Contrarily, Speed and Fowler argue for a cessation of overgeneralization regarding the 
positive corollary relationship between religion and mental health and happiness.  Focusing 
exclusively on how church attendance affects  mental health of the religiously unaffiliated, their 
results suggest, “the religiously unaffiliated experienced attending church less positively than 
Christians; when compared at the highest level of attendance, the religiously unaffiliated were 
less healthy than Christians.”98  In only investigating categorical behavioral activities, Speed’s 
and Fowler’s research highlights the fact that activities such as religious service attendance and 
prayer/meditation do not significantly correlate to higher levels of life satisfaction, happiness, or 
better states of mental health for the religiously unaffiliated.  This ignores the positive effects 
associated with belonging (socialization/identifying with) and beliefs. 
When compared to lowest levels of attendance, there were no differences between 
Christians and the unaffiliated in levels of self-rated health or overall satisfaction with life; 
however, more frequent attendance increased self-rated health and satisfaction with life among 
Christians whereas high levels of attendance had a subsequent negative effect on self-rated 
health and satisfaction with life among the religiously unaffiliated.  When attending church at the 
higher frequency (once a week), those identifying as Christian experienced higher levels of self-
rated health and satisfaction with life than those that identified as unaffiliated.99 This further 
indicates religious affiliation influences one's quality of life, negatively or positively.   
Nonetheless, this subsequently could negate the assumption that attracting the 
unaffiliated to religious events and services is the answer to the current rise of the Nones since a 
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large number of Nones report their last experience in a religious service, not including wedding 
or funeral services, was largely positive.100  In fact, contrary to the “seeker” movement of the late 
Twentieth Century, it is important to note that religious Nones are in fact not seeking to join a 
religious organization. The overwhelming majority, 93%, report they are not actively seeking or 
interested in joining a religious organization or church that would be right for them.101  Even 
among those Nones to whom religion is still important in their lives very few are actively 
interested in seeking to find a religious organization or church that is right for them.102 
Interestingly, a higher level of certainty in one's belief system is associated with greater 
psychological health.103 A claim that is also supported by Baylor’s 2011 Values and Beliefs 
survey where it was shown that what individuals believe affects mental health more than 
religious activity and affiliation (Behaving and Belonging).  Though, those respondents that 
attended religious services multiple times each week had the fewest number of mental health 
issues,104 supporting the hypothesis illustrating a possible correlation that certainty of belief 
increases religious affiliation via religious socialization (attendance).  
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Research Problem and Thesis 
Johnson provides a simplistic formula for calculating and predicting religious affiliation 
locally and globally.  By suggesting the measures of births minus deaths, converts minus 
defectors, and immigrants minus emigrants, he relies heavily on the supposition that the causes 
of current and future populations of religious and irreligious communities can be determined by 
measuring empirical population data.105 In other words, he suggests changes over time in 
religious affiliation can be measured by examining the empirical data sets just mentioned; 
however, this does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the rapid increase in the number of 
religiously unaffiliated among Americans 30 years old and younger as this population is having 
fewer children than those generational cohorts before them.  
Each successive birth cohort is less intensely religious than the one before, and there is 
little sign of people becoming more intensely religious with age or over time.106 Brauer suggests 
the reason for a lessening religiosity from one generational cohort to the next is, “not primarily 
the result of the diminishing size of the moderately religious...Rather, the highly religious make 
up increasingly small proportions of each subsequent cohort, while the proportion that is 
moderately religious has actually increased substantially across cohorts.”107 
Voas and Chaves also argue the rising numbers of religiously unaffiliated result from 
younger generations replacing older, more traditionally religious ones; however, that is not the 
entire story. The data suggest that Americans are becoming less religious across generations.  
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Something more than cohort change is responsible for the overall trend leading others to return 
the very important question, 
Is religious decline inevitable and irreversible? If there is no expectation that the process 
and the mechanisms underlying it will be disrupted, further religious decline is not only 
theoretically possible but highly plausible. However, the existence of processes that 
slowly weaken religious convictions does not preclude the possibility of strong 
counteracting forces. Certainly, U.S. history provides many examples of religious 
revivals and mobilization.108  
 
So, for example, even if the conditions that enable religious decline remain (making 
decline inevitable), religious revivals may effectively undo many decades of slow decline. In 
contrast, Voas and Chaves provide a helpful metaphor comparing the current decline of religion 
in America to a cooling bathtub.  While one may continue to add hot water, and while the water 
may get warmer, those efforts do not curb the cooling process.109 What is important for the 
Evangelical Church in particular, if it is to have any hope of existing (minimally) or thriving 
(ideally) in America, Brauer urges that unless “we understand the nature of the water heater and 
the person turning on the faucet, we are left with significant unknowns about how long the bath 
will remain comfortable.”110 
With over sixty percent of Protestant churches in America experiencing either plateaued 
or declining numbers, the ineffectiveness or outright inattention to evangelistic efforts is 
magnified by the aggressive growth of the Nones population;111 therefore, this dissertation 
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project seeks to answer one central question related to the current increase in the number of 
Americans identifying as religiously unaffiliated: Are there identifiable religious resurgence 
mechanisms in American religious history that address the current rise of the Nones and if 
initiated would facilitate future religious resurgence?   
Research Gap 
Perhaps the most significant research currently underway regarding understanding 
unbelief and religious unaffiliation is being conducted by the John Templeton Foundation. From 
January 2017 to September 2019 a research team is completing a nearly $2.9 million grant 
investigating the causes of unbelief and atheism around the world aiming to better understand the 
phenomenon that is associated with the word un-belief whether that’s atheism, agnosticism, the 
religious Nones; those individuals without religious identification.  The project is less about what 
these individuals  believe in particular.  Instead, the project is aimed at providing an analysis of 
the current None population, globally.112  It is clear Nones are a heterogeneous group consisting 
of nuances that have yet to be identified and researched.  While some research exists that 
provides broad sub-categories of religious identifiers and degrees of affiliation such as PRRI’s 
Rejectionist, Apatheist, and Unattached believers to more general classifications of agnostic, 
weak and strong atheists, etc. The lack of granular-level research into the nuances in causes of 
belief, or lack thereof, is a primary impetus for the currently underway Templeton project on 
Understanding Unbelief.  The research will culminate in September 2019 for the 50th 
anniversary of the Vatican’s 1969 conference, Culture of Unbelief.  
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Prior to the current research project on Understanding Unbelief, The Templeton 
Foundation initiated a yearlong study from October 2015 to December 2016 to conduct the 
Scientific Study of Non-Religious Belief to map non-religious belief.  This global research 
project had as its aim to establish the study of ‘non-religion’ as a major sub-field in the 
psychological and social sciences.”  However, in investigating how belief and unbelief is 
psychologically structured, the Scientific Study of Non-Religious Belief project has not provided 
insight nor direction for what is needed for a future resurgence of religion.113  
The recent focus on the rise of the Nones has led to coining new categories of religious 
identification such as spiritual but not religious, committed atheists, disaffiliated, nonverts, etc. 
providing a host of newly coined identifiers for a sociological phenomenon. But, most reporting 
and texts regarding religious affiliation and the rise of the Nones discuss the current state of 
affairs regarding the decline of religion in America in general and the rapid decline of mainline 
and Evangelical Christianity in America specifically.  Little-to-no space has been devoted to 
comparing and contrasting the causes of the current surge of religious unaffiliation and 
comparing those with potentially similar causes throughout the history of American Evangelical 
expressions of Christianity for the expressed purpose of identifying common causes for a surge 
in religious unaffiliation and the mechanisms that inaugurate a resurgence of belief in 
Christianity among the American population.  It is the lack of scholarly investigation regarding 
the causes of previous periods of religious disinterest/unaffiliation and comparing those with the 
current American religious situation that magnifies the need for this dissertation project.    
The lack of academic treatments produces a specific set of research questions that can be 
addressed and a treatment provided by weaving a hypothesis together from seeking the discovery 
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of mechanisms that can facilitate future religious resurgence in America. The primary hypothesis 
of this project suggests there are identifiable markers in the history of the American church 
regarding primacy of prayer, sermon content, evangelistic focus, intentional discipleship, etc. and 
surrounding culture regarding secularism, economy, politics, etc. that caused both periods of 
disinterest in religion and precipitated surges in interest in Evangelical expressions of 
Christianity.  Have those identifiable mechanisms preceded the current rise of the Nones and 
how present are those mechanisms of resurgence in the American Evangelical church today? 
Statement of Limitations 
Due to the relative recency of the Nones phenomenon there have been few academic 
treatments which provides the most significant limitation of this project.  The resulting lack of 
substantial, academic treatment of the phenomenon requires this project to draw from, 
incorporate, and supplement existing sources with news articles, surveys, polls, etc. to illustrate 
the recent evolution of religious adherence while consulting historical works of the religious 
history of the American people for the prospect of highlighting the potential cyclical nature of 
American religiosity.  
Moreover, this project does not investigate a comparison of the rapid religious decline of 
the United Kingdom to what is occurring in the United States.  As briefly discussed above, there 
are several that suggest America is following a similar trajectory as that of the United Kingdom, 
suggesting there could be the potential for significant predictions for the future religious 
landscape of the US and insights regarding the causes and remedies for the current rapid decline 
in those who identify as Christian.114   
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Certainly there are socio-economic and psychological factors that significantly influence 
the causes of unbelief; however, the scope and aim of this project prevents the implications of 
these influences from being fully investigated apart from the brief discussion of socio-economic 
theories influencing the rise of the Nones in the United States in Chapter 4.  
 
Review Of Relevant Research 
Robert Wuthnow’s The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since 
World War II115  is first in a four-volume treatment by Princeton that addresses the relationship 
between church and state. Though the work was published before there was a recognizable 
increase in religious unaffiliation in America, the work still provides substantial insights 
regarding the already-present shifts occurring in the religious landscape.  This work consistently 
confirms throughout that religion in America is persistent, and though it is being restructured to 
be experienced in a more privatized instead of corporate context, it will not soon disappear.  
Importantly, Restructuring addresses what Wuthnow calls the “education gap” between 
religious conservatives and liberals that began to appear during the 60s “as a result of baby 
boomers' experiences with higher education during the counterculture unrest; however, it also 
traced the rising levels of education of Evangelicals and suggested that the ‘education gap’ might 
be of limited duration.”116 Something Wuthnow further confirms from his research in Further 
Evidence, specifically that the “educational differences between religious liberals and 
conservatives appear to have diminished during the late 1980s.”117  
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Wuthnow provides an update to his 1988 text in his Sociological Inquiry article118 where 
he provides updated empirical evidence that further substantiates his primary arguments in 
Restructuring American Religion. In his interest to “see whether the main arguments advanced in 
Restructuring need to be modified or whether they are still supported by the evidence,”119 he 
concludes that the primary arguments that religion was positioned “to be deeply influenced by 
changes in its social environment” in a post-World War II America still hold true and are 
supported by the dramatically changing political and social context.  
The concept of religious socialization was not addressed in Restructuring but Wuthnow’s 
updated research in Further Evidence purposefully investigated the statistical significance of the 
familial influence on one’s religious affiliation and beliefs. Wuthnow’s analysis led him to 
confidently conclude that “one important way in which religious orientations have become 
institutionalized is family.”120  
 Part two of the Princeton Church-State series is provided by Robert T. Handy aptly titled 
Undermined Establishment: Church-State Relations in America, 1880-1920121 describes this as 
the period where the “informal” establishment of Protestantism began to markedly decline in the 
American context. In purposefully employing the term “establishment” as that entity that 
executes the leading role in determining and controlling the public agenda Handy is able to hint 
at the force with which mainstream Protestantism was able to influence the American public 
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agenda; the term as a nod to the force with which the State Church of England was able to shape 
a nation.  
Handy provides useful markers for possible causations of the decline of Protestantism 
during this time, which can inform and guide the investigation of previous periods of American 
religious history.  Citing significant population growth, an increasing religious pluralism, the 
growth of the Catholic Church, and the development of schisms within Protestantism as possible 
fault lines within the religious landscape that would only continue to widen.  Prior to the 60s and 
the election of Kennedy, what Handy concludes was the final end to the Protestant establishment, 
the majority of Protestant leaders had a favorable opinion of the state with the three Presidents 
Handy discusses (McKinley, Roosevelt, Harrison) approving of Protestant activities and 
beliefs.122  
Mark Chaves, in his American Religion: Contemporary Trends,123 traces changes 
occurring in religion in the United States between 1972 and 2008 primarily leveraging General 
Social Survey data and National Congregations Study (NCS) data secondarily. Chaves suggests 
the results do strike a balance between “the twin dangers of overstating and understating recent 
changes.”124 He quickly acknowledges that the process of cultural change is very slow and as 
such sociologists of religion and those that would study the American religious landscape are 
best served by taking the “longer view” where more significant change(s) can be observed and 
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identified.  His primary argument for the rapid increase of Nones being a  “backlash to the 
religious right's rising visibility in the 1980s.”125 will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
Chaves outlines his examination of religion (primarily Christianity) in American life in 
several significant areas126 with the primary aim being to describe the American religious trends 
in these areas over the past several decades with no purpose to explain these for the reader.  
Largely, Chaves’ findings illustrate an American religious landscape that has fluctuated, 
positively or negatively, very little since the earliest 1972 General Social Survey data, but his 
conclusion points “to a straightforward general conclusion: American religiosity has been 
declining for decades.”127 With every indicator of traditional religious belief is either stable or 
declining, and most are declining. The trend is toward less religion.”128  Though the decline is 
very slow;129 however, the decline has been so slow that it is necessary for the researcher to 
examine larger periods of history and data to be able to perceive fluctuations in the ebb and flow 
of American religiosity. Launching from this point, and what is of great relevance to this study is 
leveraging the descriptive outlines Chaves provides from data as recent as 2008 and what has 
happened since regarding the more rapid increase of those identifying as religiously unaffiliated.  
Seeking to dismiss the secular vs religious dichotomy that has for so long existed, Baker 
and Smith argue in their American Secularism: Cultural Contours of Nonreligious Belief 
                                               
125 Ibid., 20. 
 
126 Racial, ethnic, and religious diversity among religious affiliates and within congregations, changes in 
religious beliefs, public religious involvement, congregational demographics, beliefs regarding religious leaders, the 
declining membership of liberal Protestant denominations, and political and religious polarization in the American 
public.   
 
127 Chaves, American Religion: Contemporary Trends, 117. 
 
128 Ibid., 117-118. 
 
129 Ibid., 118. 
 
34 
Systems130 that there are several different types and shades of secularity and each has a nuanced 
relationship with religion.131  By leveraging GSS data from 1972 to 2012 and 2007 Pew 
Research data as a quantitative foundation, the text is able to establish the complexity of 
American secularity by providing three useful dimensions of secularity (affiliation, belief, and 
practices) that serve as delimiting scope for providing four categories of the non-religious 
(atheists, agnostics, non-religious believers, and culturally religious). The incorporation of both 
survey and interview data provides this treatment of the current state of American secularity a 
more qualitative feel. Regarding potential causes for the current state of nonreligious belief in 
America, Baker and Smith attribute this change in the American religious landscape to shifts in 
the political meanings of religion in American culture; arguing that the rate of secularity has 
increased since the 1970s due to changes in the family structure and due to the politics of 
religion.  
Locating Self As Researcher 
An imperative step in the qualitative phenomenological approach to research is 
bracketing out or identifying the researchers presuppositions and bias regarding the phenomenon 
being research.132 To explicate the significance of identifying and acknowledging the 
researcher’s bias, Wendy Sword outlines that “In a qualitative study, the researcher’s curiosity, 
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relationships with participants, and conceptual lenses through which data are gathered and 
interpreted have significant bearing on the research.” and “Reflection on the influence of self not 
only creates personal awareness of how the research is shaped by one’s own biography but also 
provides a context within which audiences can more fully understand the researcher’s 
interpretation of text data.”133  
Starbuck advocates that researchers “should both challenge their own thinking by 
disrupting their preconceptions and try to demonstrate the validity of their knowledge by 
observing natural experiments and by displacing situations from equilibria.”134 
As this project examines the religiously unaffiliated, who largely are highly educated, 
white, male, and votes Democrat,135 this researcher can similarly be considered as a highly 
educated, white, male, albeit more conservative and voting Republican. Political affiliation is of 
little interest to this author as the conviction exists that the Church is the medium of hope for 
humanity rather than a robust support and relief system developed and provided by a national 
governmental structure.   
Concerning those who have disaffiliated from their childhood faith due to negative 
experiences with the church, this author can also empathize.  Being initially reared in a secular 
home during early childhood then experiencing a familial conversion to a fundamentalist 
expression of Christianity in the southern United States, this experience encouraged the author to 
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be dedicated to the pursuit of Christian ministry in late 1999.  These experiences have provided 
this author with a valuable familiarity that will assist in the interpretation of the material being 
presented in the research.  
The theories that are generated regarding the mechanisms of resurgence will be allowed 
to emerge, as naturally as possible, from the research. As Sword agrees, this familiarity not only 
provides the researcher “a priori familiarity with relevant issues but also,” enhances the 
researcher’s “ability to make sense of the data.”136 
What has it been, precisely, that has prevented persistence in that childhood faith, and 
perhaps more importantly for this study, what needs to happen with(in) the American church to 
prevent further apostasy and initiate a period of resurgence of Evangelical American Christian 
affiliation? 
In looking to accomplish this qualitative endeavor, this author is seeking to collect and 
interpret data, (both qualitative and quantitative), and evaluate prominent periods of American 
Christianity for the aim of confirming or disproving that there are identifiable mechanisms in 
significant periods of the history of American Christianity that have sparked resurgence of 
Christian affiliation and commitment out of periods of languishing unbelief.  
 
Research Approach 
As it is detailed in the Research Gap section above, there are several substantial 
published works and global research projects currently underway that are purposefully aimed at 
illustrating the reason(s) why individuals (Americans specifically) are choosing to select “None 
of the above” on national surveys.  This project intends to investigate and analyze the ebb and 
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flow of religious affiliation throughout significant periods of American religious history.  Those 
periods that could be considered to be characterized by significantly high and low levels of 
Christian affiliation will be evaluated for the purpose of identifying mechanisms that may have 
instigated periods of unaffiliation and sparked periods of religious resurgence.  Comparing and 
contrasting historical mechanisms for resurgence can assist in highlighting and outlining certain 
cultural continuities that may help the Twenty-first Century church strategically implement these 
mechanisms in their respective demographic and geographical contexts.  
This necessitates a primarily phenomenological assessment.  As such this project does 
not focus extensively on answering the “why” of the recent surge in religious unaffiliation.  The 
aim of this dissertation is to provide a robust qualitative treatment of a recent American religious 
phenomenon. To accomplish this aim, the research that follows will make use of data which are 
drawn from several national surveys.137 Additionally, historical material supplied by surveys and 
reports which provide the most recent quantitative statistics regarding American religious beliefs, 
affiliation, etc.  Works of history which outline the ebbs and flows of American religiosity will 
also be highly utilized to identify those apparent periods of high and low religious affiliation, 
interest, and belief.   
Writing before the invention of the internet but reflecting the necessity of evolving 
approaches to scholarship concerning the study of religion, Wuthnow states to accurately 
“understand the active role of religion in the culture...requires the insights not only of 
historians...but also of sociologists and anthropologists.”138  Thus, this project will rely heavily 
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and draw upon historical studies, empirical data, and sociological publications that illustrate the 
nuances of the current religious landscape in America.  
The resulting analysis derived from this investigative approach provides the 
comprehensive descriptions, which then provide the basis for a reflective structural analysis to 
portray the essence of the American Christian affiliation as it has been experienced historically, 
contrasted with how it is currently being experienced.  This historical comparative analysis 
provides the insights that will inform the conclusions and recommendations for the contemporary 
American Christian church.  
Research Method 
The majority of research that has been conducted recently regarding religious affiliation 
and the shifting landscape of American religiosity primarily employs quantitative methodologies.  
Therefore, to assist in filling a gap in the current research, this study will consider and 
incorporate quantitative conclusions in order to provide a more robust qualitative 
phenomenological approach aimed at analyzing the narrative of American religion generally and 
the recent surge in religious unaffiliation as it affects American Christianity particularly.  As 
detailed above, this narrative of the landscape of Christianity in America will be built from 
investigation and analysis of quantitative survey data as well as works of history, sociology, 
anthropology, and psychology.  
Yin substantiates the value of a qualitative methodology allowing the method to more 
effectively provide needed insights into particular phenomena:  
By now, qualitative research has become an acceptable, if not mainstream, form of 
research in many different academic and professional fields. As a result, the large number 
of students and scholars who conduct qualitative studies may be part of different social 
science disciplines (e.g., sociology, anthropology, political science, or psychology) or 
different professions (e.g., education, management, nursing, urban planning, and program 
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evaluation). In any of these fields, qualitative research represents an attractive and fruitful 
way of doing research. 139 
 
Since the investigation of possible mechanisms of religious affiliation involves analysis 
of beliefs and experiences, a phenomenological approach ensures the aim of this project is met. 
Smith provides a useful definition that illustrates the relevance of this approach by explaining 
phenomenology as, “the study of structures of experience.... Literally, phenomenology is the 
study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or 
the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience.”140  The 
phenomenological methodology is especially “powerful for understanding subjective experience, 
gaining insights into people’s motivations and actions, and cutting through the clutter of taken-
for-granted assumptions and conventional wisdom.”141 A “pure phenomenological research seeks 
essentially to describe rather than explain, and to start from a perspective free from hypotheses or 
preconceptions.”142 More specifically, “Phenomenology searches for the meaning or essence of 
an experience rather than measurements or explanations.”143 Since qualitative phenomenology 
searches for the meaning or essence of an experience rather than measurements or explanations, 
leveraging this method will allow the research to focus more holistically on what is experienced 
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as it relates to religious affiliation.  This type of research necessarily approaches the 
experience(s) holistically instead of limiting the focus to examining individual nuances.   
To assist in safeguarding the integrity of the conclusions provided in this project, four 
phenomenological method steps will be followed throughout the study.  Bracketing, or 
epoche’,144 “is important to phenomenological reduction, which is the process of isolating the 
phenomenon being researched and separating it from what is already known about it.”145 All 
judgments are to be suspended and the only thing to be considered is how people, cultures, etc., 
are experiencing the phenomenon in their individual or collective consciousness(es).  Next, the 
researcher is required to fully immerse themselves in the study of the phenomenon so the 
meaning(s) of the phenomenon can be mined to achieve the third guiding principle of analysis 
for the purpose of categorizing and defining common themes. The final step of describing, or 
concluding, allows the researcher to assimilate his or her research findings into definitions of the 
phenomenon that allow for an intuitive recommendation for a better way forward.  
Lester proposes the inclusion of three sections, which will be incorporated below, for 
substantially reporting findings in a phenomenological approach to aid in providing applicable 
recommendations for responding to the continuing increase in religious unaffiliation and the 
American Evangelical church incorporating and/or initiating the mechanisms of a new religious 
resurgence. Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 will rely on these three sections by following the proposed 
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structure of providing a summary of the findings in the previous Chapter, e.g., Chapter 3 will 
identify and summarize the findings or mechanisms ascertained from the historical survey 
provided in Chapter 2. Then a discussion for the purpose of “relating the findings to previous 
research or commentary, to personal experience or even to common-sense opinions, and 
developing tentative theories.”146 will be provided.  Finally, the implications or recommendations 
will be established which are birthed from the previous two steps.  This final section will allow 
the author to identify significant implications and provide useful recommendations on a way 
forward for the American Evangelical church in light of the current cultural/religious context.147  
In each chapter, this project capitalizes on the benefits of qualitative research Yin outlines 
regarding qualitative research methodology by first, studying the meaning of people’s lives 
under real-world conditions. Second, representing the views and perspectives of the people in the 
study. Third, covering the contextual conditions within which people live. Fourth, contributing 
insights into existing or emerging concepts that may help to explain human social behavior.  
Finally, striving to use multiple sources of evidence rather than relying on a single source 
alone.148  
As with any research method, this approach is not without potential concern which this 
heed and navigates.  In discussing potential concerns with a phenomenological approach, Lester 
compares a potential obstacle with a contrasting value in stating:  
Phenomenological approaches are good at surfacing deep issues and making voices 
heard. This is not always comfortable for clients or funders, particularly when the 
research exposes taken for-granted assumptions or challenges a comfortable status quo. 
On the other hand, many organisations value the insights which a phenomenological 
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approach can bring in terms of cutting through taken-for-granted assumptions, prompting 
action or challenging complacency.149  
 
It is the latter, potential value, for which this current work aims. Specifically, Chapter 5 
will be devoted to sewing together the mechanisms of religious resurgence identified in Chapter 
3 with a comparison of the current dire religious landscape in order to challenge taken-for-
granted assumptions with the hope of prompting action and challenging, with heartbreaking 
immediacy, the current ineffectiveness of the American church.  An additional characteristic of a 
phenomenological methodology that may be perceived as a weakness is that it “differs from 
other research in that it does not test a hypothesis, nor is there an expectation that the results 
predictive or reproducible,” which calls into question the strength of the conclusions provided, 
but the apparent value of this lack of expectation of finality as it relates to the topic leverages the 
approach to serve as a launching point for further discussion, investigation, discussion, and 
action for the American Evangelical church. 
This method will be executed in the following manner throughout the following 
dissertation. This work will consist of five chapters aimed at analyzing the current rapid increase 
in religious unaffiliation among American Christians in general and American Evangelical 
Christians specifically and comparing and contrasting it with other periods of religious flux 
throughout American history.  
To provide this analysis, Chapter 1 will serve as an intensive introduction to the project’s 
topic and will consist of the project proposal components providing the thesis, review of relevant 
literature, criteria, research approach and methods, limitations, and conclusion.  Resultantly, the 
absence of a thorough comparison of the current American religious landscape to other periods 
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in the history of the American church where there may have been similar, if not greater, periods 
of religious unaffiliation has created a ripe environment for this project to accomplish much in 
the way of correcting a  The end goal of this work is to initiate the discussion regarding the 
mechanisms that have caused surges in unbelief historically and resurgence of religiosity 
historically and how those mechanisms can be employed by the contemporary American 
Evangelical church. 
After 2000, data from the General Social Survey suggest that the prior trends of 
converging beliefs between Nones and the affiliated began to “reverse or stagnate”150  History 
indicates an individual’s relationship with religion evolves over time and does not necessarily 
change in an instant.151 Therefore, and logically following from this introduction to and an 
outline of the research problem, Chapter 2 will provide a survey of the history of American 
religiosity for the purpose of highlighting in Chapter 3 those mechanisms that have caused the 
intense pendulum swinging from ardent religious belief and apathetic religious indifference. It 
has been stated that the lack of affiliation with organized religion may ultimately have led to a 
loss of faith among the unaffiliated.152 Therefore it is assumed there are identifiable mechanisms 
that have triggered religious affiliation, positively and negatively, and the historical examination 
provided in Chapter 2 will feed the analysis conducted in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 will have as its goal to identify the historical causes of disaffiliation and causes 
of resurgence in American Christianity for the purpose of extrapolating principles from these 
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causes of resurgence uncovered in Chapter 2. The goal of Chapter 3 is to identify common 
themes in the lived experience of American religious affiliation.  
Following the discussion regarding historical religious affiliation in America, Chapter 4 
turns to provide a thorough inquiry into the specific peculiarities of the current state of American 
Christianity.  There will be a qualifying of popular theories regarding the causes of the current 
rise of the Nones to further remove chaff and specifically highlight those features that relate to 
similar historical characteristics of the religiously unaffiliated.  
Through providing a thorough investigation of the current American religious landscape, 
Chapter 4 sets the stage for an identification of significant implications mined from Chapter 3 
and provide useful recommendations on a way forward for the American Evangelical church in 
light of the current cultural/religious context provided in Chapter 4.153  
Chapter 5 is concerned with the possibilities of American Evangelical churches initiating 
the historical mechanisms that have birthed periods of religious resurgence.  How these 
mechanisms were executed in the past and how they might be adapted and employed in the 
current American religious context are the primary questions answered in the final chapter of this 
project.  
Criteria And Definition Of Terms 
Unaffiliated vs None - Throughout this project the term “None” will be employed to indicate 
those who self-identify as having no religious identification.  After evaluating American 
Religious Identification Survey data, Barry Kosmin,  founding director of the Institute for the 
Study of Secularism in Society and a professor at Trinity College, coined the term to serve as a 
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less offensive identifier than what this population had for so long been known by, “the others.”154  
The term Nones typically refers to those who do not affiliate with a religion on social surveys but 
within the religious concept of Nones there are two primary categories.  Within the population of 
those that identify as having no religion exists those who have no religious identification and as a 
result they choose “none” or “none of the above” on social surveys. These are referred to as non-
affiliates.  The second subgroup are those who choose to not identify with a religion are doing so 
to make a statement of sorts.   
 It is important to note within this definition of Nones that neither the term nor their 
choice to not identify does not necessarily reflect on their religious beliefs, theistic views, etc.  It 
is imperative to avoid the assumption that Nones are unbelievers; simply agnostic or atheist.  
Though there is a growing number of agnostics and atheists in the Nones category they still 
comprise a significantly small number of the Nones population.  As outlined below, Chapter 3 
will provide an investigation into the similarities of historical periods of fluctuation in religious 
affiliation.  
Spiritual but not Religious - While Nones and those that have been identified as “spiritual but 
not religious” are occasionally referred to as being synonymous, the two populations are similar 
yet very distinct in that the Nones are identified as those individuals who have chosen “none of 
the above” or “nothing in particular” in religious identification surveys. The spiritual but not 
religious population consists of those individuals who, according to Pew Research, were asked 
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separate questions concerning their self-perception of their being a religious person and whether 
or not they considered themselves to be a spiritual person. The individuals who answered 
affirmatively to both questions are identified as the spiritual but not religious, a population that 
has dramatically grown to twenty seven percent of Americans.155 
Some research hints at demarcations within the None population that can potentially be 
used to categorize the whole.  The phrase “spiritual but not religious” has been used to identify 
varying population ranges within the None’s population. It will be beneficial to utilize the 
insightful delineations provided by the most recent definitions of these sub-categories within the 
Nones population provided by the Public Religion Research Institute where the survey found 
very “little evidence of a separate mode of ‘spirituality’ distinct from ‘religiosity.’”156  The 
Public Religion Research Institute indicates roughly forty percent of Nones consider themselves 
very or moderately spiritual.  Insightful and relevant for the purpose of this project is the finding 
that those Nones categorized as Unattached Believers seventy one percent moderately 
spiritual.157 Unless otherwise noted, throughout this study the generalization “spiritual but not 
religious” will be used to indicate the sub-category of Nones who are defined as Unattached 
Believers and hold similar beliefs as those who are affiliated but do not identify with a 
religion.158   
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To clearly illustrate the concepts of religiously unaffiliated and spiritual, but not religious 
are not synonymous but not entirely divorced from one another, only thirty seven percent of 
those identifying as spiritual but not religious are Nones.159 
Disaffiliation, Deconversion/Nonversion and Never Affiliated - Deconverts and Nonverts160 
are identified as those individuals who were raised in a household characterized by religious 
affiliation or were religiously affiliated at one time and chose to no longer identify with that 
religion.  It be beneficial to delineate the unaffiliated into those who disaffiliated from a religious 
background and those who were never affiliated in the first place. What seems to differentiate 
these groups is not belief but rather a taste for certain religious practices. Unsurprisingly, those 
raised in a religious home have a greater taste for continuing their religious practices even after 
disaffiliation.161  As the term nonvert signifies those that were brought up in a religious tradition 
but drifted away, similarly nonversion is synonymous with deconversion and disaffiliation which 
describes the process of apostatizing from that religious tradition.162  
Secularism and Secularization Theory - In its most basic form, the secularization thesis posits 
“the idea that modernization tends to undermine religious belief and activity.”163 In arguing for 
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the positive influence of modernization on individual’s converting to Christianity in the majority 
world context, Rizvi and Hossain suggest, “theories point to the consequences of modernization 
in initiating processes of religious conversion.” A thesis that is directly contrary to traditional 
secularization theory, especially as it relates to religious affiliation in America, which 
fundamentally proposes the process of modernization/secularization directly correlates to a 
decline in religious affiliation; however, Voas and Chaves suggest,  
the United States should not be considered a counterexample for two straightforward 
empirical reasons. First, American religiosity has in fact been declining for decades, and 
second, that decline has been produced by the same generational patterns that lie behind 
religious decline elsewhere in the West where each successive cohort is less religious 
than the preceding one.164   
 
Therefore, the concept of secularism and secularization theory will assume the idea of 
modernization of a society necessarily leads to a lessening value of religion in that society.  
Church - Christianity is not dying, but it is experiencing a seismic shift in how it is expressed. 
One major redefinition occurring is regarding where, or what, the church is. With churches 
closing at record pace,165 American Christianity appears to be departing from traditional notions 
of the church being intimately associated with a building, property, and the accompanying 
overhead is now being perceived as an unnecessary anchor that has been and is preventing the 
world from seeing the relevancy of the Christian faith.  
There is great power in the grassroots nature of early Christendom when churches met 
from house to house and in public spaces.  It is when churches became established institutions 
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that their effectiveness dwindled and confined within the four walls.166 Therefore for clarity, the 
term “church” will be used to reflect the definition of church as defined by the Augsburg 
Confession as the “assembly of all believers among whom the gospel is preached in its purity 
and the holy sacraments167 are administered according to the gospel.” and as not referring to a 
building, physical location of gathering, etc. unless otherwise noted.  
Protestant - a demarcation indicating those churches and Christian believers identifying with the 
rich heritage of the Sixteenth Century Protestant Reformation which holds “Protestantism is an 
appeal to God in Christ, to Holy Scripture and to the primitive Church, against all degeneration 
and apostasy.”168 
Evangelical - With growing religious pluralism, denominational disaffiliation, and a decline in 
those that identify as Evangelical a standard definition of what serves as demarcations of an 
Evangelical expressions of Christianity can still be established on the grounds of a few integral 
beliefs. It is imperative this term and the beliefs associated with it be clearly defined at the outset 
of this project as it will serve as the lense through which suggestions for future resurgence will 
be proposed. As such, throughout this project “Evangelical” is defined using the National 
Association of Evangelicals (NAE) LifeWay Research Evangelical Beliefs Research Definition 
based on respondent beliefs. To be considered Evangelical by the NAE LifeWay Research 
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standard, individuals must respond as strongly agreeing with the following four questions. 1) The 
Bible is the highest authority for what I believe. 2) It is very important for me personally to 
encourage non-Christians to trust Jesus Christ as their Savior. 3) Jesus Christ’s death on the cross 
is the only sacrifice that could remove the penalty of my sin. 4) Only those who trust Jesus Christ 
alone as Savior receive God’s free gift of eternal salvation.169 
Evangelical churches and those that identify as Evangelical are traditionally viewed as 
significantly more conservative than those Christians that identify with mainline 
denominations.170  
Resurgence vs Revival - Though the two terms, resurgence and revival, are oftentimes used 
synonymously, this project will employ the term resurgence to indicate an increase of religious 
affiliation in a society that is not necessarily marked by the characteristic emotionalism 
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associated with revivalism. And while revival can be identically synonymous with resurgence to 
mean the renewal or restoration of vitality after a state of depression.  The intentional use of 
resurgence is important so as to not create confusion regarding any bias related to the topic of 
revival, revivalism, or even fundamentalism.  
 To assist in delineating between the two similar terms, An increase or revival after a 
period of little activity, popularity, or occurrence.  Since Christianity in America is not dead, 
resurgence is employed to illustrate revitalization not necessarily resuscitation or resurrection 
from death. While revival is the act of or occurrence of reviving, resurgence is an instance of 
something resurging. It is a renewal of vigor, force, and effectiveness.  
Mainline Denomination - an inclusive term used to describe religious groups primarily with an 
European background and having been present in the United States since its colonial history. 
Once contributing to the American form of Christianity, they are now characterized as a 
declining element with little influence on society or culture. 
Chapter Summary 
Lower levels of religious affiliation reveal a weakening of the heart of the Evangelical 
position on evangelization and carrying out the Great Commission.171 The strength of the 
religiously unaffiliated conversion and retention rates further highlights the increasing 
ineffectiveness of Evangelical efforts to engage a culture that is becoming altogether 
disinterested in organized religion, exclusive truth claims, and the faith of their forefathers 
(parents).  
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As Chaves concludes, “It is difficult to see how the trends I have described could amount 
to good news for American religious institutions…” However, it is “good news for our 
increasingly pluralistic society.” 172  Given the current decline of Evangelical influence and the 
“bad news for religious institutions” one might conclude that efforts to reverse the rapid moving 
away from and privatization of religious beliefs are simply hoping against hope. Nonetheless, the 
confident expectation of this project is to confirm Rodney Stark’s and William Bainbridge’s 
hopeful prediction from three decades ago: “The vision of a religionless future is but illusion.”173 
The cultural context and what has transpired regarding religious affiliation and the strength of 
Evangelicalism is undoubtedly very different from when Stark and Bainbridge offered their 
conclusion. May what follows in each chapter of this project continue to confirm the accuracy of 
their conclusion and illuminate a principled way for the Evangelical church, with precise 
intentionality, dedicate time, energy, and resources to those activities, attitudes, and approaches 
that generated religious resurgence in other significant periods of American religious history. 
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CHAPTER 2 - SIGNIFICANT PERIODS OF BELIEF AND UNBELIEF IN AMERICAN 
CHRISTIANITY 
 
Introduction 
The national share of those that identify with a Protestant denomination has steadily 
declined, year over year, since Gallup began polling denominational preferences of Americans in 
1948. While those that identify with a form of Protestantism has continued to decline from 69% 
in 1948 to 35% in 2018, the share of those that identify with no religion (Nones) has steadily 
increased from 2% in 1948 to over 20% in 2017, with the sharpest increase developing during 
2005 to 2017; an increase of over 10% during that time period.174 These two religious categories 
show the sharpest decline (Protestants) and the most significant growth among all possible 
religious categories listed in the Gallup survey.  Additionally, significant are the 76% of all 
survey respondents concluding that religion is losing its influence in America; an all-time high, 
and an increase from 39% in 2001.175  
This chapter will provide a summative survey of the major religious periods in American 
history.  While there is an intersect with the mutual influence between religion and politics, the 
purpose of this chapter is not to provide an examination of that relationship nor for discussing the 
how or why of the relationship. It is clear in every period of American history, the presence or 
absence of Christian influence has had direct effect, positive and negative, on the trajectory of 
American culture. This fact led historian William Sweet to assert, “The attempt to appraise 
American culture apart from religion is a contradiction in itself, for culture has to do with the 
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moral and religious as well as the intellectual life of a society.”176 Just as the increase in Nones 
has a direct correlation to the diminishing share of the influence of Christianity upon current 
American culture (and politics), it is clear, however, that religion in general and the Christian 
faith specifically played an integral role in the early formation of the new American nation. “The 
missionary and religious purposes are obvious”177 in many of the earliest state constitutions 
which predate the signing of the Constitution of the United States on September 17, 1787.  The 
importance of religious freedom from an established church is couched in language that is 
preferential to Protestant forms of Christianity in these statements from early state 
constitutions:178  
Table 2.1 Founding State Constitutional Statements Regarding Religion 
 
State Statement Year 
Connecticut “It being the duty of all men to worship the Supreme Being, the great 
Creator and Preserver of the Universe... No person shall, by law, be 
compelled to join or support, nor be classed with any association to any 
congregation church or religious institution.” 
1776 
Delaware “Every citizen who should be chosen a member of either house of the 
legislature... Should be required to subscribe to the following declaration: 
– I do profess faith in God the father, and in the Lord Jesus Christ his 
only son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God and blessed forever more...” 
1776 
Georgia “All the members of the legislature shall be of the protestant religion.” 1777 
Maryland “It is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks 
most acceptable to him, all persons professing the Christian religion are 
equally entitled to protection in the religious liberty.” 
1776 
New 
Hampshire 
“That morality and piety, rightly grounded on evangelical principles, 
would give the best and greatest security to government, and would lay 
1784 
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in the hearts of men the strongest obligation to do subjection...” 
New Jersey “That all persons professing a belief in the faith of any Protestant sect, 
and who should demean himself peaceably under the government, should 
be capable of being elected into any office a profit or trust, or of being a 
member of either branch of the legislature.” 
1776 
New York “This convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of the 
good people of the state, ordain, determine, and declare that the free 
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without 
discrimination or preference shall forever hereafter be allowed within the 
state to all mankind.” 
1777 
North 
Carolina 
“No person who denying the being of a God was the truth of the 
protestant religion, or the divine authority of either the Old or New 
Testaments... should be capable of holding any office or place of trust in 
the civil government of the state.” 
1776 
Pennsylvani
a 
“every member of the legislature shall subscribe to the following 
declaration: I do believe in one God, the creator and governor of the 
universe the rewarder of the good, and the punisher of the wicked; and 
acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament is to be given 
by inspiration.” 
1776 
 
Instead of explicating the seemingly inseparable relationship and influence between 
American politics and religion (church and state), the aim in what follows is to build a 
framework of the periods of American history that showed evidence of significant interest in 
Christianity.  The content of this chapter will serve as the foundation upon which chapter 3 will 
build, and from which the principles regarding the rise and decline of interest in Evangelical 
forms of Christianity can be extracted.   
It is because religion has been woven into the fabric of the American nation that is what 
allows it to be traced as a steady undercurrent that has ebbed and flowed with each cultural turn.  
Guastad echoes the formative nature of religion evidenced from the very beginning of the nation 
and more recently an experience of increasing cultural disrepute in stating, “Religion was a 
powerful motive in exploration, a significant causal factor in much colonization, a partner in 
56 
territorial expansion and national cohesion...a veritable whirlwind of energies and contrary forces 
in the latter half of the twentieth century.”179 
Colonial America 
It was not yet a century after the Reformation, while the religious fervor produced therein 
was still hot, that England had set its heart on launching a successful colony in the New 
World.180  The London Company launched for the coast of Virginia at the beginning of 1607. It 
was a voyage with a heartfelt objective of the “propagation of the Christian religion” in the New 
World to those who “as yet live in darkness and miserable ignorance of the true knowledge and 
worship of God.”181  
Though the Jamestown settlement attempted to transplant and establish the Church of 
England into the infant colony, the progressive establishment of the King’s Church was as 
fragmented as the general health of the population.182  The interest in religion was high but the 
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lack of clergy that could effectively engage the large parishes along the James, York, and 
Rappahannock rivers relegated the parish churches to “both literally and figuratively at the edge 
rather than the center of community life in the seventeenth century.”183  The lacking number of 
clergy paired with poor wages and living conditions resulted in many clergy leaving the 
motherland for the New World as a means to escape “bad debts, unhappy marriages, unsavory 
reputations.”184  The severity of the increase in disreputable clergy was not only noticed but the 
ministerial debauchery caused the Virginia House of Burgess to decree in 1632:  
Ministers shall not give themselves to excess in drinking, or riot, spending their time idly 
by day or night playing dice, cards, or any other unlawful game; but they shall...occupy 
themselves with some honest study or exercise, always doing the things which shall 
appertain to honesty, and endeavor to profit the Church of God.185 
 
It wasn’t long after John Hammond lamented that the new colony of Virginia could only 
attract clergy who could “babble in a pulpit, roar in a tavern, exact from their parishioners, and 
by their dissoluteness destroy rather than feed their flocks,”186 that Roger Green in 1662 offered 
the idea of “Virginia Fellowships.”187 These fellowships would encourage the education of 
upstanding men in exchange for spending at least seven years in the new colony to positively 
affect the population.  An idea that never fully caught on until England began sending literature 
and clergy through the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and the Society for the 
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Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, respectively.188 The result of targeted efforts to 
educate qualified clergy and implant them in Virginia was a fruitful endeavor with the number of 
Anglican parishes increasing from thirty by the mid-seventeenth century to more than one 
hundred parishes by the mid-eighteenth century.189 The targeted efforts of educating worthy men 
to propagate the gospel was achieving the desired results in the New World.  
Although, at the time, Anglicanism was the state-protected religion there existed other 
young churches that were at odds with the formal liturgy of the Anglican Church and these 
churches were growing in influence due to their affinity for more Evangelical tendencies that 
encouraged a personal and passionate faith. The seventeenth century Puritans and Quakers gave 
way to the growing influence of Presbyterians, Baptists, and Methodists who expanded westward 
and settled in the foothills of Virginia and prepared the way for the First Great Awakening.190 
Presbyterians through the efforts of Samuel Davies led the efforts to spread 
Evangelicalism and saw significant success in reaching the African American population.  
Gaustad recounts a key to Davies’ success was that “Evangelical religion...made the gospel 
appear more accessible, more comprehensible, more emotionally satisfying.”191 When John 
Leland arrived in Virginia in 1776 he began work immediately in expanding the Baptist 
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denomination, and to the Anglican’s horror, many churches were established quickly where 
many women were assuming prominent leadership roles.192  
It was the rise of the Presbyterians and Baptists that fueled the push for legislation for 
religious freedom in the second half of the eighteenth century. The constant targeted persecution 
of Presbyterian and Baptist ministers by the oppressive laws that favored Anglicanism that 
resulted in the jailing of several men is what spurned James Madison’s political career in 
promulgating religious freedom.  According to Gaustad, “Madison was ready to make common 
cause with them and other dissenters who found themselves arrested and jailed for no reason 
other than the assertion of their religious opinions.”193 
On the heels of Baptists and Presbyterians, Methodists made the transition from England 
to the new nation and began to see equal success as a dissenting church. The movement birthed 
in England by brothers John and Charles Wesley, began as an effort to engage the laity to spread 
its message of improving personal piety and to reach that class of people who were “abandoning 
the National Church in ever larger numbers.”194 Once Methodism gained a foothold in Virginia, 
its Evangelical force led to its official break from the Church of England just a decade before the 
dawn of the nineteenth century.  
It was the gross, heavy-handed involvement of the English governmental system in the 
religious structure of the land which led to the eventual emigration of many seeking religious 
sanctuary in a new world.  This led to the establishment and rapid growth of dissenting 
denominations in the young colonies, which continued to seek ways to build credibility through 
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establishing institutions of higher learning for the rigorous training in critical thinking and 
religion and further distancing from any influence or support from the Church of England. 
Education was viewed as integral for the establishment of an enduring nation and for the vitality 
of a purer faith. The founding of institutions such as Harvard, Yale, and William and Mary 
further established these young colonies as viable and reputable with increasing independence of 
religious and educational influences from the Mother Country. The Anglican church that 
remained faithful to the Church of England experienced a sharp decline in influence and it’s 
evangelistic effectiveness waned as those dissenting denominations witnessed a continued rapid 
growth throughout the establishment of each new colony.195  
First Great Awakening196 1730-1745 
Chronologically, the first Great Awakening occurred prior to and stimulated the growth 
outlined in the preceding section, but it was the Great Awakening that not only ignited 
denominational growth, but the religious fervor ignited therein also fed the political agenda that 
contributed to the discussions which initiated the War for Independence from England. 
As Sweet notes, the Great Awakening not only added to church membership197 and 
increased the “practical influence” throughout the affected colonial regions, it “also sowed the 
seed of dissention and controversy,”198 which facilitated the war.  There were varying degrees of 
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division that resulted in the Presbyterian church, divisions between the Regular and Separate 
Baptists, there was the Dutch Reformed controversy and differences that spawned as a result of 
the conflict between Arminian and Calvinistic ideas. Even within Calvinistic schools of thought 
there were divisions between the Old Calvinists and the Edwardians. As a result of these internal 
schisms, Sweet writes, “Congregationalism was in a turmoil for more than a half century,”199 
following the Great Awakening. 
Formal education was a natural outgrowth of the Great Awakening for Protestant 
denominations since the three colleges (Harvard, William and Mary, Yale) that existed prior to 
the movement did not reflect the dissenting denominations’ orthopraxy.  It was during 
Whitefield’s 1740 tour that he lamented that at both Harvard and Yale “their light is now become 
darkness - darkness that may be felt; and is complained of by the most godly ministers.”200 
Simply due to a lack of strength to support such an endeavor these denominations (Baptist, 
Methodist, Presbyterians) were unable to establish colleges to train their ministers for the 
furtherance of the gospel; however, the Great Awakening provided the capital necessary to begin 
launching institutions of higher education for the formal training of individuals to be sent out as 
teachers and preachers for the purpose of spreading “the revival into new communities.”201 These 
denominations increased their strength by capitalizing on the fruits of the revived evangelistic 
interest by focusing time and energy on educational endeavors. As Sweet highlights, “Nowhere 
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did revivalism and education go more consistently hand in hand than among the New Side 
Presbyterians.”202   
Even more colleges were formed as a result of Whitefield’s influence in the latter years 
of the Great Awakening. It was Benjamin Franklin’s interest in Whitefield that led to the 
building of what became the College of Philadelphia and then later University of 
Pennsylvania.203 Additionally, it was Whitefield that influenced the forming of Dartmouth 
College and the College of New Jersey, both of which Sweet argues were “legitimate children of 
the revival.”204  Whitefield devoted considerable time and energy into establishing colleges as he 
saw them as the most effective vehicles for the promotion of the gospel. Another college that 
formed by Baptists as a result of the revival was established in Rhode Island (College of Rhode 
Island) in 1764,205 which is no surprise due to Roger Williams’ success in creating a religious 
refuge out of the colony.  Then, later Queen’s College formed in 1766 as a result of the growth 
of the Dutch Reformed Church during the revival. 
Formal education was not the only culturally transformative fruit born from the Great 
Awakening. There was also a “new missionary impulse”206 that rebirthed missional interest to 
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the Native Americans.  This revival of evangelistic and missionary zeal was evidenced in the 
New England Congregationalists and Presbyterians alike. Additionally, as a result of a growing 
adoption of the doctrine of general atonement207 the missionary zeal spread to reaching the 
African American population and the first anti-slavery inclinations grew out of Samuel Hopkins’ 
theology and preaching.208 
After the American Revolution, Founding Father and second president of the United 
States John Adams writes of the undeniable link between the growing religious fervor produced 
in the Great Awakening and the commencement of the Revolution when stating, “The revolution 
was effected before the War commenced. The Revolution was in the mind and hearts of the 
people: and change in their religious sentiments of their duties and obligations.”209 Historian Paul 
Johnson adds further clarification how it was the religious enthusiasm smoldering from the Great 
Awakening paired with political aims of independence from England that allowed both aims to 
succeed: 
It was the marriage between the rationalism of the American elites touched by the 
Enlightenment with the spirit of the Great Awakening among the masses, which enabled 
the popular enthusiasm thus aroused to be channeled into the political aims of the 
Revolution...Neither force could have succeeded without the other. The Revolution could 
not have taken place without this religious background.210 
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Though the intensification of religiosity reached a crescendo in 1740 with Whitefield’s 
tours and some denominations began to experience a plateauing of religious quickening, the 
abiding nature of the Awakening “was still powerful in parts of the country at the breaking out of 
the Revolutionary War.”211 
American Revolution 1765-1783 
So, it was the three-strand cord of Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians, paired with 
the political force of the American Revolution, that caused a concerted effort to severe ties that 
had for more than a century identified the new nation with the Church of England; however, 
preceding and in the mix of this, it was the Pilgrims, also known as Separatists, landing near 
Cape Cod in September 1620 that highlights the fundamental religious interest for leaving 
England and starting over in the New World that formed the foundation upon which the Baptists, 
Methodists, and Presbyterians could thrive.   
Initially, the Puritans retained a desire to remain a part of the Church of England.  They 
wanted to reflect a “purer part in a new England that would be able to demonstrate what a truly 
revitalized Church of England ought to be.”212  The Pilgrims on the other hand, chose schism 
from the Church of England and aimed to start anew in the New World. Nonetheless, both the 
Pilgrims and Puritans provide evidence that for many, religion was a primary reason for leaving 
England and of a deliberate effort to establish a pure church in the New World.  Gaustad 
articulates regarding the desire of these new religious efforts to provide an example that England 
would hopefully witness and adopt: 
They (the new citizens) came to prove that one could form a society so faithful, a church 
so cleansed, that even old England itself would be transformed by witnessing what 
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determined believers had managed to achieve many thousands of miles away. That was 
the vision to be steadily pursued, without weakening or wavering, without transgressing 
or backsliding, without forgetting that it is God who has made us and not we ourselves. 
We are his people, bound together with him in a solemn covenant.213 
 
It did not take long for the unmistakable differences between the Church of England and 
the new Puritans to become evident in both beliefs and practice.  Puritan John Cotton articulated 
the primary complaints against the Church of England which provided the foundation for the 
New England Way; complaints that paved the way for a redefinition of how the church would 
exist in a purer form in the New World.214   
The New England clergyman and advocate of religious freedom215, Roger Williams, in 
being exiled from New England for his dissenting216 arguments against the New England Way, 
founded the colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations.  This new colony “would be a 
haven for all dissenters, for persons of all shades of religious opinion, or of no religious opinion 
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at all.”217 It was Williams that helped found the earliest Baptist church in Providence.218  
Quakers also found safety in Rhode Island which allowed them to  increase their strength, along 
with many other denominations219 with which Cotton Mathers found quite appalling. Mather 
lamented that never before had there existed “such a variety of religions together on so small a 
spot of ground where one might find Antinomians, Anabaptists, Antisabbatarians, Arminians, 
Socinians, Quakers, Ranters - everything in the world but Roman Catholics and real 
Christians.”220 Further evidence that the establishment of early American colonies, especially as 
colonies expanded, were motivated by intense religious interests during a time where individuals 
and communities devoted considerable effort in establishing and nurturing a pure Christian 
church that was cleansed of the rigid and lifeless forms of the Church of England.  There was an 
intense desire, however varied, to establish a new nation that was from the very foundations built 
to seek the “guidance of scriptures in regulating all aspects of the lives of their citizens, where 
scripture was cited for many criminal statutes.”221 
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It was in 1792 that the Methodists were reportedly numbered approximately forty 
thousand. The denomination was growing at such a pace that Jedidiah Morse exclaimed “Their 
numbers are so various in different places, at different times, that it would be a matter of no 
small difficulty to find out their exact amount.”222 
Johnson illuminates the growing personalization of the Christian faith for the believers in 
the New World,  
Hence Americans never belonged to the religious category who seek certainty of doctrine 
and through clerical hierarchy...: most Americans... believe[d] that knowledge of God 
comes direct to them through the study of Holy Writ. They read the Bible for themselves, 
assiduously, daily.” Where “virtually every humble cabin in Massachusetts colony had its 
own Bible. Adults read it alone, silently. It was also read aloud among families, as well as 
in church, during Sunday morning service, which lasted from eight till twelve.223  
 
Methodists had grown with particular force in Maryland due to their concerted missionary efforts 
in reaching blacks and women, “utilizing both laity and clergy, employing devout women no less 
than zealous men.”224  Former slave turned Methodist minister, Richard Allen testified to the 
missionary effectiveness of the Methodists through their presentation of the gospel message for 
the common people in recounting, “The Methodists were the first people that brought glad 
tidings to the colored people. I feel thankful that ever I heard a Methodist preach...blacks were 
beholden to the Methodists, under God, for the light for the Gospel we enjoy; for all other 
denominations preached so high flown that we were not able to comprehend their doctrines.”225 
                                               
222 Edwin S. Gaustad and Mark A. Noll eds. A Documentary History of Religion in America to 1877, 
(Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans Publishing, Third Edition 2003), 290. Quoting Jedidiah Morse in American 
Geography 1789.  
 
223 Paul Johnson, A History of the American People, (New York, NY: HarperPerennial, 1998), 40. 
 
224 Gaustad and Noll eds. A Documentary History of Religion in America to 1877, 291. 
 
225 Richard Allen in Milton C. Sernett ed. African American Religious History: A Documentary Witness, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, Second Edition, 1999), 149. 
 
68 
Allen goes on to provide further confirmation of the Methodists’ success in preaching the gospel 
in a way that was accessible to everyone, 
I was confident that there was no religious sect or denomination would suit the capacity 
of the colored people as well as the Methodist; for the plain and simple gospel suits best 
for any people; for the unlearned can understand, and the learned are sure to understand; 
and the reason the Methodist is so successful in the awakening and conversion of the 
colored people, the plain doctrine of having a good discipline.226 
 
The Revolutionary Era eventually gave rise to a period of religious decline in America 
due to distraction and disruption.  The moderation of Christian zeal did not occur at the dawning 
of the War in 1765, but had been cooling for the two decades after the climax of the Great 
Awakening as Ahlstrom argues, “The long preoccupation of Americans with government and 
politics, not to mention with the war itself, raised immense problems for the churches, bringing 
on, among other things, a prolonged religious depression.”227  Ahlstrom highlights ways in which 
the church was affected during the Revolutionary Era that resulted in a significant decrease in its 
effectiveness and general depression of religious interest in America.  Primarily, the church, 
dissenters and high church alike, became distracted by the Revolutionary and Jeffersonian 
political environment.  The election of Jefferson brought with it the prominence of 
Enlightenment philosophy and resulted in the primacy of framing theological issues in more 
governmental ways which resulted in, as Ahlstrom calls it, “theological transformation.”228 This 
new political ethos that promoted natural theology and more secularized ways of interpreting the 
new American experience necessitated that the church respond accordingly with nearly every 
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denomination feeling the need to redefine how it engaged the culture.  Finally, the immediate 
opportunity for churches to grow during this new and uncertain time was a reality, but how they 
were to go about it in the context of increased religious freedom was the hard question not easily 
answered.229   
It is clear, the Revolutionary War affected the American church and initiated a period of 
religious decline and a transition in religious-political focus.  It was a critical period for each 
denomination because of its preoccupation with politics.  The church was so distressed during 
this period that Ahlstrom suggests that by the end of this era membership had diminished 
absolutely, “so that not more than one person in twenty or possibly one in ten seems to have been 
affiliated; in many churches membership itself became increasingly nominal.”230  To compound 
the problem of decreasing church membership and overall religious disinterest, there was a 
correlating reduction in new ministers being trained and deployed into churches to help rekindle 
the revival zeal that had long subsided.  The population of current ministers also dwindled as a 
result of the war as many either fled (their area or the country), became chaplains, some fought, 
which resulted in leaving their congregations with no theological or pastoral oversight.  No 
denomination was left unaffected, but it was the Church of England in America that experienced 
the most dramatic negative impact from the War.  Ahlstrom suggests more than seventy 
thousand Loyalists fled the country during and immediately following the War.231 While Noll 
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notes that when the War first began, “all of the Methodists missionaries except Francis Asbury 
returned to England.”232  
Nonetheless, evidence of the persistent nature of the Christian religion can be seen in a 
few denominations during the Revolutionary Era.  For the Baptists revival zeal persisted 
throughout the turmoil.  When compared to the years before the War to less than a decade after, 
the overall number of Baptist churches in the New England colonies increased significantly: 
Table 2.2 Growth in Number of New England Churches233 
Colony 1740 1790 
Connecticut 3 55 
Massachusetts 11 92 
Maine - 15 
New 
Hampshire 
- 32 
Rhode Island 11 38 
Vermont - 34 
TOTAL 25 266 
 
The New England colonies were not alone is witnessing significant growth among the 
Baptists during the War.  The southern states, still reaping harvests of a continued interest in 
revivalism, produced much fruit.  In 1790, Virginia had nearly as many Baptist churches (218) as 
all of New England.”234     
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The enduring nature of Christianity also became evident for the Methodists in the year 
following the conclusion of the American Revolution.235  In 1784 John Wesley implemented the 
Deed of Declaration, which cultivated an immediate interest in the renewal of the Methodist 
denomination in America, which Wesley referred to in his diary as “the desolate sheep in 
America.”236  The strategy to revitalize American Methodists hinged on the ordination of a large 
number of ministers.  Wesley logged his passion and belief in the strategy of ordaining and 
sending ministers into these anemic congregations as the most effective way to breathe new life 
into these people.  This newly concerted effort to restore the Methodist church in America and 
the continued multiplication of Baptist churches served as a precursor to the Second Great 
Awakening. 
Nearly every denomination, for the exception of the Anglican Church, experienced 
growth in the fifty years leading up to the Second Great Awakening: 
Table 2.3 Denominational Growth 1740-1790 
 
Denominational Growth 1740-1790 
Denomination 1740 1790 
Methodist 0 712 
Baptist 96 858 
Presbyterian 160 725 
Roman Catholic 27 65 
Congregational 423 750 
Anglican 246 170 
Lutheran 95 249 
Quaker 50 375 
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German 
Reformed 51 236 
Dutch Reformed 78 115 
Total 1256 4255 
 
2nd Great Awakening -1790-1840 
As a result of the war and the rational deism that seemed to be gaining a foothold in the 
recently victorious new nation, the church was desperate for renewed strength and vigor.  It was 
in 1790 that what has been called the “most influential revival of Christianity in the history of the 
United States,”237 the Second Great Awakening was birthed. While it was the Revolutionary 
Revival in New England that prepared the way for the Awakening,238 it was the western frontier 
that seemed to provide the most kindling for the movement.  Revival success in the frontier 
would carry this renewed religious enthusiasm that produced significant advance for 
Protestantism through the turn of and well into the new century until approximately 1840.239  It 
was the weakening of the American church, particularly in the New England colonies, as a result 
of the Revolutionary War created a fertile environment for the coming religious resurgence.240  
Sweet emphasizes the draining effect the War had on the church when he confirms, "In post-
Revolutionary America religious and moral conditions of the country as a whole reached the 
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lowest ebb tide in the entire history of the American people."241 Gaustad goes further to 
substantiate the waning numerical strength of the post-Revolution church approaching the 
dawning of the new century by highlighting, “While church adherence remained high at least 
into the 1770s (with perhaps as much as 40 to 50 percent of the population attending church with 
some regularity), formal church membership was sinking, and in the 1790s reached an all-time 
low (somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of the adult population).”242 It was “by 1780 the 
percentage of adult colonists who adhered to a church was between 10–30%, not counting slaves 
or Native Americans. North Carolina had the lowest percentage at about 4%, while New 
Hampshire and South Carolina were tied for the highest, at about 16%.243 
With many areas in the western frontier regions entirely vacant of churches immediately 
following the War. Characteristic of the peculiar persistence of the Christian faith, the church 
was able to rebound from the Revolutionary ebb it was experiencing. The momentum Baptists 
and Methodists had been building in the years immediately prior to the beginning of the new 
Awakening assisted in their ability to continue to scale in each new region they reached.   
Whereas the aim of the First Great Awakening was to revive those already in the church, 
the ambition of the new awakening was focusing its intentions on converting the unbeliever and 
“bringing the gospel to all America and to the heathen lands abroad.”244  Though the movement 
had its beginnings in the New England colonies it quickly spread to the frontier having great 
                                               
241 Sweet, Revivalism in America, 117. 
 
242 Gaustad, A History of Christianity, 163. 
 
243  Mark C. Carnes, John A. Garraty and Patrick Williams, Mapping America's Past: A Historical Atlas, 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996), 50.  
 
244 Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People 387. Ahlstrom adds an additional, subsequent 
motivation of the Second Great Awakening as those involved hoping to “make America the world’s great example 
of a truly Protestant republic.” 
 
74 
success in camp meetings.  The most significant manifestation of the revival was in Cane Ridge, 
Kentucky in 1801 where some argue became the birthplace of the Second Great Awakening in 
the south.245  It was in Cane Ridge that the emotionalism that the Second Great Awakening has 
become known for overshadows, in much of the scholarly literature, the evangelistic 
underpinnings and success of the movement.  
The Awakening was markedly egalitarian with many documented instances of children 
and women preaching,246 which were both a break from traditional established roles within the 
Church.  Writing soon after the Cane Ridge revival, Richard McNemar highlights that the move 
of God disregarded all social and denominational divisions in that there was no, “distinction as to 
age, sex, color, or anything of a temporary nature: old and young, male and female, black and 
white, had equal privilege to minister the light which they received, in whatever way the spirit 
directed.”247 It was a revival accessible to everyone. 
While there was no concerted effort to deliver a message that would have appealed more 
to one audience than another, interestingly the large majority of converts during this Awakening 
were women. Nancy Cott provides data regarding the disproportionate number of female 
converts in that, “There were at least three female converts to every two male converts between 
1798 and 1826, according to the Reverend Ebenezer Porter's estimate in 1832.”248  Cott also 
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suggests that in addition to the likely conversion of women, it was those individuals under the 
age of twenty five that converted at a greater rate and were often times the first to convert.249 It 
could have been the rejection of traditional gender roles within revival meetings that served as a 
distraction for men that prevented their conversion at the same rate as that of women.  To this 
point, Meyer argues that, “The emotional woman on display at the revival often proved to be a 
stumbling block, an example of emotionalism run amok or the traditional susceptibility of the 
female mind.”250 It is argued that the emotionalism of the revival caused men hesitation and thus 
resulted in the conversion ratio of women to be greater but husbands also took concern with their 
wives converting a point Susan Lindley illustrates, “Husbands, especially in the South, 
sometimes disapproved of their wives' conversion, forcing women to choose between submission 
to God or their spouses. Church membership and religious activity gave women peer support and 
place for meaningful activity outside the home, providing many women with communal identity 
and shared experiences.”251  Not only did women face potential criticism within the home, but 
they also bore the primary responsibility of religious instruction within the home. A point Mary 
Ryan confirms when explaining, “Women also took crucial roles in the conversion and religious 
upbringing of children. During the period of revival, mothers were seen as the moral and 
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spiritual foundation of the family and were thus tasked with instructing children in matters of 
religion and ethics.”252 
This was a responsibility the revival prepared them well for by meeting their spiritual, 
social, and emotional needs. As Cott suggests, 
Just as the doctrine of the revivals intersected at vital points with young women's needs, 
the means used to propagate revivals suited young women's predilections. Prayer 
meetings gave young women opportunity for public expressions of anxiety and offered 
them sympathy and support perfectly attuned to the peer relationships they relied on at 
work or at school away from home. These small group meetings also put effective 
pressure on participants to become converts.253 
 
Perhaps the central message being proclaimed, that of an evolving New England 
Calvinistic message which was beginning to adopt the afore-viewed heretical Arminian doctrine 
of man’s involvement in salvation provided the younger, mostly female audience a sense of 
choice that they were now able to exercise in a manner that affected their identity formation and 
eternal trajectory. The message in this revival was man should do all that the individual could in 
the act of repenting of ones sins and placing faith in Christ’s finished work on the cross. 
According to revivalist Increase Graves of Bridgeport, Vermont, individuals under the 
conviction of the Holy Spirit were to strive "to do all they are able, just as much as if they could 
save themselves by their own works, the sure destruction of those who forbear all exertions, and 
of those also, who neglect to exert themselves in the right manner."254  There was a very clear 
shift from the Calvinistic message of the complete sovereignty of God and the inability of the 
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sinner to save themselves in the First Great Awakening, to the message of the Second Great 
Awakening where every individual had been provided the ability to come to Christ through faith.  
Noll notes that this shift “arose from a widespread desire for a theology of action that could 
encourage and justify the expanding revivals of Christianity.”255 
This theology for action allowed the Awakening that initiated the nineteenth century to 
not only reinvigorated the Protestant churches spiritually, the movement also propelled the 
church into politico-cultural influence and confirmed its ability to influence on a national level as 
Ahlstrom confirms, “Protestant churches, with their message and methods tuned to the patriotic 
aspirations of a young nation, reaching their high point of cultural influence” during this 
resurgence.256 The Second Awakening resulted in a clear sense of purpose for social reform 
generally, but evangelism both at home and abroad specifically and this dual desire led to the 
establishment of several institutionalized organizations to transform and evangelize America.  
Through the visionary leadership of Henry Beecher the following organizations were founded: 
American Board for Foreign Missions, the American Bible Society, the Colonization Society for 
liberated slaves, the American Sunday School Union257, the American Tract Society, the 
American Education Society, the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance, and the 
American Home Missionary Society.  Beyond Beecher’s influence, the Southern Baptist 
Convention (which later became the largest Protestant denomination) was also established during 
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this time,258 but, perhaps the most enduring legacies of the Second Great Awakening were the 
elevation of missionary priority and the prominence of women’s religious and societal roles.  It is 
the evangelistic mobilization that affected not only the world generally with the launching of 
global missions endeavors but the national evangelistic aim is what Noll calls, “the truly great 
missionary story of the century.”259 
The aim of the local church was the salvation of the  individual and the establishment of 
institutions both through which it would be able to affect transformation in the world.260 It was 
this at-home evangelistic success that ensured the continued successful expansion of the 
Methodist and Baptist churches in America.  Noll admits “statistics can never tell the whole 
story,” but the growth of the Methodist church can be evidenced in Francis Asbury’s evangelistic 
efforts when he first came to America there were “four Methodist ministers caring for about 300 
laypeople. When he (Asbury) died...there were 2,000 ministers and over 200,000 Methodists in 
the States and several thousand more in Canada.”261  Similarly, the Baptists had continued to see 
significant growth, and by “1812 there were close to 200,000 Baptists...with half of them in the 
states of Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Kentucky.”262 By 1850, on the cusp of 
the Third Great Awakening, Baptists numbered more than one million with approximately three 
quarters of them being involved in missionary endeavors.263 
                                               
258 Ibid., 169-180. 
 
259 Ibid., 185. 
 
260 Timothy L. Smith, Revivalism and Social Reform: American Protestantism on the Eve of the Civil War, 
(Eugene: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2004). 
 
261 Noll, A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada, 173. 
 
262 Ibid., 178. 
 
263 Ibid. See also, C.C. Goen, Broken Churches, Broken Nation, (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1985), 
50 for further insight “During the Revolution, a critic had scoffed that after the war Methodists would scarcely be 
79 
An additional, persistent result of the Second Great Awakening was the increase of 
religious pluralism in America.  This time saw a rise of sects and offshoots of various colors of 
the Christian faith that have persisted with varying levels of influence and strength to the present 
day. The Colonial through the American Civil War witnessed religious pluralism in an innocent 
manner in that there existed a plurality of expressions of the Christian religion.  There were sects, 
native religions, and some expressions of religions practiced by immigrants. But, largely, 
religious pluralism existed in the form of varying, but somewhat similar, Christian doctrines held 
by different Christian denominations.  The nineteenth century, however, specifically growing out 
of the Second Great Awakening, witnessed the development of several sects and cults that later 
developed into significantly influential religions in the American context.  It was during the 
Second Great Awakening that created an experimental environment that encouraged the 
formation of several offshoots that have since grown in great prominence.  Christian 
restorationism, Seventh-Day Adventism264, Jehovah’s Witnesses265 and perhaps most significant, 
the Mormons266 had their beginnings in the rich spiritual ground of the period. 
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By the end of the Second Great Awakening the number of churches had expanded 
exponentially throughout the colonies and states with Baptist, Methodists, and Presbyterian 
churches drastically outnumbering other existent denominations:267 
Table 2.4 Denominational Growth 1850 
 
Denominational Growth 1850 
State Methodist Baptist Presby. State Methodist Baptist Presby. 
AL 577 579 162 MS 454 385 143 
AR 168 114 52 MO 250 300 125 
CT 185 114 299 NH 103 193 113 
DC 16 6 6 NJ 312 108 149 
DE 106 12 26 NY 1231 781 671 
FL 87 56 16 NC 784 615 151 
GA 795 879 97 OH 1529 551 663 
IL 405 282 206 PA 889 320 775 
IN 778 428 282 RI 23 106 0 
IO 71 20 38 SC 484 413 136 
KY 530 803 224 TN 861 646 363 
LA 125 77 18 TX 176 82 45 
ME 199 326 7 VT 140 102 242 
MD 497 45 56 VA 1025 649 240 
MA. 262 266 528 WI 110 49 40 
MI 119 66 72     
 
Civil War (1861-1865) Through WWI (1914-1919) 
Protestant churches benefited from the renewed spirit flowing from the most recent 
awakenings. Carwardine summarizes Robert Baird’s 1856 data in providing evidence for the 
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exponential growth evangelical denominations had experienced by the mid-nineteenth century. 
The four largest denominations Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists had a 
combined membership of approximately three million or nearly 13% of the total population of 
the relatively young nation;268 however, as with the War for Independence, the Civil War also 
extracted a significant toll on the momentum that had been built during the years immediately 
preceding.  Wilson argues regarding the influence of religion upon the war that though it was not 
an immediate cause like in the Spanish Civil War, the influence was nonetheless present, albeit 
developing over time in informing, “The flash points in the 1850s that became immediate causes 
of war had little overtly to do with religion, but with fears about the future of northerners and 
southerners under the Constitution.” adding, “Religion was a long-term cause of the war.”269  It 
was becoming clear that the Civil War marked a “major shift in the public story of Christianity in 
the United States.”270 
Evangelical involvement in politics increased prior after the turn of the nineteenth 
century.  As the century was drawing to a close evangelical missionary endeavors, rather than 
being limited to the expansion of the gospel only, were beginning to be viewed as vehicles for 
the expansion of American ideals in the majority world. A year after his election to the 
presidency, William McKinley illustrated the intimate, almost indiscernible, relationship 
between the aims of Christian missions and the aim of American expansion in stating in relation 
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to the Spanish-American war “there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to 
educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace to do the 
very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ died.”271 Where revivalists were 
quoted as urging, “politics are a part of religion in such a country as this,”272 to the majority of 
evangelical males being significantly involved in politics in some way. 
Prior to the Civil War politicians drew heavily from evangelical practices exercised 
during the great awakening and adopted mass revivalism tactics into their campaign strategies.  
Donald Mathews highlights that politicians of this age who sought to influence on a large scale 
and draw the most voters would “open party conventions with prayers, multiplied political 
meetings and rotated speakers, their political songs even incorporated the language and tunes of 
evangelical hymns, and, like revivalists, party activists sought to rally the faithful, draw in the 
undecided, and reclaim the backsliders.”273  Campaigners leveraged God and the devil to 
illustrate a world sharply divided “not between two sets of morally neutral policies, but between 
two moral orders, between political salvation and the victory of the Devil.”274  The success 
politicians were experiencing in assimilating the revivalistic strategies also assimilated Christian 
rhetoric and piousness into the culture as can be seen in James Dixon’s account upon visiting 
America. An English Methodist who visited the United States in 1848, Dixon wrote that 
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"Christianity pervades the United States in vigorous action;" He did not mean however, "that 
every individual is a pious Christian, but that the spirit of the evangelical system is in sufficient 
power to give to religious opinion and sentiment the complete ascendant in society."275 
The impending certainty of the War was evidenced by the schisms that split American 
Protestantism in the 1830s and 1840s which were related to the role of slaveholders within the 
churches.  The church schisms unleashed angers, fears, and even violence, which further divided 
the nation's religious people and set the tone for eventual political division.276  Some have even 
suggested that the missionary enterprise itself was a great facade to hide the fractures within the 
church.  On this point Ahlstrom argues that, "crusades of diverse sorts were organized, in part, it 
would seem, to heal or hide the disunity of the churches."277 It was the moral righteousness for 
which Evangelical denominations were striving to influence on a national (even global) scale 
through the vehicle of politics that Carwardine has expressed as a potentially unavoidable 
consequence that made the Civil War inescapable: 
We have no way of knowing if without the evangelical element there would have been a 
war. What we can say is that the moral energies established by the Second Great 
Awakening were powerful enough to splinter national denominations and national 
parties; though conflicts of strictly material interest are often open to negotiation, they are 
rarely so when associated with a conviction of moral righteousness.278 
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Though the dawning years of the twentieth century have become known as the 
Progressive Era, the effects of the Civil War and proceeding years led Noll to refer to the period 
after the war and those years transitioning into the twentieth century as the “last years of 
‘Protestant America”279 and Marty calls these transitional years the “complacent era”280 in the 
Protestant experience in America, but the twilight years of the nineteenth century and the birth of 
the twentieth century was not void of pockets of spiritual vitality.  There was what has become 
known as the “business man’s awakening”281 that lasted approximately a year from 1857-1858 
that gave rise to noon day prayer meetings and urban evangelism.  Additionally, Dwight L. 
Moody’s ministry rose to prominence during the latter years of the nineteenth century where 
Moody Bible Institute had its founding and Moody’s central message282 was an effective balance 
between Finney’s revivalistic rigidity and Sunday’s theatrical style. Important here is the similar 
rise in priority of missionary zeal that had accompanied past periods of resurgence of Christian 
faith.  An example to highlight this recurring focus on local and global evangelization as a result 
of rekindled faith was Moody’s founding of the Student Volunteer Movement where he 
encouraged young people to pursue “the evangelization of the world in their generation.”283 
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By 1880 the national share of the most prominent Protestant denominations had increased 
from 3 million or 13% of the population to approximately nine million which was then, 18% of 
the American population.284  During the second half of the nineteenth century both Methodists 
and Baptist saw aggressive growth.  Methodists had grown from 1,250,000 to approximately 
5,500,000 and Baptists increased their numbers from 750,000 to approximately 4,500,000 during 
that period.285 The Protestant population appears low given the level of growth and increased  
influence over the past decades but as Joseph P. Thompson notes, not all adherents would 
officially identify as members:  
In reading the statistics of the American churches, it should be borne in mind that the 
term members by no means represents the total of worshippers in the several 
congregations, or of nominal adherents to a confession, but only those who by their own 
act have united with the church proper, the spiritual body, and who partake of the 
sacraments.286 
 
Nonetheless, and despite Protestants making up far less than half of the nation’s growing 
population they firmly believed, as Handy argues, that “they formed the majority religious voice 
in the culture.”287  It was during the dusk of the eighteenth century that the commonly assumed 
view was that America was essentially a Christian nation but there was a growing dilemma with 
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which the church had to bend in its separation from the state whose “constitutional provisions 
explicitly forbade its government to institute religious tests for public office, establish religion, 
or prohibit its free exercise.”288 Even the public education system was heralded as a sacred 
venture as Robert Wood Lynn points out that Protestants viewed public schools as “symbolic of 
both our national unity and God’s handiwork in history. As such it was a sacred cause, worthy of 
religious devotion.”289  The educational system provided a solution that the denominational 
divisions prevented Protestants from developing in previous years.  
Another common theme whose significance can be seen echoing with greater frequency 
in each period of resurgence is the involvement and participation of women.  Similarly, in the 
years after the Civil War and leading into the infant decades of the twentieth century, the 
increase in missionary activity, both local and global,290 owes much to the presence and support 
of women. Noll provides insight into the prominence of missionary involvement of women, 
“single women in their own missionary societies and the lives of male missionaries made up 60 
percent of the nation’s missionary force in the late nineteenth century. By the turn of the century, 
forty-one women’s missionary societies supported over 1,200 missionaries.”291 
Prior to this time, missionary efforts had been advanced by smaller pockets of 
evangelistic concern and had successfully expanded the church into the new frontier; however, as 
the church looked in the face a new century, missions gained national interest.  “The number of 
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American foreign missionaries, which stood at 934 in 1890, reached nearly 5,000 a decade later 
and over 9,000 in 1915.”292 
Early 20th Century 
It was during this time that the nation’s population doubled293 and new advancements in 
technology, the processes of industrialization, urbanization, and the new cultural and religious 
nuances produced by increased immigration created a very different landscape with which 
Protestantism had to learn to navigate.  It was the dusk of the nineteenth and dawn of the 
twentieth century that served as a “time when the earlier religious settlement was tested and 
challenged.”294 
The years after the Civil War provided a less turbulent environment than previous 
decades had afforded the Protestants and the remaining years of the nineteenth century leading 
into the early decades of the final century of the millennium saw a renewed increase of Christian 
influence in the American culture.  Gaustad provides insight into how these numbers continued 
to grow “At the beginning of the twentieth century, about one-third of the nation’s population 
could be found on the membership rolls of the churches and synagogues.  By the middle of that 
century, membership had increased to well over fifty percent.”295 It is significant to note that 
during that same time frame the nation’s population doubled from approximately 76 million to 
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over 150 million.  Correspondingly, church membership mirrored this growth in both absolute 
numbers and percentage of the entire population.296 
Nonetheless, the fractures from division within the church still existed. As a result of the 
Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy and the doctrinal divisions within the Baptist and 
Presbyterian denominations, Fosdick highlights the diminished appeal of the church among the 
educated of the day by lamenting “The educated people are looking for their religion outside the 
churches.”297  
Where could the solution be found? Fosdick proposes two necessary elements. The first 
is a spirit of tolerance since “intolerance solves no problems.”298 The second element is “a clear 
insight into the main issues of modern Christianity and a sense of penitent shame that the 
Christian church should be quarreling over little matters when the world is dying of great 
needs.”299 
Ministers often bewail the fact that young people turn from religion to science for the 
regulative ideas for their lives. But this is easily explicable. Science treat’s a young man’s 
mind as though it were really important.”  “A scientist says to a young man: ‘Here is the 
universe challenging our investigation. Here are the truths we have seen so far. Come 
study with us.’ See what we have already seen and then look further to see more. For 
science is an intellectual adventure for the truth. Can you imagine any man who is 
worthwhile turning from that call to the church, if the church seems to him to say, ‘Come 
and we will feed you opinions from a spoon. No thinking is allowed here except such that 
brings you to certain specified, predetermined conclusions. These prescribed opinions we 
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will give you in advance of your thinking; no think, but only so as to reach these 
results.300 
 
As in the past, the dawning of a new century in America brought with it an entirely new 
social and cultural context in which the church had to determine its place.  Similarly, as in each 
preceding cultural context, the church sought the moral reform of society and determined the 
best way to achieve this end  was, as Noll suggests that, “most Protestant reformers maintained 
that they key to changing society lay in converting individuals, who would then reorder their 
private lives.”301 This renewed gusto for moral reform again provide opportunity for women to 
assume a leading role.  One such reformation initiative was that of the Temperance movement 
which paved the way for the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1919; however, and 
although the Temperance movement along with the implementation of the new Amendment had 
short lived positive results highlighting the government’s general inability to mandate moral 
reform.302 This movement is mentioned here as evidence of the inability of a government to 
successfully legislate morality, a tendency at which the First Amendment sought to prevent as 
Philip Schaff explained, “the American nation is as religious and as Christian as any nation on 
earth, and in some respects even more so, for the very reason that the profession and support of 
religion are left entirely free.”303 This is a point that will be touched on again as the rise of the 
religious right and the founding of the Moral Majority is discussed below.  
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It was during this period that saw the rise of fundamentalism as a reaction against 
growing theological liberalism, the naturalistic explanations germinating from Darwin’s Origin 
of Species, and the biblical higher criticism encouraged by modernity’s threat against the 
Christian faith. There were forces aimed at undermining the influence that Protestantism had so 
long enjoyed, namely the liberalism and rationalism that some within the Protestant camp viewed 
as the formidable enemy which had to be met head on in order to preserve the influence 
Protestantism had enjoyed for two centuries. Fundamentalism was able to rally their influence by 
aiming their aggression against the increasingly popular Social Gospel movement that was able 
to use the same Bible Protestants had historically used but Darwinian ideology and higher 
criticism created an impasse preventing consensus regarding the inerrancy of Scripture. The 
Social Gospel was charged by conservative evangelicals of being a different gospel altogether in 
that the salvation of sinful man was the primary aim of the true gospel not the salvation of 
society against which Hugh Price Hughes argued, “The salvation of the individual soul was not 
sufficient. Society must be saved as well as Christians.”304 
James Hunter suggests it was “By 1910 the majority of Protestant ministers and 
theologians had abandoned the conservative positions as indefensible.”305  It was against this 
context that formulated the expressed aim of fundamentalists to produce a reestablishment of 
fundamental Christian doctrines that had suffered from rationalism in recent years.  The 
movement has become known for its militant-like defense of these fundamentals which were 
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outlined in a work edited by R.A. Torrey, The Fundamentals of the Faith, from which the 
Fundamentalists get their name.306  It was this argument and fight for a return to the 
fundamentals of the Christian religion that forbade any views contrary to those outlined in 
Torrey’s work. As Martin notes they were the “Fundamentals of the Faith from which no 
deviation could be tolerated.”307 
The 1920s came to a close with the Fundamentalist-Modernist Controversy that surfaced 
the split within American Protestantism.  In attempting to regulate public school curriculum, 
culminating in the Scopes Monkey Trial in July 1925, Fundamentalists led by William Jennings 
Bryan who led the prosecution of a high school biology teacher that taught Darwinian evolution. 
Though the Fundamentalist’s prosecution was successful, the movement suffered irreparable 
damage to their reputation due to the media’s portrayal of Fundamentalists as anti-intellectual 
stemming from their view of biblical literalism.  As a result, Fundamentalists retreated from the 
public scene and turned their attention inward and focused on building private institutions for 
learning in attempts to serve as what American religious historian Randall Balmer describes as, 
“a protective device to shield evangelical kids in particular from the corrupting influences in the 
larger culture...giving way to Liberal Christians dominating national politics and denominational 
institutions, until key court decisions -- Green v. Connally and Roe v. Wade which served to 
galvanize them to re-engage in wider culture.”308 
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Balmer provides an illustrative summary regarding the fundamentalists’ withdrawal from 
the public and political scene after the Scopes Monkey Trial: 
For about 50 years from the Scopes Trial in 1925 until, Jimmy Carter's campaign for the 
presidency beginning in 1975, evangelicals are not involved in politics. Many of them are 
not even registered to vote because politics is dirty and unseemly, and besides, Jesus is 
coming back at any time to get us out of this mess, so why should we worry about the 
temporal order? And that was a very, very real sentiment among America's evangelicals 
for the middle decades of the 20th century.309  
 
Though as militant and commonly divisive as history has shown Fundamentalism to be, 
the movement endured with lessening force.  Grant Whacker of Duke University Divinity School 
writes of the lasting effects of fundamentalism that germinated throughout the twentieth century 
in outlining, “Historic Fundamentalism, largely forged before World War I, helped to produce 
the massive evangelical, Pentecostal, and charismatic revivals after World War II, as well as the 
Christian Right in the 1970s and 1980s.” 
World War II to the Rise of the Religious Right 
The individualistic theology that grew out of the Second Great Awakening and the 
individualism310 in general that had been growing in acceptance through naturalistic and 
humanistic philosophies continued to create shifting shades of religious affiliation throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century.  There was in the years after World War II what historian 
Robert Wuthnow calls a “restructuring of American religion”311 where he notes Christianity 
remained vigorous throughout the post-war decades. As Wuthnow notes the evangelistic force 
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characteristic of Evangelicals previous to the War was becoming more difficult to discern in the 
surrounding culture,  
In area after area it was as if the war had shaken religious leaders from their previous 
ways of thinking and forced on them a larger consciousness of the world which left them 
in awe of forces shaping modern culture. Their call to repentance remained clear, but 
increasingly it seemed to echo from the stratosphere rather than focusing on individual 
hearts.312 
 
However, until the rise of the Religious Right in the late 1970s the influence of 
Christianity in the public and political arenas had abated, but not vanished entirely. It was during 
these years that “the churches' larger role in society was, however, conceived of primarily as 
influencing society by influencing individuals.”313 Nonetheless, though evangelicals were taking 
a break from politics their churches benefited from renewed strength in the post-war prosperity.  
After what he calls a decade long “lull” Wuthnow provides statistics that illustrate the post-war 
church growth:  
Southern Baptists added nearly 300,000 new members in the first four years after the 
war...the Methodist church in 1948 showed that membership had increased faster in the 
previous four years than at any time since 1925 and projected a need for nearly 3,000 
additional clergy in the next five years. The Disciples of Christ announced their largest 
annual gains in over 30 years.314 
 
Yet it was not only the Protestants that were reaping the harvest of the rekindled religious 
interest. Additionally, the Catholics were baptizing over one million infants each year and 
launched their own building initiatives that resulted in 125 hospitals, over 1,000 new elementary 
schools, and 3,000 new parishes. Additionally, Catholic seminaries saw a thirty percent increase 
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in enrollment.315  Further, Church historian Martin Marty provides further evidence of a renewed 
enjoyment of religion in America and suggests it was the relaxing of standards for membership 
that contributed to growth. Nonetheless, the War was over, the economy was thriving, and the 
church was again worth attending as the numbers show: 
In 1920, 43 percent of the people were on the rolls; in 1930 47 percent; in 1940 this had 
grown only to 49 percent but in 1950 57 percent were members, and by 1956 this had 
grown to 62 percent. Eventually, the crest was reached at 63 percent or 64 percent, and 
almost 50 percent of the American people claimed to have attended church in any 
week.316 
 
As the church was directing efforts at creating organizations and the preaching and 
teaching ministries in local congregations to positively affect individuals with the gospel who 
could then in turn positively affect society. This is the philosophy of ministry in which the young 
Jerry Falwell was trained and which he echoed in his early preaching encouraging ministers to 
preach the gospel only and to avoid becoming entangled in civil and political issues of the day.  
Nonetheless, as the young Falwell matured in ministry and understanding of American culture 
and began organizing efforts to catapult evangelicals onto the political scene for a fight to re-
establish biblical morality in America once more. 
In a 2005 interview with Jon Meacham, Jerry Falwell confessed the motive behind 
changing his position in his early ministry from encouraging ministers to preach the gospel only 
and not get involved in civil issues, to being one of the most prominent religious-political figures 
of the twentieth century when stating, “It was only after the early '60s, with the court rulings 
outlawing voluntary Bible reading and school prayer, and [then] Roe v. Wade, that I became 
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convinced that my position was now wrong ... and I did an about-face and spent the last 30 years 
forming the religious right."317 
A seismic shift in the center of Evangelicalism occurred from the 1950s to the latter half 
of the 1970s. In analyzing the content of the most popular Christian publication, Christianity 
Today, David Wells provides an illustration of the Evangelicals’ moving away from their 
traditional center to adopting the mores of the modernist culture through the shrinking space 
given to expounding biblical truth, 
In the editions of 1959, fully 39 percent of the space was given to exploring and 
expounding biblical truth; by 1989, this had fallen to 8 percent. And whereas the news, 
which in modern experience is virtually synonymous with the experience of diversity, 
had filled only 20 percent of the pages in 1959, three decades later in 1989 it filled 40 
percent.318 
 
However, the lull was to be short lived as George Gallup in a 1976 issue of Newsweek 
magazine called it the “year of the Evangelical.”319 Though Evangelicalism did experience 
success through the public crusades of Billy Graham, as a whole it experienced relative minimal 
cultural influence compared to previous generations, that is, until the 1970 Supreme Court case 
of Green vs. Connally in which the Internal Revenue Service issued a statement that argued any 
organization that engaged in racial discrimination or segregation was not a charitable institution 
and should not be eligible for tax-exempt status.  This case led to withdrawal of Bob Jones 
University’s tax-exempt status and influenced the rise of the religious right and sparked the 
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interest of Jerry Falwell, and eventually led to the growth of the Religious Right and the 
founding of the Moral Majority (1979-1989). 
Resurgence of Religious Education 
It was from the years immediately following World War II through the rise of the 
Religious Right that America experienced a surge in the interest in and establishment of an 
emphasis on religious education. This renewed enthusiasm was motivated by the projected 
population increases and the church’s corresponding desire to continue to influence society by 
educating the individual in Christian values and a biblical worldview. Wuthnow explains how 
the absence of religious instruction in higher education had resulted in a growing biblical 
illiteracy during the twentieth century, “casual surveys by some of the larger denominations 
revealed that students on secular campuses were already virtually illiterate as far as biblical 
knowledge was concerned.”320  “The goal of religious education,” Wuthnow submits, “was to 
halt the corrosive tendency,” of uneducated individuals to naturally gravitate toward evil.321 
Through 1991, the percentage of Nones was stationary across time at about 7 percent of 
the U.S. adult population. After 1991, there is a steady linear increase in the percentage of 
respondents who are religiously unaffiliated, reaching nearly 22 percent by the last year of the 
survey and showing no signs of slowing.322 
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The Dying Protestant Mainline 
Beginning in the years following World War II the declining importance of 
denominationalism began being felt throughout the American religious landscape.323  Joseph 
Bottum writes of the certainty of the demise of mainline denominations in America in stating 
undeniably,  
The death of the Mainline is the central historical fact of our time: the event that 
distinguishes the past several decades from every other period in American history. 
Almost every one of our current political and cultural oddities, our contradictions and 
obscurities, derives from this fact: The Mainline…has lost the capacity to set, or even 
significantly influence, the national vocabulary or the national self-understanding.324 
 
The 1998 and 2002 GSS surveys report the Mainline Protestant denominations have the 
oldest average age of any religious group in America at 52 years of age.  With the aging 
demographic of the mainline denominations coupled with the decrease in young adults who are 
religiously affiliated the population is vanishing from which these churches have traditionally 
attracted adherents.  The shrinking membership is not the only alarm sounding for these 
Mainline churches. Certainty of belief has also correspondingly decreased in recent years as 
well. As Joseph Bottum explains, 
Strength of belief is usually taken to indicate future stability: a measure of the likelihood 
of a denomination’s members will pass their faith on to their children.  When the Baylor 
study (2005) asked about doubts of the existence of God, 100 percent of the members of 
historically black Protestant churches reported no doubts, 86.5 percent of evangelical 
Protestants had no doubts, and only 63.5 percent of Mainline Protestants had no doubts. 
Regarding reading the Bible regularly, Evangelicals were at 42.1 percent but Mainline 
was at only 16 percent.325 
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Church historian, Walter Sundberg, provides additional insight into potential factors influencing 
the demise of mainline denominations in America.   
Mainline denominations lack impetus because they deliver a confused message based on 
a strategy of accommodation. This strategy asserts that the Christian proclamation must 
be made as compatible as possible with the intellectual presuppositions of contemporary 
society. Churches must re-symbolize their historic faiths in light of prevailing cultural 
imperatives taken from the natural and social sciences. Otherwise the Christian message 
will fall on deaf ears. The primary means of accommodation are historical-critical 
method in biblical scholarship, the politicization of theological concepts and 
denominational activities for the purpose of social reform, the redefinition of Christian 
anthropology using therapeutic categories derived from psychology, and the toleration of 
religious diversity in ecclesial life.326 
 
Comparing this intrinsic “confusion” of method and message to the Evangelical doctrinal 
certainty provides a formidable theory for the slower decline of Evangelical adherents in 
America. There is a slow, but sure decline in Evangelical churches where The Yearbook of 
American and Canadian Churches reveals “growth fell from over 3 percent annually during the 
1950s to about 1 percent through the 1980s to less than a half percent through 2005, at which 
point Southern Baptist declines pushed the entire family into negative growth for the first 
time.”327 
Shrinking Southern Baptists 
While Mainline denominations have been the focus of recent research with many 
attributing the steady decline to liberal theologies and shifting positions regarding cultural issues 
these hypotheses are no longer holding true as the only reasons for shrinking numbers.  The 
recent Annual Church Profile released by the Southern Baptist convention revealed and 
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confirmed what pollsters and sociologists have been asserting for some time. Overall 
membership numbers for the Convention which fell to below fifteen million for the first time 
since 1989 and are at the lowest point since 1987.328  This drop in membership is a decrease of 
nearly 200,000 from the previous count in 2017 which was the largest decline in the 
denomination since 1881. Adding to the severity of shrinking numbers is the decline in the 
number of baptisms which are lower than they have been in over fifty years when the 
denomination baptized as many but was half the size as it is now.     
The “conservative resurgence” birthed in a 1979 effort of conservatives, led by Adrian 
Rogers, in the Southern Baptist Convention to take control of the Convention over the issue of 
biblical authority and the direction of their seminaries.  Conservatives argued liberal theology 
had infiltrated the faculty ranks at these seminaries and was wrecking the conservative values of 
the ministers in training.  Michael Foust supports this allegation by providing a summary of a 
1976 Ph.D. dissertation by a Southern Seminary student: 
According to the thesis, 87 percent of first-year students had no doubts that Jesus was the 
divine Son of God. By their final year, the number had fallen to 63 percent. In another 
category, 85 percent of first-year students believed that belief in Christ was absolutely 
necessary for salvation; by their final year, only 60 percent held to that view.329 
 
In a successful movement, Adrian Rogers’ leadership was able to right the Southern 
Baptist ship and as a result of a recovered conservative biblical heritage and the six seminaries, 
publishing house, and missions boards all instituted new leadership and all faculty are now 
required to affirm biblical inerrancy as a criteria to teach and lead. 
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The Current State of Biblical Higher Education 
The concerted emphasis on religious education renewed in the years following World 
War II is now on the backside of its apex where institutions of Christian higher education have 
experienced the sixth straight year of declining enrollment. This appears to be a direct correlation 
to the corresponding decreased importance the role of religion is occupying in the lives of 
college-aged individuals.  With a few of the larger Christian institutions experiencing relative 
success (though some are declining in various categories of enrollment) most smaller Christian 
institutions are struggling to keep their doors open as a result of rising tuition, decreased donor 
support, and the rapid expanse of online education. One example of a recent closure is Baptist 
Theological Seminary in Richmond, Virginia. It was “the first free-standing seminary started as 
an alternative to the six Southern Baptist Convention seminaries during a schism in the late 20th 
century – is closing its doors at the end of the current academic year.”330 However, the school 
was forced to close its doors much sooner than the end of the 2019-2020 academic year due to 
financial pressure and low student enrollment.  
Several other seminaries and theology schools with mainline denomination affiliations 
have or are on the verge of closing their doors due to the same enrollment and financial pressures 
experienced by Baptist Theological Seminary.331  The declining enrollment in biblical higher 
education provides further evidence of the ebbing influence of Christianity in America and 
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perhaps, secondarily reflects the characteristic lethargy of these institutions to adapt methods to 
meet the needs of its people.  
Secularization and Secular Theory 
Secularization theories in general, which will be addressed in the next chapter have failed 
to account for the peculiar persistence of evangelical forms of Christianity in America:  
Virtually every discussion of secularization asserts that high level of religiosity in the 
United States make it a decisive counterexample to the claim that modern societies are 
prone to secularization. Focusing on trends rather than levels, the authors maintain that, 
for two straightforward empirical reasons, the United States should no longer be 
considered a counterexample. First, it has recently become clear that American religiosity 
has been declining for decades. Second, this decline has been produced by the 
generational patterns underlying religious decline elsewhere in the West: each successive 
cohort is less religious than the preceding one. America is not an exception. These 
findings change the theoretical import of the United States for debates about 
secularization.332 
 
Interestingly, Schnabel and Bock argue that religion is not waning in America and any 
claims that secularization is the catalyst for the recent spike in religious Nones are mistaken. 
Their research suggests that intense religion defined as strong affiliation, very frequent practice, 
literalism, and evangelicalism continues to experience vitality in the American context even 
though it is abating in comparable countries such as the UK.  This hypothesis leads them to 
conclude that intense religion in America is as strong as ever but it is the population of 
individuals who are only moderately religious that is shrinking and contributing to the increase 
of those who do not identify with any specific religion.333 Rodney Stark of Baylor Institute for 
Studies of Religion similarly found when looking at U.S. church attendance numbers going back 
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to the earliest days of the nation, that the percentage of church-attending Americans relative to 
overall population is more than four times greater today than it was in 1776.334 
Sociologists Peter Berger had long been an evangelist for secularization theory as 
evidenced in his publications from the 50s and 60s but in recent decades he has recanted his 
previous position. The reason for his deconversion from his views is due to the persistence of 
religion in the world in general and in America particularly.  Berger defines secularization as the 
thought that, “Modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the 
minds of individuals.”335 It is this assumption, he admits, “that has turned out to be wrong.” He 
goes on to confirm his belief in the failure of secularization theory by concluding, “The world 
today, with some exceptions... is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so 
than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely 
labeled "secularization theory" is essentially mistaken.”336 Additionally, Schnabel and Bock 
conclude that contrary to what is occurring in comparable countries, “religion in the United 
States is persistent and exceptional in ways that do not fit the secularization thesis.”337 
Chapter Summary 
In an essay originally published in 1899, William Reed Huntington addressed the 
temporal nature of the old vestiges (Bible reading  and prayer in public schools, religious 
mottoes on currency, etc.) that remained from a past, more intimate relationship between church 
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and state by prophetically outlining what was sure to unfold in the coming century as the fissure 
between the two bedfellows continued to widen to the chagrin of continued prevailing Protestant 
desires for shaping the moral fabric of the nation:  
These vestiges of Christianity, as we may call them, are printed on the sand. The tide has 
only to crawl up a few inches further to wash them clean away. There is nothing in the 
theory of the Republic that makes such usages an essential part of the national life. They 
rest for the most part upon the precarious tradition of colonial days: or if on the statute 
law, what is statute law but the creature of temporary majorities? The moment popular 
opinion sets against them, all these relics of an established religion must go by the board.  
They are not the natural fruit of our system; they are but reminders of an old order of 
things that have passed away; fossils embedded in the rock on which the existing 
structure stands. One by one they will probably be chipped out and set aside as 
curiosities.338 
 
Bottum argues the relationship between Protestantism and politics that has permeated American 
culture has created a precarious situation for the contemporary church that finds itself struggling 
for survival, 
Many Americans are profoundly patriotic...and many Americans are profoundly critical 
of their country. We are left...with a great problem in combining the two and that 
problem was bequeathed to us by the death of Protestant America - by the collapse of the 
churches that were once both the accommodating help and the criticizing prophet of the 
American experiment.339 
 
As the largest denominations are experiencing a dwindling enrollment there is, 
nonetheless, a sign of continued and persistent spiritual vitality.  There has been, in each period, 
a steady increase in American commitment to send missionaries to the world. Though America 
continues to send more missionaries the increase in the periods illustrated below trails 
significantly behind the percentage of population increase in America. In other words, as the 
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overall population continues to increase the percentage of missionaries sent does not match the 
percentages in overall population growth:  
Table 2.5 Number of Missionaries Compared to Population Growth 1900-2010 
 
1900 1960 
Rank Country # Rank Country # 
1 UK 6,530 1 USA 20,500 
2 USA 5,591 2 UK 5,700 
3 Germany 1,833 3 Canada 3,600 
2000 2010 
Rank Country # Rank Country # 
1 USA 64,084 1 USA 95,000 
2 India 41,064 2 India 82,950 
3 S Korea 12,279 3 S Korea 21,500 
 
Regarding the frequency with which Americans pray, there is an intriguing discontinuity 
in the GSS data between 2002 and 2004. Between 1983 and 2002, there is essentially no change 
in the percentage of those saying that they pray several times per day, but the value jumps 
dramatically from 24.6 percent in 2002 to 32.2 percent in the next GSS survey in 2004, and it 
declines thereafter.340 The importance of this data is that the decline has continued since 2004.  
President and CEO of the Southern Baptist Convention Executive Committee, Ronnie 
Floyd ardently stated in response to the 2018 Annual Church Profile,  
It is time to press reset spiritually and strategically in the Southern Baptist Convention. 
Prioritizing and elevating the advancement of the good news of Jesus Christ into every 
town, city and county in America, as well to every person across the world, must be 
recaptured by every church. Urgency is not an option for any of us as Christ-followers. 
People need Jesus and they need Jesus now. Our generation of Baptists must believe and 
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determine now that we will do whatever it takes to present the Gospel of Jesus Christ to 
every person in the world and to make disciples of all the nations.341 
 
Similarly, current Southern Baptist Convention president J. D. Greear outlines what he believes 
is needed to reverse diminishing influence of conservative American Evangelicals,  
For the upcoming generation, our prayer should be to see an increase in evangelism, 
church planting and revitalization, and ultimately an end to decades of decline. First 
things must be first, not only in our declarations but especially in our demonstrations. I 
pray that our annual meeting in Birmingham will spur all of us to that end.342 
 
Perhaps Fosdick with many other Evangelical ministers of times past clearly articulated 
the message that continues to give life to the church and thus to the world, “There is one thing 
that does matter - more than anything in all the world - that men in their personal lives and in 
their social relationships should know Jesus Christ.”343  It is to this end that Chapter 3 aims to 
further investigate the periods of American history surveyed here in Chapter 2 to identify and 
extract those fundamental mechanisms that sparked seasons of Evangelical resurgence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
341 Carol Pipes, “SBC: Giving increases while baptisms continue decline,” Baptist Press, May 23, 2019, 
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CHAPTER 3 - HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE IN 
AMERICA  
 
“History doesn't repeat itself but it often rhymes” Attributed to Mark Twain 
 
Introduction 
Several scholars have examined the peculiar resiliency of religion in the United States 
and how that resiliency seems to provide a fatal blow to the general conclusion of secularization 
theories.344  Others have argued on the contrary using the evidence of the rapid pace of religious 
disaffiliation among younger cohorts345 while others continue this argument by leveraging 
European data to suggest that the United States is on a similar secularizing trajectory as 
experienced in the UK. Sociologists such as Simon Brauer and Robert Wuthnow suggest it 
should be no surprise that religion is on the decline in America;346 however, none of these have 
examined previous periods of American religious history for the purpose of identifying 
comparable declines of religious affiliation and the religious or cultural mechanisms that sparked 
religious resurgence.  
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The intent of this chapter is to identify a familiar cycle regarding those mechanisms that 
served as triggers for the ebb and flow in levels of Evangelical affiliation during those periods of 
American religious history surveyed in Chapter 2.  As such, this chapter seeks to uncover the 
factors that have caused or inhibited religious affiliation.  It is here proposed that there will be an 
identifiable cycle consisting of an ebb or decline in intense religiosity, concerted prayer born out 
of dissatisfaction with the current religious climate, a resurgence of religiosity that leads to a 
renewed zeal for evangelism and missions resulting in church growth both locally and globally, 
the establishment of organizations and/or the institutionalization of aspects of the resurgence, 
Evangelical political involvement/influence, which results in a subsequent ebb in religiosity.  
The conclusion suggested in this chapter is that Evangelical alliance with politics diminishes the 
appeal, attractiveness, and effectiveness of the gospel specifically and church generally.   
It is hypothesized at the beginning of this chapter that each time the Church experiences a 
great period of resurgence it has tended to establish organizations aimed at institutionalizing the 
primary facets of the resurgence in attempt to secure the moral reform of society. Then, the 
Church abdicates its responsibility to preach the gospel to the individual for the conversion of the 
individual so the individual can multiply that new life in society.  This responsibility is abdicated 
through the process of politicization.  As a result of this abdication of responsibility, there is a 
diminished importance of the local church and a corresponding diminishing of the authority and 
reliability of Scripture to speak to the whole life of the individual.  Finally, there is a diminished 
confidence or certainty in religion in general and Evangelical expressions of Christianity 
specifically.  
This chapter also aims to go beyond Simon Brauer’s brief discussion regarding the 
potential inevitability of religious decline in American and whether it is irreversible and if it is a 
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self-reinforcing process.347 As discussed above, both Mainline and Evangelical churches are 
experiencing declining numbers with, “mainline theologians and church officials rationalize 
membership loss by ascribing it to the effects of modern secularization.”348 this generalized 
hypothesis is found to be inaccurate when viewing overall levels of religiosity in America.349  
There are some pockets that show growth,350 but to ascribe an increase in Nones and a decrease 
in Mainline and Protestant numbers in America to secularization alone is a false conclusion.  
Colonial America 
Preceding the spread of Christianity to America was the more recent resurgence of a 
vibrant Protestant faith in the Motherland during the seventeenth century.  Without providing an 
examination that is too broad in scope, the work of Richard Baxter provided much momentum 
for the growth of Pietism and the Evangelical Awakening that occurred in Britain beginning in 
1735. Perhaps his greatest contribution to the growth of Protestantism was his The Reformed 
Pastor published in 1656 which provided pastors with practical advice exhorting them to “serve 
with spiritual vitality.”351  In the work, Baxter admonishes pastors to be consumed with 
evangelistic fervor and earnestly attend to the spiritual vitality of their families in stating, “You 
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are not likely to see any general reformation (revival), till you procure family reformation.”352 
These ends were to be birthed from a renewed discipline of cultivating a life of prayer as Baxter 
states, “Your people will likely feel when you have been much with God,” and more certainly, 
“Prayer must carry on our work as well as preaching: he preacheth not heartily to his people, that 
prayeth not earnestly for them.”353 
Philip Spener authored Pia Desideria (Pious Desires) which was to serve as a manual of 
reform for the Lutheran church in the latter years of the seventeenth century.  Drummonds 
referred to Spener’s work as the “manifesto” which provided eight characteristics of the renewed 
Lutheran movement important to note here: the new birth, religious enthusiasm, a joyous feeling 
of communion with Christ, sanctification, biblicism, theological education, missionary 
evangelism, and social concern.354  In his six measures necessary for the reform of the Lutheran 
church, Spener’s first measure was a “greater commitment to the spread of the Word of God,”355 
which assumes a great confidence in its authority and reliability. A conviction that will be seen 
repeated in each future period of resurgence of American Evangelicalism.  
The cultural environment before resurgence as McDow and Reid recount was rife with 
“Philosophical rationalism and divergent theological views” that “created a spiritual vacuum 
within Christianity that contributed significantly to spiritual declension. At the same time, strong 
spiritual influences in Protestant churches were used of God to create spiritual hunger within the 
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lives of many that served as a catalyst for revival.”356 It was against this context that men like 
Baxter and Spener served as catalysts for the Evangelical Awakening in Britain in 1735, which 
prepared the way for Whitefield and Wesley to ignite the spiritual blaze in the New World during 
the First Great Awakening.  
 Immediately preceding the Evangelistic Awakening in Britain was the deplorable social 
situation that provided a spiritual vacuum that W.H. Fitchett describes as “It would be easy to 
multiply testimonies showing how exhausted of living religion, how black with every kind of 
wickedness, was the England of that day.”357  The ministers mirrored, and perhaps facilitated, the 
lifeless spirituality of the day due to being “more concerned with political unity than spiritual 
fervency;”358 where “the Church of England was highly involved in secular politics and 
culture.”359 A situation that necessitated determined devotion to revitalizing the anemic church. 
John and Charles Wesley and George Whitefield each played their part in the forming Methodist 
church but the movement was born from concerted effort in practicing a life of scholarship, holy 
living, and cultivating a life of vibrant prayer.   
It was in 1738, that the Wesley brothers along with others experienced, as a result of an 
organized all night of prayer, what has been called the Methodist Pentecost.  Wesley recounts 
this event in his Journals, 
About three in the morning, as we were continuing instant in prayer, the power of God 
came mightily upon us, insomuch that many cried out for exceeding joy, and many fell to 
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the ground.  As soon as we recovered a little from the awe and amazement at the presence 
of His majesty, we broke out with one voice, “We praise Thee, O God; we acknowledge 
Thee to be the Lord!”360 
 
After returning from America, George Whitefield wrote a parallel testimony of the 
overwhelming nature regarding the intensity of this season of prayer,  
Sometimes whole nights were spent in prayer. Often have we been filled as with new 
wine. And often have we seen them overwhelmed with the divine presence and crying 
out, ‘Will God indeed dwell with men upon earth? How dreadful is this place! This is 
none other than the house of God and the gate of heaven!361  
 
These accounts are provided here as further evidence that purposeful and intense prayer born 
from a despair regarding the current state of affairs and a desperation for the presence of God 
precedes waves of resurgence of Christianity.  As a result of Whitefield’s intentional cultivation 
of a life of prayer and diligence in preaching the gospel, after preaching his first sermon in 1739 
to his death in 1791 there were nearly two hundred thousand Methodists around the world.362 
First Great Awakening 
The period immediately preceding the First Great Awakening was marked with …”What 
concerned American Protestants, after the first planting of Massachusetts Bay, was the sterility - 
not of colonial soil but of its spiritual life.”363  It was in this religiously sterile backdrop that men 
like Increase Mather and John Cotton gave rise to the “jeremiad” sermons where they saw the 
opportunity to leverage the fast day sermons issued on the state-ordained364 fast days to speak 
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against the spiritual lethargy of the church.  Though there were some such as these men who 
were devoted to preaching with renewed vitality, as McDow and Reid notes, “the majority that 
sought revival began to acknowledge by the turn of the eighteenth century that “only united, 
earnest prayer could bring a divine outpouring...Rather than calling the people to change so that 
God would pour out His Spirit, ministers began calling people to seek God’s face in prayer, in 
order that He would lead the people into revival, which would in turn would initiate a moral 
reformation.”365  The focus on God’s intervention and renewal of the  individual as a catalyst for 
moral reform in society is another fundamental principle that will be evidenced in later periods 
of resurgence.  When this principle is reversed spiritual vitality begins to ebb.  
Dutch Reformed pastor Theodore Frelinghuysen witnessed some of the earliest 
intimations of the Awakening when he acknowledged the apathy366 of his own congregation and 
began focusing his efforts on evangelistic preaching and the necessity of the conversion of the 
individual through faith alone for entrance into the eternal Kingdom as well as for church 
membership.   
Presbyterian William Tennant Sr. founded the Log College movement initially aimed at 
providing a space for intense theological training to combat the dead orthodoxy rampant in those 
Pennsylvania churches.  His primary vision was to “instill in each student a passion for 
evangelism, for a devotional life, and for the Word of God,” with the curriculum being “critical 
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in the future development of leaders in the Awakening.”367   Williams’ son, Gilbert, continued 
the movement of his father and published his sermon “The Danger of an Unconverted Ministry” 
in 1740 which was distributed throughout the colonies as an indictment against many 
Presbyterian ministers suggesting many were unregenerate and thus entirely unfit to preach the 
gospel.  This renewed focus or doubling down on orthodoxy, evangelism, necessity of personal 
conversion experience, and commitment to the authority of Scripture resulted in an increase of 
“New Side” ministers from twenty-two to seventy-two. Those who were against the approaches 
that advanced the Awakening (Old Side) witnessed a corresponding decrease in their numbers.  
Jonathan Edwards, considered the father of the Awakening in New England, also 
demonstrated a frustration with the characteristic apathy of his congregants toward God and their 
lack of zeal for piety.  His life, like those other leaders in the Awakening, was “characterized by 
fasting and prayer”368 and encouraged youth to follow suit and form small groups for the purpose 
of prayer, which he considered the most important key for promoting a resurgence of faith.  It 
was during Edwards’ sermons on justification through faith alone that the Awakening revived his 
congregation, which resulted in several hundred professing faith in Christ in only a few months’ 
time.  It is worth noting here, The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Holy Spirit, which 
Edwards published in 1741 provided five marks of a true revival, three of which provide further 
evidence for a recurring theme in periods of resurgence.  The first was a focus on pure doctrine 
exegeted from an authoritative view of Scripture. The third mark suggested true revival caused 
men to hold Holy Scriptures in greater regard. The fifth mark illustrated the recovery of the 
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passion for evangelism.369 “The degree of their acceptance of these evangelistic ideals,” Maxson 
notes, that was “the ultimate measure of the ultimate numerical strength” of the Great 
Awakening churches.370 
Post Awakening Expansion 
That there was a resurgence of religious interest can be seen in the results produced 
during this period.  McDow and Reid summarize the general results of the movement by 
explaining, “Multitudes professed to changed lives. Churches were established and strengthened. 
Missions enterprises were birthed...Christian experience, when yoked with doctrinal fidelity, was 
affirmed. Institutions were founded.”371 As an example of the number of churches established 
between New England and the South, Baptist churches grew from forty nine to seven hundred 
and twenty seven.372 More specifically, as outlined above, this movement was birth from 
attention to intense prayer and pastors consistently speaking about the issues of the day and 
challenging their people to study, understand, and discuss these matters as they related to living a 
holy life in a world that was not their home.373 
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It was Edwards that highlighted the broad scope of revival which tends nearly always to 
extend almost infectiously into other regions, “The tidings of remarkable effects of the power 
and grace of God in any place, tend greatly to awaken and engage the minds of persons, in other 
places.”374  Hammond expounds further the cyclical nature of revival highlighting how they 
begin in pockets and typically combust into a regional or even national reach,   
The cyclical nature of these movements is imposed by the kind of activity that a revival 
represents. An outburst affects communities and extends well beyond communities to 
large areas and even at times to a whole country.  Whether begun by a single charismatic 
leader or simultaneously in several different places, a revival has a contagious effect 
which spreads elsewhere.  The same social forces that produce a revival in one place are 
likely to be germinating in other places, and an initial outburst attracts the attention of 
others who take up the call.375 
 
Nonetheless, by 1750 the waves of religious affection had begun to wither. Edwards so 
clearly articulated his heart, and echoed the fundamental activity that led so many to witness 
such a widespread resurgence of a lively faith, namely intense, focused prayer for God’s 
presence, “So it is God’s will...that the prayers of his saints shall be on great and principal means 
of carrying on the designs of Christ’s kingdom in the world. When God has something very great 
to accomplish for his church, it is his will that there should precede it the extraordinary prayer of 
his people.”376 So, it was the concerted prayer of New England ministers that paved the way for 
the Second Great Awakening.  
The French and Indian War distracted attention away from the work that had been birthed 
in the Great Awakening to such a degree that “after 1763 by the declining state of Anglo-
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American relations, the revivals lost priority as a general concern in New England.”377 
Distraction coupled with internal division in the Church snuffed out the blaze of the Awakening 
to nothing more than rote religiosity as Ahlstrom recounts of the resulting cooling of religious 
fervor of the time, 
For half a century ‘Old Calvinists’ and Edwardseans would contend for control of local 
parishes, educational institutions, and other corporate enterprises of the churches. Such 
contention had serious negative consequences, in that it drove many peace-loving souls 
out of the churches and led many more to embrace milder forms of religion.378 
 
By the end of the eighteenth-century higher criticism had served as a catalyst for growing 
theological liberalism which had created a ripe cultural context for a renewal of Protestant 
expressions of the faith born out of a desperation of the spiritless church.  
American Revolution 
The natural result of this distraction and disunity was that the Evangelicals "increasingly 
confused civic virtue with piety and, finally, political enthusiasm with the joy of conversion ... 
the very religious life of the colonies came to center on the crisis in public affairs."379  Where, 
"religious revivalism, saving souls,” devolved into “a political activity, a way of producing a 
reborn majority to remodel society according to God's will and with his help."380  Gordon-
McCutchan follows, “Should this ‘remodeling’ be opposed, revolution will be in the making.” A 
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cycle that is witnessed after each major American Awakening and will be evidenced below 
through the political crusades of the Religious Right. 
The Revolutionary Era gave rise to a period of religious decline in America due to 
distraction and disruption.  Where “the churches reached a lower ebb of vitality during the two 
decades after the end of hostilities than at any other time in the country’s religious history. In 
many ways, the war itself began the process of decline.”381  
Additionally, it was the war that created a roadblock for the recruitment of new ministers 
and the retention of current clergy.  Current clergy were distracted, some fled, some became 
chaplains, while others chose to fight in the War.  To compound the issue of clergy supply, the 
faculty of the new colleges that had been established for the training of new ministers were 
scattered and there was no longer attention given to maintaining a recruitment funnel for 
producing new pastors.  With fewer ministers devoted to rekindling the fire of revival, there was 
a correlating decrease in religious interest and a prolonged period of religious attention 
redirected to political questions.  Where for Evangelicals, "independence thus became not only 
political, but moral. Revolution, republicanism, and regeneration all blended in American 
thinking."382 Ahlstrom explains this transformation of the relationship between religion and 
patriotism,  
It is ironic that a time of religious desuetude should also provide the circumstances for a 
resurgence of churchly activity in America, but such is the case - made doubly ironic by 
the fact that religious apathy contributed directly to the result. The great tradition of the 
American churches, as it developed in the nineteenth century, depended upon - almost 
consisted of - 1) the reality of religious freedom, 2) the relatively distinct separation of 
church and state, 3) the growing acceptance of the idea of denominationalism 4) the rapid 
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growth in favor of the voluntary principle in matters of patriotic piety, with its belief in 
the divinely appointed mission of the American nation.383 
 
He concludes for clarity “A colonial people almost congenitally exercised with religious 
questions of all sorts - and possibly exhausted by or in reaction against the Great Awakening - 
became preoccupied for forty years chiefly with the problems of politics.”384 
Second Great Awakening 
The French and Indian and Revolutionary Wars had a significant philosophical influence 
on the religious zeal that resulted from the First Great Awakening before these wars. It was 
Thomas Paine’s The Age of Reason that criticized the Evangelical belief of revelation and the 
authority of Scripture.  This “new” thinking infiltrated the college campuses and eroded 
confidence in traditional orthodox beliefs and resulted in a quelling of spirituality throughout the 
campuses and began to be reflected in the morals of the citizens.  Being the first college founded 
in the new nation, William and Mary had succumbed to the skepticism transplanted from Europe 
leading Bishop Meade to regretfully describe the situation where “Infidelity was rife in the state, 
and the college of William and Mary was regarded as the hot-bed of French politics and religion.  
I can truly say that then and for some years after in every educated young man in Virginia whom 
I met I expected to find a skeptic, if not an avowed unbeliever.”385  Nonetheless, “revival often 
begins at times and places where circumstances appear most bleak,”386 and it was so as revival 
erupted on several college campuses as a result of student-led prayer meetings.  
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The Reverend Ammi Robbins described the impact that an individual profession of faith 
had in Norfolk, Connecticut in 1798,  
Numbers who had as yet remained unmoved, when ... they beheld many of their intimate 
companions a husband, a wife, a brother, a sister, a parent, a child, a near friend, a late 
jovial companion, with sweet serenity, solemnly giving up themselves to the Lord ... they 
were pierced through, as it were, with a dart. They often went home full of distress, and 
could never find rest or ease until they had submitted to a sovereign God.387 
 
Methodism after the 1784 Christmas Conference “expanded almost exclusively by 
domestic evangelism” and it would “exceed in its rate of growth all other large Protestant 
churches.”388  The new growth of the church can be traced to two fundamental aspects, according 
to Ahlstrom, its message and its structure,389 and although ministers delighted in unexpected 
conversions of lifelong infidels, they had to report that the best subjects for conversion were 
young persons who had been reared in families of some piety.390  
Mark Noll recounts the spread of revival through the Congregational churches of the 
Northeast, “In the east concern for revival gripped several local Congregational ministers in 
Connecticut during the early 1790s.  By the turn of the century a considerable network of these 
ministers was exchanging information on signs of religious vitality. Together they were praying 
and preaching for the revival of church attenders and for the conversion of the indifferent.”391  
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For example, Congregationalist minister and eighth president of Yale College, Timothy Dwight, 
grandson of Jonathan Edwards, discovered several of his students were deists and to confront the 
“infidelity,” he “labored by forthright argument to restore confidence in the Bible, and he began 
a four-year cycle of sermons designed to communicate the essentials of the faith.”392  In 1802 
revival swept the campus where a third of the 225 students were converted. 
The western frontier was spiritually destitute which made it a prime missionary target for 
zealous ministers.  The living conditions were much harsher than the developed East and as a 
result ministers were few, and most pioneered the new territory to secure land for their family. 
Reflecting on the dire spirituality of the west Asbury lamented, “When I reflect that not one in a 
hundred came here to get religion, but rather to get plenty of good land, I think it will be well if 
some or many do not eventually lost their souls;”393 however, the spreading of the Awakening 
quickly bore much fruit in this barren land as evidenced by a camp meeting at Cane Ridge in 
August 1801 where an estimated twenty to twenty five thousand pioneers traveled to attend.394 
As the movement continued it became apparent that not only were young people 
converting at a higher rate than their elders, but it was women that were much more likely than 
men to convert. Phoebe Palmer “insisted that God’s grace was poured out on women and men 
alike and that all who tasted the heavenly gift had the obligation to pass it on.”395 Explaining the 
important role women played in the spread of Christianity during this time, Nancy Cott explains,  
It is important to recognize that economic development especially the decline in 
household manufacture disrupted the daughter's usual place in the household before it 
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disrupted the mother's.  The predictability of the daughter's relation to and function in the 
family faltered. The decline of household manufactures compelled many young women 
to seek paid employment outside the family, to reproduce in cash their former domestic 
usefulness.396 
 
As a result of the renewed interest in the authority of Scripture and making disciples of 
all nations the increase in missional fervor was a natural result of the Second Awakening 
affecting both congregations and campuses alike. One example of the revived zeal for missions 
was the missions work that began at Williams College after the revival. It then spilled over to the 
student body of Andover Theological Seminary. In 1806 Samuel Mills and fellow classmates 
took refuge from a thunderstorm in a barn and held a prayer meeting in which they each 
committed to take the gospel to the world. As a result, they created the American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions.  Mills concentrated his efforts on taking the gospel to the 
American frontier and as a result of his fruitful efforts the American Home Missionary Society 
was formed in 1826 after his death.  
As renewed concern for evangelism increased it reignited a zeal for missions during the 
Second Great Awakening.  President of Brown University, Francis Wayland, “What object ever 
undertaken by man can compare with this same design of evangelizing the world?  Patriotism 
itself fades away before it.”397  Wayland goes on to confirm that it is only through the conversion 
of individuals rather than the conversion or influence of society can a moral revolution be 
realized when urging his audience to consider the means by which a moral revolution is to be 
obtained by arguing, “It is, in a word, by the preaching of Jesus Christ and him crucified. It is by 
going forth and telling the lost children of men, that God so loved the world, that he gave his 
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only begotten son to die for them...This is the lever by which, we believe, the moral universe is 
to be raised; this is the instrument by which a sinful world is to be regenerated.”398 
By the late eighteenth century the continued revivalism that had been popularized in the 
First Great Awakening had “swept Evangelicals into command of America’s Protestant 
churches.”399  As a result of the pervasive expansion of Evangelicalism throughout the first half 
of the century, by the end of the Revolutionary War, Evangelicals had secured a monopoly in the 
American publishing industry and saturated the land with the distribution of tracts, books, 
popular literature, and devotional material.  
Leading up to the cusp of the Civil War, ”the revolutionary transition was to the 
acceptance of an unordained and uneducated layman as an appropriate interpreter of the 
tradition, spokesman for the church, and shepherd of souls.”400 Still, it was during the latter years 
of the Second Awakening that Evangelicals focused their efforts on expanding their influence 
through education. One significance of the educational aspirations of Evangelicals that assisted 
in increasing influence and prominence throughout the mid-century was the establishment of 
institutions of higher education; however, one of the most successful of these endeavors was 
directed at reaching and educating children through what came to be known as the Sunday 
School movement.  Originally aimed as a mission to the poor and unconverted working-class, 
each Sunday, nearly one-seventh of American children ages five to fifteen were benefiting from 
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these two and a half hours of instruction each Sunday.  In 1827 it was estimated that 350,000 
children were being instructed in the approximately four hundred auxiliary societies.401 
Nevertheless, even the original righteous ambitions of the Sunday School movement 
would eventually be leveraged by Evangelicals for the hopeful zeal of reforming and securing a 
Christian America.  As Sweet summarizes, “The Sunday school, it was believed, could produce 
moral character for democracy, build a Christian America, and provide America with a 
constantly renewed soul.”402  The American Sunday School Union even formally adopted a 
missional statement positioning it as a morally guiding force for the nation as being “eminently 
adapted to promote the intellectual and moral culture of the nation, to perpetuate our republican 
and religious institutions, and to reconcile eminent and national prosperity with moral purity and 
future blessedness.”403 
Further, at the same time as Evangelicals were devoting energy to reaching the world zeal 
for missions was advanced in the form of local voluntary missionary societies.  Regarding the 
original ethos of missionary purity in the forming of voluntary societies, Sweet reveals, “the 
fundamental premise of these associations...was that a nation could be conquered for Christ just 
as readily by collective action as by political group.”404 These voluntary societies were growing 
in popularity with approximately more than thirty percent of adults in New York City belonging 
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to one of the church-related societies;405 however, the Constitution of the American Home 
Missionary Society reveals the characteristic nineteenth century Evangelical fascination with 
establishing a Christian America in confirming its dual patriotic-Christian ambition in affirming,  
“We are doing the work of patriotism, no less than that of Christianity.”406 “There were those 
who thought that individuals, redeemed and reformed, would automatically and irresistibly 
transform the social order. Others believed that only through broad attack on social problems 
could the Kingdom be forced.”407 
Nonetheless, by the 1850s evangelicals began to ignore social issues and social stability 
with the most prominent example being involvement with the Temperance movement.  With the 
movement enjoying the “greatest intensity and longevity of any reform movement in American 
history and the evangelicals were zealous in promoting it. “Evangelicals justified their 
temperance action as a religious and patriotic duty to build a sober and energetic republic of 
good rather than a drunken and lazy republic of evil.”408 Furthermore, Evangelicalism’s 
infiltration and influence of American culture is seen in Sweet’s summary of the results of 
Finney’s theology, “Finney’s dyadic doctrine of human freedom and self-determination, in 
which sin was something one did, not something one was, broke the back of Calvinism by 1830 
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and proved the perfect theological scaffolding for the emergence and espousal of a free-labor, 
free-market economy.”409 
Gordon-McCutchan summarizes how periods of Evangelical awakening have 
dramatically accelerated the rate of social change and have resulted, “ironically,” in the opposite 
of what one might expect of a movement aimed at providing a “stabilizing social force” as he 
proposes is the aim of such awakenings. He continues to argue, “Each of these awakenings 
contributed, to the populace at large, ideological assumptions which quickly led to violent 
revolution. Revivalistic religions which emerged to calm social anxiety rapidly became agencies 
for social destruction.”410 In his research he examines four different periods of American 
religious history and discovered a particular pattern where in times of social stress people 
became likely converts to “enthusiastical” religions. Once converted, these enthusiasts then 
engaged in revolutionary activity.”411  
Civil War 
It was by the middle of the nineteenth century that “a holiness emphasis asserted itself 
among American Evangelicals that led to a reform-minded call for an alignment of personal 
morality with social and political purity.”412 As mentioned above, those in the South carried 
longest the view that social reform would come through the conversion of the individual who 
would “indirectly elevate the moral well-being of society.”413 It was also during this same time 
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that Evangelicals replaced the “theological doctrine of predestination with a political doctrine of 
predestination,” which Sweet defines as “the evangelical empire was predestined and thus had a 
natural right to expand to its geographical boundaries, which were across the continent, and to its 
religious boundaries, which were across the globe.”414 
The Civil War also created a monumental shift in traditionally held views concerning the 
millennium. Postmillennialism was long held as the dominant view of most Protestants but as a 
result of the Civil War, the de-emphasis on personal conversion, and the rise of biblical higher 
criticism where biblical imagery was mythologized this gave way to premillennial notions which 
resulted in the rise of the Social Gospel and the drive to establish the Kingdom on earth as it is in 
heaven.   
Leading up to the commencement of and during the Civil War Evangelicals found 
themselves wrestling with how the morality of slavery should be defined, with many of the 
earliest abolitionist leaders being Evangelical.  Although, as Sweet concludes, “Evangelicalism 
found the coils of the slavery controversy impossible to get out of. Its strategies proved 
inadequate to eradicate America’s greatest evil and instead ended up rending divisions, splitting 
denominations, enraging religious friends, and alienating social institutions and political 
parties.”415  It was this inability of Evangelicalism to unify around such a momentous moral 
cause during such an integrally opportunistic time in American history that led to an eventual 
ebbing of Evangelical vitality during the twilight years of the nineteenth century.  
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Though the Civil War further embedded Evangelicalism into the fabric of American 
society, the rise of new religions, higher criticism, and Darwinian theories of evolution created 
an ever-increasing indifferent environment and entirely novel ways of interpreting reality.  This 
was a new world to which Evangelicals were not accustomed and where “a scientific and 
historical spirit worked to flatten the landscape of the spiritual life.”416 Leading into the dawning 
of a new century Evangelicalism had successfully entwined itself into the DNA of the nation. 
However, such a grafting in created a socio-religious environment that in most cases prevented 
Evangelicals from assimilating many if not all new historical-critical influences.  These 
influences nuanced theology in subtle ways where God had been tamed from sovereign ruler of 
the universe and wrathful against sinners with Jesus being the only way of salvation to now both 
God and Jesus being a source of great comfort and unlimited blessing. Further the biblical text, 
being demythologized, now served as a source of inspiration for a better life rather than 
conviction.  
Throughout the nineteenth century where the resurgence of Evangelicalism through 
revivals and Awakenings transitioned into the Sunday School movement as the primary vehicle 
for evangelistic efforts, it too fell into the cycle of being effective at producing converts, 
successful in growing the church both numerically and in influence, served as a unifying agent, 
was institutionalized in the American Sunday School Union, with the mission and effectiveness 
eventually becoming diluted with affection for societal reform through political engagement.  
Early Twentieth Century 
In postulating a proposed cyclical nature of Evangelical history, Gordon-McCutchan 
illustrates the twentieth century emergence of Fundamentalism with its inward focus to its 
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evolution into the rise of the Religious Right and its insistence on Evangelical political crusade 
as the primary means of (re)-establishing the Kingdom of God in America with millennial hopes 
of preparing the way for the second coming of Christ,  
...the breakdown of traditional institutions produces social chaos and anomie; an inwardly 
directed religious form emerges to minimize the anxiety born of this social dislocation; 
this inwardly directed form succeeds insofar as it makes people independent of 
institutions or self-reliant; those still in the hierarchy of society (be they religious or 
political figures) attack the newly emergent religion of inwardness, thereby politicizing 
the thinking of its members; the religion of inwardness reacts by extending and making 
ever clearer and more radical the theological principles on which its break with tradition 
rests; it then begins insisting upon changes in the political or religious sphere to bring 
them into coincidence with the teachings of the inner religion; next, it justifies these 
changes in terms of millennial expectation; if it meets with opposition it will soon 
identify those who oppose it with the forces of evil; it will then teach those who follow 
the religion of inwardness that they have a religious duty to engage in political 
revolution.417 
 
The early Twentieth century was marked by Protestant attempts to reform society through 
social organizations and political influence.  The turn of attention from preaching the gospel for 
converting the individual to a focused desire to renovate society born from the revivals in 
antebellum America continued as a “potent force in American life...through the first World 
War.”418  This eventually led to the rise of the Social Gospel movement. Born in the late 
nineteenth century, the Social Gospel movement is defined by Noll as “The most prevalent 
Protestant attempts to reform urban life were based on principles of private action and personal 
responsibility.  Many older churches developed programs of social outreach and support to 
supplement more traditional services.”419  “The origins of the Social Gospel were both domestic 
and foreign. The strong link in the American revival tradition between personal holiness and 
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social reform contributed to the genesis of the movement…”420 Leaders of the Social Gospel 
were trying to solve an American dilemma, namely how to adapt the Protestant tradition of an 
earlier rural America to the changing demands of a newly industrial society.421 
Protestants saw it as the “duty of the government to make it easy to do right and difficult 
to do wrong.”422 There was perhaps no greater example of Protestant attempts to leverage 
government to make it “easy to do right and difficult to do wrong” than the Temperance 
movement. It was the Prohibition that “would establish the social conditions of morality under 
which men are more likely to be moral than when living under an environment which is 
conducive to immorality and wrong-doing.”423   
World War II to Present 
The mass evangelism success of Billy Graham is perhaps the most vibrant illustration of 
the effectiveness of a confident belief in Evangelical doctrine and certainty in the power of the 
gospel during the mid-twentieth century.  Regarding the message of Billy Graham (like Moody 
before him), he saw the first objective for the gospel to “change the hearts of women and men 
then, one may proceed to transform the world.”424  With careful concern so as to not dilute the 
fundamental aim and power of the gospel, Graham acknowledged that his understanding of the 
power of the gospel to affect society through the individual evolved throughout the first decade 
of his ministry,  
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My belief in the social implications of the gospel has deepened and broadened.  I am 
convinced that faith without works is dead. I have never felt that the accusations against 
me of having no social concern were valid. Often the message of the evangelist is so 
personal that his statements on social matters are forgotten or left out when reports are 
made. It is my conviction that even though evangelism is necessarily confined within 
narrow limits the evangelist must not hedge on social issues. Yet I am more convinced 
than ever before that we must change men before we can change society. The 
international problems are only reflections of individual problems. Sin is sin, be it 
personal or social, and the word repent is inseparably bound up with evangelism. Social 
sins, after all, are merely a large-scale projection of individual sins and need to be 
repented of by the offending segment of society.425 
 
Graham conceded that mass evangelism, though an important form, was not the most 
ideal form of evangelism as this responsibility was to be owned by the church.  Graham echoed 
the necessity of having an authoritative view of Scripture as a prerequisite for the effectiveness 
of the church in the world.  “The church has been effective only when it has spoken with 
authority.” He said, “I am convinced that the reason some ministers are cracking up is that they 
have no authority. I am thankful that there is a return to biblical preaching in America. The 
Scriptures are beginning to return to their rightful place as the authority in the church.”426  
The first aim of evangelism and resurgence then should be a converted membership.  
Speaking to the criticisms that were often leveled against the mass evangelism crusades of 
Graham, Elton Trueblood clarified that one of the largest mission fields in America at the time, 
and most certainly currently, is the church roll.  He argued, 
If our only mission field is that of the 4 per cent who claim no affiliation, our 
opportunities for religious advance are severely limited... Our main mission field today, 
so far as America is concerned, is within the church membership it- self...[Our] task is to 
try to reach the present membership of churches with a message of such vitality that all 
experience conversion within the church, rather than a conversion to the church...In the 
Billy Graham Crusade in New York there were certain skeptics who sometimes 
complained that the figures were not dependable because, they said, many of the persons 
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who made decisions for Christ were already church members. Therefore, they said, the 
statistical reports were not accurate. What amazing misunderstanding this shows on the 
part of the critic!427 
 
While the generation influenced by Billy Graham’s shows higher levels of religious 
affiliation, they did a poor job of passing on that intensity of Christian affections to their children 
who, in turn, did even more poorly at passing on those affections to the next generation. With 
each subsequent generation there is an increased diminishing of intensity of religious belief and 
decrease in religious affiliation. According to the American Family Survey, of those who 
matured during the successful years of Graham’s crusades, those currently older than 65, only 
twenty one percent self-identify as atheist, agnostic, or nothing in particular, which is a five 
percent increase from 2015.428 
The Conservative Resurgence and the Rise of the Right 
Examining the past presidential elections since 1980 it becomes increasingly clear to 
absolute certainty that Evangelicals continued to align with and crusade for Republican 
initiatives. Gordon-McCutchan suggests that Evangelicalism has always tended to be “a religion 
of social control predicated upon inner- direction,” and this fascination with social control is 
what has given it “a pronounced tendency toward political revolution.”429 But this is not how 
periods of resurgence began, nonetheless this is what each devolved into, which resulted in a 
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recession of religiosity.  He goes on to rightly caution, “Hence preaching social control by means 
of Evangelical piety is a very dangerous business.”430 
During previous periods of Evangelical resurgence, “the sort of revivalism preached 
corresponded with the social situation of the hearers.”431 Where the social anxiety was most 
intensely experienced the awakenings spread quickest. This can be seen with the Second Great 
Awakening spreading quickest in the frontier where it can be assumed anxiety generated from 
the economic instability and uncertainty of personal health were prevalent through to the rise of 
the Religious Right as Supreme Court decisions invalidated long-held traditional Evangelical 
mores in the public spheres which created inner and external social and religious angst. This 
angst nurtured a ripe environment for Evangelicals to rally a new revolution. Unfortunately, and 
again, efforts were misguided at seeking reformation political action. 
Chief Executive Officer of the Public Religion Research Institute, Robert P. Jones 
outlines it was the waves of Evangelical resurgence throughout the eighteenth century that 
formed the political underpinnings and identity of the new nation.  He continues to summarize 
the political contest during the latter half of the twentieth century that facilitated the alliance, 
especially in the South, between politics and the Evangelical church,  
In the south, the explosion of evangelical churches coincided with a wave of racial 
reaction in the wake of the civil rights movement. After being a Democratic stronghold, 
the South became solidly Republican beginning in the early 1970s. The Republican 
“southern strategy” used race as a wedge issue to attract white votes in the wake of the 
civil rights movement, but it also proffered a socially conservative message that gelled 
with the values of the emerging Religious Right.432 
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In the late 20th century, there was another resurgence in religious interest that fueled new 
successes of conservative politics. Building the momentum that reached its apex with the rise of 
the religious right and conservative resurgence it was “Preachers like Billy Graham and Jimmy 
Swaggart – in spectacular revival meetings and increasingly on television – attracted millions of 
white converts to churches which emphasized literalist interpretations of the Bible, strict moral 
teachings and apocalyptic expectations;”433 however, scandal also rocked the Evangelical 
confidence in the late 1980s with several televangelists being found out for mishandling 
finances, prostitution, and infidelity.  This had significant reverberations throughout the 
American culture as confidence in the trustworthiness of religious leaders plummeted. Tom 
Smith, Director of the National Opinion Research Center, provides a summary of the Gallup 
Social Survey data regarding the impact of the televangelists scandal, 
the percent with a ‘great deal’ of confidence in the leaders of ‘organized religion’ fell 
from 30% in early 1987 before the Bakker scandal to 21% in 1988 after the Bakker 
disclosures and during the Swaggart expose (and those with ‘hardly any’ confidence rose 
from 19% to 32%). Also, showing a clear scandal effect was the general measures on 
religious influence. The percent saying that the influence of religion was increasing fell 
from 48% in 1985 and 1986 to 36% in 1987 and 33% in 1988...church membership 
dipped from 69% in 1986 and 1987 to 65% in 1988 and the percent praying daily fell 
from 58% in 1985 to 53% in 1989.434  
 
Even so, confidence in religion and the church remained as the majority among other 
categories polled by Gallup even after the televangelist scandals broke.  It wasn’t until 2002 
Catholic sex abuse scandal that the confidence Americans placed in religion and the church 
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dropped sharply below fifty percent for the first time.435 General Social Survey data from 
showed a majority of Americans (sixty nine percent) believed that the influence of religion was 
increasing in America. By 1990 confidence had dropped to thirty three percent.436 The General 
Social Survey religious preference trendline from 1972 held relatively flat until 1991. As seen in 
the chart below, the number of those selecting “No religion” begins to sharply increase after 
1991.437 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - Religious Preference Timeline 
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Religious affiliation reached a fourteen-year low in 1991 matching the 1977 low of six 
percent however it was during 1991 that a continual drastic climb has occurred in the number of 
those who have chosen “no religion” in the General Social Survey.  Similarly, there was a 
corresponding increase in those that chose “Other” as their religion from less than two percent in 
1991 and more than doubling to three and a half percent by 2018.438 Interestingly, the number of 
Americans that identify as being Evangelical has held relatively flat since 1991 according to 
Gallup survey data.  At forty one percent of Americans identifying as Evangelical in 1991, 
reaching a low of thirty six percent in 2015 it was hovering at forty one percent in 2018.439 
Similar to what has been witnessed in past resurgences of Christianity in periods of 
American history examined here, current levels of intensity of religiosity remain consistent 
among those aged 25 and younger, however has Schnabel and Bock point out, the number of 
those in this age category who have disaffiliated has drastically increased in recent decades:  
We also considered patterns among young people on this and other measures and found 
similar patterns of persistent intensity. Looking just at people aged 25 and under—a 
relatively small proportion of the sample for which we would expect some year-to-year 
fluctuation—26 percent were strongly affiliated in 1974, 22 percent in 1988, and 25 
percent in 2016. Whereas strong affiliation remained consistent, no affiliation among 
those 25 and under almost tripled from 13 percent in 1974 to 35 percent in 2016. The 
percentages for strong affiliation are lower overall for this group than those for all 
Americans—which suggests that people may age into strong affiliation, as we are 
effectively controlling for cohort by looking at the same age group over time—but are 
similarly consistent.440 
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Hout and Fischer conclude that the growth of religious non-affiliation, particularly among 
younger cohorts of Americans, represents a movement away from the organized religious bodies 
that Americans associated with conservative politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s.441  More 
specifically, Schnabel and Bock conclude that the general increase of religious disaffiliation in 
America was initially sparked as a backlash against the rise of the Religious Right.442  Which 
served as a “reminder...that the relationship between the sacred and the secular have been a 
frequently contentious issue in American politics.”443  
The Diminishing of American Evangelicalism 
Jeffrey Jones of Gallup illustrates the accelerated decrease in membership numbers in 
America’s churches within the past two decades, "U.S. church membership was 70% or higher 
from 1937 through 1976, falling modestly to an average of 68% in the 1970s through the 1990s. 
The past 20 years have seen an acceleration in the drop-off , with a 20-percentage-point decline 
since 1999 and more than half of that change occurring since the start of the last decade."444 
Declining denominationalism has expanded beyond the collapse of Mainline 
denominations to now seriously affect the largest denomination in America. The significance of 
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this decline is seen in Wuthnow’s explanation of the meaning denominationalism once had in 
forming and determining the religious identity for Americans. He argues,  
over the past half-century, denominationalism has declined seriously as the primary mode 
of identification in American religion. Indications of this decline include increased 
interfaith and interdenominational switching, heightened tolerance across faiths and 
denominational boundaries, ecumenical cooperation, and a deemphasis in many 
denominations on distinctive teachings and specific membership requirements.445 
 
This decline in denominational loyalty and its subsequent negative effects on religious affiliation 
was acknowledged by Sherkat at the turn of the twenty first century where he predicted this 
increased permeability of denominationalism would result in a decline in religious loyalty 
“particularly in younger cohorts.”446  This is precisely what has occurred at a very rapid rate in 
the twenty first century, especially in the last decade.447 
According to Sundberg, many Mainline theologians and leaders attempt to “rationalize 
membership loss by ascribing it to the effects of modern secularization.” He goes on to affirm 
that, “They assert that the decline of the church is inevitable because we live in a ‘post-Christian’ 
era in which fewer people are attracted to organized religion. The trouble with this mainline 
scenario is that it does not fit the facts of religious life in America.”448  The culprit for the decline 
of religious affiliation generally and Evangelical affiliation specifically is not the secularization 
of culture (though that is occurring, naturally) but it is the secularization of the church as 
illustrated by the overall decline in spiritual vitality in these Evangelical congregations.  
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Clarifying Kelley’s central thesis in Why Conservative Churches are Growing, Sundberg 
asserts, “This strategy asserts that the Christian proclamation must be made as compatible as 
possible with the intellectual presuppositions of contemporary society.”449  Sundberg continues 
to provide a succinct summary of the primary means by which Mainline churches capitulate to 
culture in accommodating their message, “The primary means of accommodation are historical-
critical method in biblical scholarship, the politicization of theological concepts and 
denominational activities for the purpose of social reform, the redefinition of Christian 
anthropology using therapeutic categories derived from psychology, and the toleration of 
religious diversity in ecclesial life.”450  Although Kelley was writing in the latter part of the 
Twentieth century and Sundberg was echoing these charges against Mainline congregations at 
the turn of the Twenty-First century it has become increasingly definite that more and more 
Evangelical churches have made their message “as compatible as possible with the intellectual 
presuppositions of contemporary society,” where now only ten percent of those who consider 
themselves “born again” hold a biblical worldview.451  This has consequently initiated a resultant 
decline in membership and affiliation in Evangelical denominations.   
Writing in 2001, Darren Sherkat provided data analysis that concluded, “denominational 
loyalty is only declining among Liberal Protestants, Episcopalians, and in Catholicism.”452  Data 
from the Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches reveal a deceleration of growth for 
Mainline churches going back as far as 1955.  Growth fell from over three percent annually 
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during the 1950s to about one percent through the 1980s to less than a half percent through 2005, 
at which point Southern Baptist declines pushed the entire family into negative growth for the 
first time.453 
Perhaps the most prominent bastion of Evangelicalism in America is represented by the 
Southern Baptist Convention who in 1967 surpassed the United Methodists in size.  The 
denomination has prevailed as the largest, growing denomination in America until recently.  
Unfortunately, with no accurate way of measuring conversions one is left with relying on data 
recording the number of baptisms for a given period for measuring congregational effectiveness. 
The data is showing more interest as recorded by increased attendance to religious services, but 
commitment is decreasing as illustrated by the decline in recorded baptisms where they have 
declined for eight of the last ten years with. For 2017, congregations reported baptizing 254,122 
individuals which was nearly a twenty seven percent decrease from 2007.  This provides the ratio 
of one baptism for every fifty-nine church members. These alarming indicators of a deceleration 
of growth led Mohler to admit this, “statistical crisis related to baptisms raises huge theological 
questions.”454 
Albeit, the denomination is still adding numbers and saw just over a six percent increase 
in churches between 1997 and 2007;455 however, increasing the number of churches is not 
translating into evangelistic effectiveness as missions activity declined from 2016 to 2017.  
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Southern Baptist churches reported 4,376 church-type missions in 2017, which is a decrease of 
nearly three percent from 2016.456Additionally, individual membership in Southern Baptist 
congregations fell for the eleventh consecutive year, to below fifteen million. Since 2006, 
Southern Baptist Convention congregations have lost about 1.3 million members.457 
Mohler provides two insights as potential reasons for the steadily declining numbers in 
the largest Evangelical denomination in America. First, those in the Southern Baptist Convention 
are not as concerned about reaching the lost as they once were. Second, the methods of 
evangelism that were once successful at reaching the lost and increasing membership numbers 
are no longer effective in the current culture.458 Mohler concedes that for the largest 
denomination in America, it is time “to acknowledge the hard fact that rates of identification 
with and membership in evangelical congregations is likely to fall even further.” 
Although, even with the high child mortality rate in Colonial America, the church was 
still growing, a fact contrary to assumptions by the Southern Baptist Convention and other 
theories regarding low birth rates. Mohler argues that it is the falling birth rates that has 
contributed to the corresponding decline in SBC’s numbers,  
Throughout recent centuries, the vast majority of church members have been the children 
of church members. It is no accident that falling birth rates are reflected, in short order, in 
baptism statistics. There is no question that children raised within Christian homes by 
Christian parents are most likely to make their own profession of faith and continue 
church participation into adulthood. There is also no question that when Christian parents 
have fewer children, they produce fewer future converts to Christianity. The fall in the 
birth rate has been precipitous and the trend lines parallel baptism statistics in the SBC.459 
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The decreased fertility rates in America are a natural consequence of increased wealth 
and availability of healthcare, which resultantly lowers child mortality rates.  Max Roser 
explains, “When more infants survive fertility goes down and the temporary population growth 
comes to an end.”460 While reaching children of current members is the “top priority” for 
Southern Baptists, Mohler concedes that they are “also about to find out if we can reach young 
people to whom we did not give birth. That is more challenging.”461 
With the rise of the outwardly (politically) focused Religious Right and the parallel 
inward focused Evangelical Conservative Resurgence aimed at reestablishing the authority of 
Scripture during the late 70s and throughout the 80s there was a revived sense of certainty of 
belief among Evangelicals. 462  Reminiscent of the fundamentalist-modernist controversy of the 
early twentieth century, albeit not as militant, the conservative resurgence in the Southern Baptist 
Convention did not so much create a resurgence in affiliation or interest in Evangelicalism as it 
aimed to purify and realign the denomination especially regarding the authority and inerrancy of 
Scripture.  
In surveys between 1984 and 1992, in polling to determine national distribution of 
religious conservatives, liberals, and moderates, it was found that Americans began to exhibit a 
greater degree of certainty regarding their religious identity.  During the heyday of the Moral 
Majority and as the Conservative Resurgence was accomplishing its aim of reestablishing the 
authority of Scripture in the Southern Baptist Convention and its seminaries, those that indicated 
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they did not know if they were conservative, liberal, or moderate fell from sixteen percent in 
1984 to seven percent in 1989. There was a corresponding increase in those that identified as 
conservative, increasing from nine percent in 1984 to sixteen percent in 1989; however, certainty 
of belief has continued to decline with each subsequent generation.  
Sherkat speaks to the effects of these dissolving religious convictions and how the lack of 
clear or strict463 denominational distinctiveness creating clearly definable costs and benefits 
facilitates a denominational permeability.  He concludes from General Social Survey data 
evaluated from 1973 to 1998 that “(1) religious groups with distinctive theologies, liturgies, or 
rituals will have higher rates of retention; (2) denominations with little distance from secular 
society will have lower rates of retention and will lose members through switching; and (3) 
denominations that are similar to a high number of other religious organizations will have lower 
rates of retention.’464 The relatively recent increase in churches with non-denominational names 
or denominationally unaffiliated also experience the same vague definability that eases attrition 
for their intended audiences. General Social Survey data shows, “the nondenominational “other 
Protestant” category posts the lowest overall retention rate among religious affiliations, while the 
diverse “other religions” category charts a relatively high loyalty percentage.”465 Whereas, 
perhaps not surprising, the retention rates of the unaffiliated are increasing with each subsequent 
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generational cohort. Further, retention rates even among the strictest denominations that have 
clear distinctives are on the wane in America.  Chaves and Voas provide empirical evidence that 
religious affiliation, belief, and practice in the United States have in fact been declining for 
decades and because this decline has been produced by the same generational patterns 
underlying religious decline elsewhere in the West: “Each successive cohort is less religious than 
the preceding one.”466 Importantly, this decline in the intensity of religiosity in America is 
occurring among the moderately (fuzzy middle) religious as well as intensely religious. 
General Social Survey data from 2000 to 2010 reveal the membership decline was nearly 
the same for Evangelical congregations as for Mainline.467 Roozen goes on to report that 
interestingly, “the biggest decline among any age group within these families is among older 
evangelicals. Among that group, the number expressing confidence in organized religion fell 
from forty three percent to twenty seven.”468 Roozen went on to illustrate in the “Decade of 
Change” report, that “spiritual vitality”469 of American congregations also dropped significantly 
among Mainline, Evangelical, and Catholic denominations but the decline was most dramatic 
again for those Evangelical congregations dropping from forty nine percent in 2005 to thirty one 
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percent in 2010. The lower vitality was mirrored in the FACT survey by a decrease in 
congregational emphasis on prayer groups, spiritual retreats and scripture or theology studies. 
While it is clear the spiritual vitality of American congregations has significantly 
decreased over the last decade, there is a demand for more rigorous and relevant teaching from 
Scripture is reflected in the desires of the majority of parishioners. A recent Barna survey 
revealed that more than sixty seven percent of spiritually active believers confirmed their desire 
for their church to provide more instruction describing what the Bible teaches about current 
social and political issues.470  When congregational leaders intentionally built supportive 
communities, and engaged their people in faith practices (within and outside the congregation), 
they strengthened vitality. When leaders or the congregation at large focused on anything else, 
vitality diminished.471 
Further, polling data reveal that younger generations are disaffiliating at a much faster 
rate than previous generational cohorts.  With the decreased birth rate in America coupled with 
the lack of confidence in religious teaching, the importance of religious socialization through the 
family unit becomes magnified as indispensably necessary.472  Indeed, the structures of society, 
perhaps unknown to converts themselves, play a key role in determining religious choice.473 
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However, Simon Brauer acknowledges that though unique cultural nuances may contribute to the 
decline of religious interest and affiliation what sustains that decline is not necessarily unique 
and can be addressed. He explains that,   
Despite varied histories and cultures, countries might undergo the same process of 
religious decline if it is instigated by certain conditions common to contemporary life and 
maintained by basic processes of familial and societal socialization of new members. In 
other words, what starts religious decline is relatively new while what maintains it is not. 
One possibility is that forces that had previously engaged religious convictions have 
weakened, leading to a slow decline toward modest religiosity (Smith 
2017:198).conditions, albeit at different times and under different circumstances, that 
weaken the ability of society and families to socialize youth into religious 
traditions...Religious counter-movements, such as the religious right in the United States 
or anti-Soviet Catholic nationalism in Poland, might combat or offset some of that 
change. But so long as it remains harder to socialize new members into religious 
traditions than before, each subsequent generation will slowly make society less religious 
overall.474 
 
Regarding the factors that appear to be causing religious non-affiliation and disaffiliation 
in the West, Brauer discusses the influencing force of religious change as a non-directional 
process versus religious change as a self‐reinforcing process.475 In short, "with each generation, 
irreligious socialization will increasingly fuel the growth among religious nones more so than 
disaffiliation."476 Hammond echoes this as it relates contrarily to resurgence in arguing that, “just 
as the revival is social, so is its dying out: fading enthusiasm can also be contagious.”477 
Religious communities not only inform members' preferences and considerations of options, but 
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also sanction members' behaviors.478 Youth researchers Regnerus, Smith, and Fritsch suggest 
that it is a “common sense notion that parents and their own religious practices are among the 
strongest influences on the religious behavior of adolescents.”479  
Importance of Familial Religious Socialization 
The ability of parents to effectively communicate and transmit their own religious beliefs 
to their children for sustained growth (even survival) of that religion magnifies  the importance 
of religious socialization that allows Wuthnow to confidently assert, “Put simply: One important 
way in which religious orientations have become institutionalized is family.”480 Thus the integral 
necessity of family can be seen as the lynchpin for securing future Evangelical resurgence in 
America.  As Richard Baxter contended, “You are not likely to see any general reformation 
(resurgence), till you procure family reformation.”481 
Generally, the overall importance of religion in one's family of origin and the parents' 
specific religious activities reinforce religious conservatism that can be typically correlated with 
Evangelicalism. According to Wuthnow, the specific activity that had the strongest effect on 
reinforcing religious conservatism was reading the Bible at home and being sent to Sunday 
school having the weakest effect.482 This leads Wuthnow to confidently conclude, it is religious 
socialization in the family unit that “plays a role in maintaining religious conservatism: People 
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whose parents regarded religion as important and who engaged in family devotional practices 
such as reading the Bible together are more likely to attend religious services regularly and 
identify themselves as conservative.483 This finding suggests that some of the shift toward 
religious conservatism among baby boomers (noted earlier) may be a return to the religious 
practices of respondents' childhoods.484   
Unfortunately, however, the generational picture is bleak in America. With over a third of 
young Protestant teens do not think that church usually makes them think about important things. 
Schwadel and Smith’s research suggests, “On the whole, teens whose parents are affiliated with 
conservative denominations are somewhat more likely than most other Protestant teens to report 
that church usually makes them think about important things.485 
While it is the youngest generation in which a resurgence of Evangelical influence would 
most likely occur, it is precisely this generation (Millennial) that is most likely to continue the 
abdication of traditional Evangelical worldview as Barna laments,  
The United States is in the early stages of biblical abandonment and the consequent 
cultural decline.  Increasing numbers of people are comfortable with faith as long as it 
provides the benefits they seek and is neither demanding nor constraining.  This shift 
began tentatively more than four decades ago and has been gathering momentum ever 
since. Millennials, the generation whose choice will ultimately determine the nature of 
Christianity and the Church in America for several decades, appear poised to 
wholeheartedly support the shift away from biblical Christianity and toward new belief 
patterns.486 
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Presiding Bishop and Primate of the Episcopal Church of the United States, Katharine 
Jefferts Schori explains her parents’ reasoning for conversion from Catholicism to Episcopalian 
“I think my parents were looking for a place where wrestling with questions was encouraged 
rather than discouraged.”487 This testimony reminds the Church of the necessity to preach and 
teach with a confident certainty which results naturally in a clarity of how Scripture continues to 
speak into the lives of each generation. Steve Bruce explains the benefit of parents transmitting a 
confident Evangelical faith to their children that assists its ability to thrive compared to an 
ambiguous faith, 
The socialization of young children necessarily involves bowdlerizing and simplifying. 
The virtue of conservative Protestantism is that it survives such treatment better. Children 
can understand and believe in a God with the white beard who actually did make the 
world in six days and who dictated the Bible to faithful stenographers. Apart from 
anything else, conservative Protestantism has the advantage that its treatment of the 
Bible, as containing true stories of miraculous occurrences, makes for appealing 
presentation to children. Because conservative Protestantism is realistic and dogmatic, 
what is left after it has been reduced to the level of the comic book is still consistent with 
the mature product. When it suffers the same translation, liberalism appears either empty 
or uncertain and ambiguous.488 
 
In discussing the ambiguity that has led to the decline of the Protestant Mainline 
denominations that has prevented the passing on of the faith to the next generation, Sundberg 
affirms the situation is no better for those Evangelicals that have not engaged in rigorous 
religious activity by concluding, “Lapsed evangelicals are no more successful in passing faith on 
to their children than Christians raised in mainline churches.”489  Barna suggests the abiding lack 
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of planning and inadequate investment in the next generation will continue to add to the unstable 
futures of American churches. Where now three out of five religiously active parents say that 
they are primarily responsible (fifty nine percent) and more than one-third says that it’s mostly 
them, with the help of church leaders (thirty six percent).490491  
Additionally, Wuthnow’s data suggest that religious conservatism is also reinforced by 
congregational interaction, that is involvement in the local church, but not by special-purpose 
groups operating outside the local congregation.492 He argues, “One reason why religious 
conservatives are, in fact, conservatives rather than moderates is simply that they participate in 
congregations that provide affirming plausibility structures for conservative beliefs.”493 
However,  the conversion occurs most frequently through pre-established relationships with 
family being the most obvious and perhaps accessible, social networks (sacred and secular) also 
serve as a catalytic agent in the conversion process, to or from religion. Since it is “through 
repeated consumption of specific religious products, individuals come to prefer them to 
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alternatives”494 the necessity of familial involvement in purposeful religious socialization of their 
children becomes even more integral for any hope of a resurgence of Evangelicalism in America. 
Chapter Summary 
As a result of the examination presented in this chapter, a few conclusions must be 
proposed. First, religious alignment with political authority tends to diminish religious influence. 
Second, the primacy of prayer and preaching has served in each period as the impetus that 
sparked Evangelical resurgence.  Third, the importance of the family unit in transmitting the 
Christian faith to the next generation was viewed as a primary responsibility of parents, and 
fourth, as the authority of Scripture is diminished there is a corresponding ebbing of intense 
religiosity.  When the Evangelical message has evolved from the conversion of the individual so 
the individual can influence the greater culture, to interests in transforming the greater culture to 
affect the morality of individuals there is a declension in the effectiveness of Evangelicalism in 
the culture. This loss of evangelistic effectiveness, an Evangelical distinctive, is an influential 
catalyst for the rise of the Nones, especially among the traditionally Evangelical-affiliated, which 
Sherkat echoed nearly two decades ago, 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, liberal and moderate denominations became 
increasingly secular and this lack of distinctiveness from secular society pushed out 
members who desired more otherworldly religious compensators. Further, niche overlap 
with secular alternatives has meant that decreased loyalty also contributed to increasing 
rates of defection from organized religion — to both nonaffiliation and the nebulous 
“other Protestant” designation.495 
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In nearly every period of American religious history periods that experienced intense 
religious resurgence in America provide evidence that religious alignment with political 
authority tends to diminish religious influence over time.  The dangers of religion aligning with 
government and politics can be evidenced in other countries as well. For example, the 1876 
Spanish Constitution had established near complete religious freedom, and the influence of the 
Catholic church among the masses had been in decline in the early twentieth century because of 
its alliance with the oligarchy.496 Historian William Sweet provides further insight into how this 
relationship tends to weaken the fundamental aim of the religion, 
When religion attempts to interfere in the affairs of the civil state, it weakens and 
undermines the state’s legitimate power - the state becomes the tool of the church and 
does not function in its own right. Persecution by the state because of religion, in the 
attempt to secure religious uniformity, confuses the civil and the religious, denies the 
principles of Christianity and civility.497   
 
Further, as Sweet quips, Evangelicals have a persistent tendency of “constantly sticking 
their noses into the public arena.”498  Whereas the political agenda in the nineteenth century was 
fashioned around religious issues and leveraged tactics taken from the revivalist tradition the 
current political agenda in America is fabricated around constitutional and civil issues that 
leverage an equation of civil rights with inalienable morality.  
The men and women that sparked and served in advancing these periods of resurgence 
were burdened with an intense dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs both inside the 
church and culturally.  They had been serious students of Scripture and had given themselves to .  
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Although they were burdened with the current state of affairs of society, they did not aim to 
convert society. As they were students of Scripture, they were also students of the times, which 
allowed them to craft their methodologies accordingly for the conversion of the individual who 
lived in those churches and cultures, and although many revivals are known for their 
emotionalism, the key players used in these greater resurgences tended to avoid the emotionalism 
and were able to promote a sense of ecumenicity that allowed the movement(s) to transcend 
traditional and previously limiting denominational, demographic, and geographical boundaries.   
Indeed, there has been a vast growth of the non-religious in the United States in the past 
decade. One potential factor is just when a certain critical mass is obtained being unaffiliated 
becomes a legitimized identity that is no longer taboo and has become socially normalized.  
Although the decline in Evangelical affiliation has accelerated in recent years, hope is not lost for 
a resurgence in the near future as Brauer believes, “Even if the conditions that enable religious 
decline remain (making decline inevitable), religious revivals may effectively undo decades of 
slow decline.”499 Adding, “until we understand the nature of the water heater and the person 
turning on the faucet, we are left with significant unknowns about how long the bath will remain 
comfortable.” 
As with the importance of religious socialization in familial structures for the transmitting 
of religious values and increasing probability of affiliation, the principle holds true for political 
affiliation as well.  Wuthnow confirms the political socialization power of congregations by 
arguing, “One reason why religious conservatives are, in fact, conservatives rather than 
moderates is simply that they participate in congregations that provide affirming plausibility 
                                               
499 Brauer, “The Surprising Predictable Decline of Religion in the United States,” 19. 
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structures.”500 The current religious climate highlight these affirming plausibility structures 
making it easier, or perhaps more comfortable, for many who would have in previous 
generations to self-identify as a None. On the contrary, congregations that  
Individuals do not choose their religious identities as an act of rebellion but more so, 
perhaps, in a vacuum void previously occupied by religious belief that was certain, most 
importantly to this study, orthodox Evangelical belief in the authority of Scripture and  
“Religious orientations are not arbitrary labels that people choose when confronted with a Gallup 
pollster, but are identities that correspond loosely with stances on the Bible and on contested 
issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and school prayer.”501  Rizvi and Hossain confirm that 
“the single best predictor of church participation turned out to be belief - orthodox Christian 
belief, and especially the teaching that a person can be saved only through Jesus Christ.”502  
Further, the life of the mind was never ignored and concerted effort was typically always 
devoted to creating or substantiating institutions, schools, etc. that provided academic 
opportunity to sharpen the intellect for a more ardent delivery of the gospel and theology. Elton 
Trueblood articulated during the pinnacle of Billy Graham’s evangelistic success that “No vital 
Christianity is possible unless at least three aspects of it are developed. These are the inner life of 
devotion, the outer life of service, and the intellectual life of rationality.”503 Evidence of these 
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501 Ibid., 325.  
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three aspects of vital Christianity can be traced in each major period of Evangelical resurgence in 
American religious history.  
The decline in the spiritual vitality, religious interest and affiliation continues as the new 
century begins to mature. As Roozen illustrated in the 2010 FACTS survey, “Despite bursts of 
innovation, pockets of vitality, and interesting forays into greater civic participation, American 
congregations enter the second decade a bit less healthy than they were at the turn of the 
century.”504 This process of declination appears to be increasing in momentum as each year 
passes.  Chapter 4 will provide an analysis of the current state of spirituality in America, 
specifically as it relates to Evangelical affiliation among each generation.  An investigation of 
current beliefs and possible motivations for disaffiliation for each generational cohort will be 
provided for identification of any existing common themes. The purpose of discovering any 
identifiable catalyst(s) for the accelerated growth of the Nones population in America to possibly 
confirm future Evangelical resurgence is possible. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE CURRENT STATE OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 
 
Introduction 
Writing in the latter half of the twentieth century, American historian Theodore Roszak 
explained that the Christian faith in America had become, “socially irrelevant, even if privately 
engaging.”505  While Protestant forms of Christianity have dominated the American culture for 
more than two centuries, according to some researchers it should be no surprise that there has 
been a significant shift away from religion as experienced in America during the last two 
decades.506  
In a 2016 interview at the Reason Rally,507 Executive Director of the Secular Coalition 
Larry Decker proclaimed with confidence the rapidly increasing influence of the religious Nones 
in America, 
I’m religiously unaffiliated.  I think that what we’re seeing is that the - None of the 
Above community, and the religiously unaffiliated community in this country is growing, 
larger than any religious demographic.  And to me, that says that we’re winning, you 
know.  And it’s not a fight against religion, per se.  But it’s a fight for the equality for all 
people in this country to have freedom of religion, and freedom from religion.  I 
personally think that we’re going to turn this into a very strong voting bloc, particularly 
when we’re connecting with people around values that the secular community shares - 
                                               
505 Theodore Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends, (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973), 412. 
 
506 Simon Brauer, “The Surprising Predictable Decline of Religion in the United States,” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 2018 0(0): 1-22. See also James E. White, Rise of the Nones: Understanding and 
Reaching the Religiously Unaffiliated, (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2014) where he holds fast to the process of 
secularization as the primary cause of the rise of the Nones and clearly states since America is becoming more 
secular, “we should not be surprised at the rise of the Nones - or when their ranks continue to swell.” 48. 
 
507 The Reason Rally is an event held during presidential election years. It is “a not-for-profit organization 
whose mission is to hold large events in celebration of atheist, humanist, and secular identity and to demonstrate the 
power of the secular voting bloc.” It supports “fact-driven public policy, the value of critical thinking, and the voting 
power of secular Americans.” With the stated goal of showcasing “the presence and power of the nonreligious 
voting bloc, and to demand that reason be put at the forefront of our public and political discourse.” See, 
https://reasonrally.org/about.html Accessed August 23, 2019. 
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the values of freedom, equality, inclusion, and knowledge.  And, and you know - they’re 
not just for the secular community.  They’re American values.508 
 
Political scientist, Ryan Burge provides further insight into the historically ascending 
religious trendline as revealed in General Social Survey509 data that the increase is occurring 
among all generational cohorts where, “A person under the age of 40 is four times more likely to 
say that they have no religious affiliation today than in 1972. However, the jump in those over 40 
is six times as likely.”510 As there has been an increase in those that have self-identified as 
Evangelical in both age groups described by Burge, the expansion of Evangelicals has been 
negligible compared to the increase in those who have no religious affiliation.  The increase in 
those identifying as Evangelical has increased from seventeen percent to twenty one percent 
among those under 40 and seventeen percent to eighteen percent for those over 40 years of age 
from 1972 to 2018; however, the increase in those identifying with no religion has increased 
from eight percent to thirty two percent among those under 40 and three percent to seventeen 
percent for those over 40 years of age in the same amount of time.511 This accelerated population 
increase now gives religious Nones (twenty three percent) a slightly greater share of the 
                                               
508 Quoted from personal interview with Jerry Johnston, June 4, 2016 Washington D.C. Reason Rally. 
Larry Decker joined the Secular Coalition as its Executive Director in December 2015. He has spent nearly two 
decades in Washington, D.C. as a government relations professional in the public, private and nonprofit 
sectors. Thoroughly a humanitarian, he has secured nearly $1.5 billion for the global fight against AIDS and global 
Red Cross relief efforts. He is devoted to creating better lives for humanity.  
 
509 Since 1972, the General Social Survey (GSS) “has studied the growing complexity of American 
society. It is the only full-probability, personal-interview survey designed to monitor changes in both social 
characteristics and attitudes currently being conducted in the United States.”  The GSS is the National Opinion 
Research Center’s (NORC) longest running project. ”NORC at the University of Chicago is an independent research 
institution that delivers reliable data and rigorous analysis to guide critical programmatic, business, and policy 
decisions.” See, https://gss.norc.org/About-The-GSS Accessed August 23, 2019. 
 
510 Ryan P. Burge, “Plenty of the ‘Nones’ Actually Head Back to Church,” Christianity Today, February 6, 
2018.  
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American population as Evangelicals (twenty two and a half percent) and Catholics.512  The 
population of Nones has now surpassed Evangelicals in size from the Pew Research Center 
Religious Landscape survey conducted in 2014 where over twenty five percent of the population 
identified as Evangelical and only twenty two percent identified as None.513 
 The American Family Survey reports the highest number of Nones at thirty five percent 
of Americans and the number is even more staggering among the Millennial cohort at forty four 
percent with the Generation X cohort nearly as large at forty three percent.514 The data are 
providing a clear illustration of Decker’s declaration that the Nones are beginning to “win” in 
redefining the American religious landscape at the detriment of Evangelicalism.  In examining 
only a one year span, Brauer is able to illustrate the stability of the moderately religious 
population515, but the decline of the highly religious and corresponding growth of those that do 
not consider themselves to be religious.516 
 
                                               
512 Neil Monahan and Saeed Ahmed, “There are now as many Americans who claim no religion as there 
are evangelicals and Catholics, a survey finds,” CNN, April 26, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/13/us/no-
religion-largest-group-first-time-usa-trnd/index.html Summarizing Ryan P. Burge’s analysis of 2018 General Social 
Survey data available found in, https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/pages/show?page=gss%2Fhelp_variables 
 
513 Pew Research Center, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” May 12, 2015.  
 
514 American Family Survey, Deseret News and The Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy. 
 
515 Brauer categorized GSS respondents as religious if they met two criteria. “First, they must have 
reported being at least “Somewhat religious,” the third-most-religious response option on a seven-point scale. 
Second, they must have reported that they attended religious services at least once per month. I categorized 
respondents as secular if they met three criteria. First, they must have reported being no more than “Somewhat 
nonreligious,” the third- least-religious response option on a seven-point scale. Second, they must have reported that 
they attended religious services several times a year or less frequently. Finally, they must have reported that they 
prayed less frequently than once a week. The remaining respondents were categorized as ‘fuzzy.’” Simon Brauer, 
“The Surprising Predictable Decline of Religion in the United States,” 6. See also, David Voas, “The rise and fall of 
fuzzy fidelity in Europe,” European Sociological Review, 2009 25(2): 161 for a more detailed discussion of “fuzzy” 
religiosity. 
 
516 Simon Brauer, “The Surprising Predictable Decline of Religion in the United States,” 10-16. 
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Table 4.1 Stability of the Moderately Religious 
Category 2016 2017 
Highly Religious 38 37 
Moderately 
Religious 30 30 
Not Religious 32 33 
 
The number of Americans who identify as atheist, agnostic, or nothing in particular is 
now thirty five percent.  For Millennials and Generation X, the most common “religion” is no 
religion at all. The Nones claim forty four percent of the 18–29 age group, and nearly that (forty 
three percent) among those who are 30–44.517 The fact that high levels of religiosity are 
declining even among those that have traditionally been viewed as the most religiously 
conservative, i.e. Evangelicals, and those that are not identifying with religion are becoming 
more confident in identifying as such creates a precarious situation for the American church and 
perhaps a religio-cultural situation that can be celebrated by secularists generally and Nones 
particularly.  
In short, the confidence Americans currently place in religion and the church is at an all-
time low since Gallup began polling this survey question in 1973 after the Watergate scandal.  
Breaking below fifty percent for the first time in 2002 after the Catholic sex scandal news broke, 
the confidence has continued to plummet to an dismal thirty six percent, lower even than the 
presidency and United States Supreme Court.518 One potential factor contributing to the waning 
                                               
517 Jana Riess, “Religion declining in importance for many Americans, especially for Millennials,” Secular 
Coalition for America, December 11, 2018. Riess is citing the American Family Survey data in the context of the 
benefits of an ever-increasingly secular America. 
 
518 Justin McCarthy, “U.S. Confidence in Organized Religion Remains Low,” Gallup, July 8, 2019. 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/259964/confidence-organized-religion-remains-
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confidence in religion provided by a recent Pew Forum study reveals Nones believe religious 
organizations are too concerned with money and power, rules and politics.519 Those that have 
grown up in the church are leaving in droves; even those that have served as prominent speaking 
and worship leaders of global ministries are publicly renouncing their Christian faith.520  
Underlying Reasons for Religious Departure 
Religious switching, according to Pew Research, accounted for an estimated twenty three 
percent increase in growth of the religiously unaffiliated population in America.521 However, for 
those that grew up attending Protestant church(es) during their adolescent years and later left the 
church, an overwhelming majority indicated they disaffiliated due to “life changes,” typically 
college or moving away from home, that create resulting in enough distance from the church to 
show that it was not that integral for their spiritual well-being.  Sixty six percent of college-age 
adults ages 18-22 stop attending church according to the most recent LifeWay “student dropout 
survey.” The survey respondents were provided with fifty-five options as for indicating the 
reason they stopped attending church.  According to the survey, the results could be grouped into 
four primary categories:  
 
 
                                               
519 Pew Research Center, “Nones on the Rise,” October 9, 2012. 
https://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/  
 
520 Both songwriter and worship leader for Hillsong United, Marty Sampson and best-selling Christian 
author and pastor, Joshua Harris renounced their faith in Christianity in 2019. 
 
521 Pew Research Center, “Ranks of unaffiliated are expected to grow due to religious switching,” The 
Changing Global Religious Landscape, March 31, 2017. https://www.pewforum.org/2017/04/05/the-changing-
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Table 4.2 Reasons Young Adults are Dropping out of Church522 
Life Changes: that prevented them from 
attending 96% 
Church/Pastor Related 73% 
Religious, Ethical, or Political Beliefs 70% 
Youth/Student Ministry 63% 
 
Interestingly, among those aged 18-22 that attended church regularly during high school 
and continued to do so, though a diminishing group, chose to remain connected to the church 
because they viewed church as a vital part of their relationship with God.523 Further, those that 
did drop out of church after graduating from high school, but later returned to the church 
primarily did so as a result of parents or family members encouraging them to attend (thirty 
seven percent).524 Of those that dropped out after graduating high school, only thirty one percent 
                                               
522 Holly Meyer, “What new LifeWay Research survey says about why young adults are dropping out of 
church,” Nashville Tennessean, January 15, 2018.  Life Changes included work responsibilities, moving to college 
that prevented them from attending. Church/Pastor concerns included thirty two percent citing church members 
being judgmental and twenty nine percent cited a lack of feeling connected. Religious, Ethical, and Political beliefs 
included twenty five percent disagreeing with the church’s political or social stance on issues and twenty two 
percent admitted to attending only to please someone else in their lives at the time. Youth/Student ministry related 
concerns twenty three percent cited a lack of connection with the student ministry and only twenty percent cited the 
students in the ministry were judgmental or hypocritical.  See also, Frank L. Pasquale, “Empirical Study and Neglect 
of Unbelief and Irreligion,” in The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief, ed. Tom Flynn (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 
2007), 763-764 where Pasquale explains additional hypothesized factors, “Psychologist Bruce Hunsberger and his 
colleagues have provided more relevant data in a series of studies of Canadian high school and college students who 
adopt substantially irreligious stances. They tend to measure low in authoritarianism, high in complexity of thinking, 
and they exhibit a more gradual process of attitude change that begins earlier in life than among religious converts.” 
 
523 Young Adult Dropout Report 2017, “Church Dropouts: Reasons Young Adults Stay or Go between 
ages 18-22,” LifeWay Research, 25. http://lifewayresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Young-Adult-Church-
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returned to the church to attend services at least twice a month.525 So, the large majority, nearly 
seventy percent, that leave church will never return.526 
Importantly, those that are leaving are not leaving because of life stage effects.527 In other 
words, the rapid rise of Nones among Millennials is not simply a result of “that’s what people do 
in during that stage of life.” Rather, those that are choosing no religion appear to be doing so as a 
result of generational differences in preferences.  It is true that for decades coming-of-age young 
adults tend to disappear from church during their young adult years, typically in large numbers 
but many of them have usually found their way back to their childhood faith. This is no longer 
the case with each subsequent generational cohort.  The most recent Gallup data reveals, “The 
lower rate of church membership among religious millennials appears to be more a product of 
generational differences than of life-stage effects. In 1998-2000, sixty eight percent of 
Generation X respondents were church members when they were roughly the same age as today's 
millennials.”528 
Similar to Decker’s proclamation above, the majority (sixty two percent) survey 
respondents in America believing the global share of religiously unaffiliated will continue to 
increase in the coming decades, Pew research seems to indicate the contrary.  Pew Research 
Center is able to project that the global unaffiliated population will decline in the decades ahead 
due to the older religiously unaffiliated population in Asia being replaced by a younger, more 
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religious cohort.529  It is interesting, however, that it is Americans who assume the population of 
Nones will continue to increase; perhaps a reflection of their own experience with the rapid 
increase of the religiously unaffiliated in recent years.  Further, young adults, currently the 
fastest growing cohort of Nones, believe the religiously unaffiliated will be the largest religious 
category by the year 2050.530 
Since it is becoming increasingly clear that the population of Nones in America has 
dramatically increased among all cohorts in the past two decades and the increase shows no sign 
of slowing, Christianity is growing in the global context and slowing in the American context, 
and membership and beliefs of traditional Evangelicalism in America as represented by the 
Southern Baptist Convention is declining, the aim of this chapter is three fold. First, there will be 
a general examination of the geography and demography of American Nones.  This section will 
speak to the context and any contributions geography provides in determining the religious 
beliefs, or lack thereof, of American Nones. Additionally, there will be an examination of the 
religious beliefs and characteristics of four generational cohorts (Baby Boomers, Generation X, 
Millennials, and Generation Z) for the purpose of revealing in each cohort potential cause(s) that 
serve as catalyst(s) for the rapid increase in religious unaffiliation with each successive grouping.  
Second, a general qualifying of popular theories that have been presented as primary stimulants 
for the abandoning of Evangelical Christianity and the increase of religious switching, which has 
                                               
529 Pew Research Center, “Babies born to Muslims will begin to outnumber Christian births by 2035; 
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resulted in an ever-increasing population of Americans who choose to refuse to identify with any 
religion. Finally, an examination of the Evangelical Church in America, specifically data from 
the Southern Baptist Convention, as it relates to the loss of Evangelicalism’s foothold in 
American culture and how the failure of the Baby Boomers and Generation X in the American 
Evangelical Church to religiously socialize (evangelize) the subsequent generation has served as 
the primary catalyst for the rise of Nones and the decreasing membership in American 
Evangelicalism in general and Southern Baptist Churches specifically.  
Southern Baptist Convention membership data will be leveraged due to the Southern 
Baptist Convention serving as the largest evangelical denomination in America for several 
decades. It is assumed that Southern Baptist Convention data provides a more reliable 
representative sample of American Evangelicalism for this study.531  This chapter will utilize 
historical data from the Southern Baptist Convention to serve as a comparison between the 
religious views and characteristics of the religiously unaffiliated and the beliefs and 
characteristics of the largest Evangelical denomination in America.  
Geography of Belief 
Geography can play a role in how one chooses to religiously affiliate. Regarding the 
influence of geography, Keysar suggests, “The geographic clustering of American non-
                                               
531 Ryan Burge clarifies why narrowing the data set to the Southern Baptist Convention provides more 
objectivity compared to examining non-denominational data. The high defection rate among those that identify as 
non-denominational, “Not only is nondenominational Christianity among the largest affiliations, it also saw the 
highest rates of defection...Nondenominational Protestants were more likely than Protestants in other traditions to 
shift their identity during the four-year period (CCES data). Around 24 percent of those who claimed a 
nondenominational affiliation in 2010 switched—about double the volatility among Baptists and Methodists (12% 
and 12.9% respectively) and nearly three times that of Lutherans and Episcopalians (both at 8.6%) during the same 
time period.” Ryan P. Burge, “Where Protestants and Catholics Go When They Leave Their Churches,” Christianity 
Today, February 20, 2015. See also, Jeffrey M. Jones, “U.S. Church Membership Down Sharply in Past Two 
Decades,” Gallup, April 18, 2019 “Nondenominational Christians (fifty seven percent) are less likely to belong to a 
church than those tied to a specific denomination (seventy percent).” 
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identifiers, non-members and non-believers in the West fits its classification as the “none zone” 
in the Religion by Region series.”532 Further, and contrary to previous FACT surveys that 
showed that newer rural developments produced the most religious growth, the most recent 
survey conducted in 2010533 indicated that those congregations located near or in cities, 
regardless of geographical region, now experience the most growth; however, as far as the most 
spiritually fertile national geographic region, the South, from Maryland to Texas, continues to 
produce the most growth.534 Nonetheless, even the South is not immune to the declining 
inclination to share ones faith where from 2005 to 2015 those considered born-again residing in 
the South witnessed a twenty eight point decrease in those that share their faith with others.535 
Further, the South also is experiencing an exponential increase in the number of Nones.536 David 
                                               
532 Ariela Keysar, “Shifts Along the American Religious-Secular Spectrum,” Secularism and Nonreligion, 
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Unlikely to Come Back,” 14-15.  Unattached believers, those Nones who claim religion is still important in their 
lives, live in the south with over half being women.  https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/PRRI-RNS-
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Roozen, Director of Hartford Seminary’s Hartford Institute for Religion Research outlines how it 
is more than location that now determines the likelihood of influence for a congregation, 
Location, Location, Location used to be the kind way that researchers described the 
extent to which the growth or decline of American congregations was captive to the 
demographic changes going on in their immediate neighborhoods...in today’s world, 
growth and decline are primarily dependent upon a congregation’s internal culture, 
program and leadership, and therefore a congregation’s own ability to change and 
adapt.537 
 
Though there are pockets containing higher rates of the religiously unaffiliated, largely 
the numbers are increasing in every geographical region in America even in the South which has 
typically been perceived as a geographical bastion of religious conservatism.  
Demography of Belief 
Attempting to generalize the religiously unaffiliated in America falls outside the scope of 
this project.  Julia Duin’s research concludes that “men and singles are the largest demographic 
among the unchurched.” Although, “unchurched” does not necessarily correlate to religiously 
unaffiliated. Duin goes on to provide data showing an emerging classifiable group, working 
moms, which is about to join those two demographics of men and singles.538  Additionally, there 
are other facts such as sexual orientation that can increase the likelihood of identifying as a 
None. Students whose sexual orientation is Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Queer, or Other were more 
than twice as likely to be Atheist, Agnostic, or None, compared to heterosexual students (57 
percent versus 27 percent).539 Further, research from the Public Religion Research Institute 
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reveals that among those who left their childhood religion, women are twice as likely as men to 
say negative religious teachings about or treatment of gay and lesbian individuals was a major 
reason they chose to leave their religion (forty percent vs. twenty percent, respectively). Women 
are also about twice as likely as men to cite the clergy sexual-abuse scandal as an important 
reason they left their childhood faith (twenty six percent vs. thirteen percent, respectively).540  
Moving beyond gender and identity demography, Voas and Chaves suggest it is 
generational replacement that has contributed significantly to the religious decline as they say it 
“is largely the result of more-religious older generations being replaced by less-religious younger 
generations.”541  However, the rate of growth of the Nones population is compounded by the fact 
that each generation is doing less and less to religiously socialize or disciple the next where now 
in America, "with each generation, irreligious socialization will increasingly fuel the growth 
among religious Nones more so than disaffiliation."542 Therefore, It is necessary to provide a 
survey of the four most prominent generational cohorts in America.  Generation Z, Millennials, 
Generation X, and the Baby Boomer generation, which comprise the majority of the American 
population and are of age to make influential decisions, many are of age to have families, and 
contribute to society.   
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Generation Z 
Although the General Social Survey only provides data on those over eighteen years of 
age America’s youngest cohort, Generation Z, typically classified as those born after 1996543, 
will be briefly discussed here since valuable insight can still be ascertained regarding the 
religious preferences of America’s youngest cohort.  An overwhelming forty percent of young 
adults aged eighteen to twenty two are religiously unaffiliated and only a little over fourteen 
percent identify as Evangelical which fell to third behind Catholicism (sixteen percent).544 
Further, and perhaps most alarmingly, Generation Z has deprioritized family placing personal 
achievement, even hobbies and pastimes, above their value of family heritage as influencing 
their sense of self. Falling to fourth, tying with the prioritization of religion, among the youngest 
generation, the influence of family was the top priority among all other preceding generations.  
Similarly, and perhaps the catalyst for this is the family’s decreasing prioritization of religion 
with each subsequent generation.545 
Perhaps one of the most alarming symptoms of decreasing levels of religiosity among the 
youngest cohort is the drastic increase in mental health issues experienced by this generation. In 
explaining that,  “as a proxy of the social aspects of religion, attendance is one of the primary 
reasons for better health and well-being among the religious,”546 Fenelon and Denielsen speak to 
                                               
543 See Michael Dimock, “Defining generations: Where Millennials end and Generation Z begins,” Pew 
Research Center, January 19, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-
generation-z-begins/ Similarly defined by the American Marketing Association. 
 
544 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, Brian Schaffner; Stephen Ansolabehere; Sam Luks, 2019, 
"CCES Common Content, 2018", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZSBZ7K, Harvard Dataverse, V1. The data includes 
a nationally representative sample of 60,000 American adults. 
 
545 David Kinnaman, “Gen Z: Your questions answered,” Barna Research Group, February 6, 2018. 
https://www.barna.com/research/gen-z-questions-answered/  
 
546 Andrew Fenelon and Sabrina Danielsen, “Leaving my religion: Understanding the relationship between 
religious disaffiliation, health, and well-being,” Social Science Research 57 (2016), 55, 50. 
168 
the positive mental health benefits of regular religious service attendance illustrates the 
correlation between drastically lower rates of religious service attendance among the youngest 
generations and the dramatic rise in mental health issues.  
Evidence of this correlation is shown among members of Generation Z who are the least 
likely to report "excellent or very good" mental health. Generation Z is significantly more likely 
to report their mental health as fair or poor, with twenty seven percent saying this is the case. 
Millennials (fifteen percent) and Gen Xers (thirteen percent) have similar numbers reporting fair 
or poor mental health, while fewer than one in ten Boomers (seven percent) and older adults 
(five percent) consider their mental health fair or poor.547 When it comes to specific mental 
health issues, adult Gen Zs are more likely than other generations to report they have been 
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder (eighteen percent) and more likely than all other generations 
to report they have been diagnosed with depression (twenty three percent). While those in 
Generation X (fifteen percent), Millennials (fourteen percent) and Boomers (twelve percent) are 
diagnosed.  Recent research confirms what college mental health professionals and 
administrators have noticed over the past few decades: there is a mental health crisis taking place 
on college campuses.548 Growing numbers of students arrive on campus with histories of 
significant mental health challenges, and higher proportions of college students report taking 
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psychiatric medications than ever before.549  As those in Generation Z show the lowest levels of 
religious service attendance they are reporting the highest number of mental health issues.  
Millennials 
There are varying opinions regarding a definitive date range for Millennials. This study 
employs the parameters used by Pew Research Center where Pew Research Center decided in 
2018 to use 1996 as the last birth year for Millennials for their future work. Anyone born 
between 1981 and 1996 (ages 23 to 38 in 2019) is considered a Millennial, and anyone born from 
1997 onward is part of a new generation.  Gallup provides data showing that the None 
population is more than one in three Millennials with thirty three percent reporting no religious 
affiliation in 2019.550 Some researchers have referred to Millennials as being “spiritually 
confused” largely as a result of “the guidance (or lack thereof) provided by religiously 
unaffiliated Baby Boomer parents on religion and spirituality.”551  For this cohort, church 
membership is becoming much less important than previous generations with “just forty two 
percent of millennials are members of churches.”552 With only twenty two percent of Millennials 
holding that none of the primary, traditionally held religious texts qualify as a sacred text 553 it is 
clear that the belief in the inerrancy of Scripture is in sharp decline.  
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It was the parenting style of the Baby Boomer cohort provided a developmental 
environment that provided children more freedom of choice.  Explaining this new parental 
encouragement of choice, Bibby, Russell, and Rolheiser show that “pluralism, equality, 
diversity, and individual freedom were values woven into the parenting practices of many Baby 
Boomers who, unlike their own parents, were less inclined to expose and involve their children 
in religious traditions and faiths.”554 Consequently, “many Millennials received passive guidance 
from parents, who actively chose to allow their children to independently explore religion and 
spirituality.”555  This accurately mirrors Thiessen’s and Wilkins-LaFlamme’s research that 
concludes the four primary factors serving as the most significant catalysts for the two youngest 
generations in choosing to not identify with a religion being 1) Parents give choices to children 
(whether to attend religious services), 2) Intellectual Disagreements (Unanswered questions, 
compatibility of faith/science, etc.), 3) Social Influences, and 4) Life Transitions.556  The primary 
influencing agent became parents imparting autonomy at an early age which showed to be 
detrimental to the child’s spiritual development and the vitality of the church as “this emphasis 
on autonomy and choice gives young people, for example, the option of not attending church.557 
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This created a cultural context where, “religious affiliation is now a matter of private choice”558 
confirming that these identified causes reaffirm the critical role parents play in passing on 
religious faith leading Ed Stetzer to state forthrightly, 
There is no easy way to say it, but it must be said. Parents and churches are not passing 
on a robust Christian faith and an accompanying commitment to the church.  We can take 
some solace in the fact that many do eventually return. But Christian parents and 
churches need to ask the hard question, “What is it about our faith commitment that does 
not find root in the lives of our children?559 
 
The “roots” as Stetzer suggests, are what is missing in the lives of the youngest cohorts 
and which is allowing them to spiritually drift as they mature. To this, Smith and Snell posit, 
“Little evidence supports the idea that emerging adults who decline in regular external religious 
practice nonetheless retain over time high levels of internal religious faith.”560 Leading them to 
conclude that the case is “quite the contrary.”561 McConnell argues, that thirty five percent of 
those that leave the church eventually find their way back to the church. However, this reveals 
that the overwhelming majority, approximately sixty five percent or more, will not return.562  
This data magnifies Mohler’s emphasis on the necessity of parents intentionally discipling their 
children while they are young by concluding, “There is no question that children raised within 
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Christian homes by Christian parents are most likely to make their own profession of faith and 
continue church participation into adulthood,”563  
Hope is not lost on the Millennials, however. Social scientist, Robert Putnam provides a 
glint of confident hope that these will be the individuals who will lead the way in a positive 
cultural revolution that is not so individualistic but more civil and interdependent upon one 
another. And, it is religion, he says, that is the best vehicle for this generation to create a 
resurgence Putnam states, “I actually think it’s possible that the millennials will lead a renewal of 
civil society. There’s a decent chance we’re on the verge of a major change in American 
society...And religion, he said, could very well be a part of that.” 564 
Generation X 
Pew defines Generation X as those born between 1965 and 1980.565 A comparison of the 
1990 and 2008 American Religious Identification Surveys566 indicated that “Generation X 
became more secular and also less Christian (eighty five percent in 1990 v. seventy five percent 
in 2008) as it aged and grew in size.”567 Importantly, the number of Nones grew among 
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Generation X during the same time period from eleven to sixteen percent.568  In general, 
Generation X experienced significant growth due to immigration, increasing its overall 
population from twenty nine million to thirty four million between 1990 and 2008.569  This 
growth from immigration was primarily due to immigration from Latin America, a point worth 
noting as the significance is seen in the strikingly low number of first and second generation 
immigrants in the Southern Baptist Convention.570  Regarding immigration, according to 2007 
and 2014 Pew survey data the overwhelming majority of the religiously unaffiliated population 
is third generation or greater immigrant. With this population holding relatively steady in the 
seven-year period at eighty percent in 2007 vs seventy five percent in 2014.571 
The data make it clear that Generation X experienced a significant secularizing effect and 
it is necessary to determine whether this was a result of more individuals from this cohort 
pursuing higher education with fifty seven percent having completed some college or completed 
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a bachelor’s degree or higher.572 In addressing the assumed secularizing effect of higher 
education, Kosmin explains that the assumption does not hold true for Generation X; “Secular 
members of Generation X are just as likely as religious members of Generation X to have a 
college education. Moreover, members of Generation X with a college degree are no more likely 
to identify as Nones than those without college degrees. Thus, education was not a factor in 
secularization among Generation X in 1990 or 2008.”573 
Brooke Hempell, senior vice president of research for Barna remarked,  
What stood out most to us was how stark the shift was between the Boomer and Gen-Xer 
generations...We expected Millennials to be most influenced by other worldviews, but the 
most dramatic increase in support for these ideals occurs with the generation before them. 
It’s no surprise, then, that the impact we see today in our social fabric is so pervasive, 
given that these ideas have been taking root for two generations.574 
 
So, it was not necessarily those in Generation X that were secularized through the process of 
pursuing higher education but rather they were conditioned by the generation before them; their 
parents. Confirming the hypothesis that preceding generation(s) socialization had a great effect 
on the religiosity of the succeeding generation is confirmed by Kosmin and Navarro-River’s 
analysis,  
Identification with religion declined among Generation X as they aged, particularly 
among men, which suggests that the secularization of Americans is not just about young 
people from the Millennial Generation abandoning religion because it has become too 
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politicized. It is an on-going and wider process that involves other generations in 
American society, particularly Generation X.575  
 
Similarly, to general fertility estimates of the religiously affiliated, those in Generation X 
“who self-identified with the Christian traditions have more children and are more likely to be 
married than are Nones or Other Religions.”576 Nonetheless, the current trend of lower fertility 
and marriage rates can find its origin among those in Generation X.577 Following the trends of 
the generations that came before them, it could have been assumed that Generation X would 
have married, had children, and identified with religion as they aged but this has not been the 
case.  Those in Generation X that are now having children are raising those children in less 
religious environments than preceding generations which will most assuredly serve as a 
continued catalyst for the declining American Evangelicalism in general and the rapid increase 
of Nones specifically.  
Those in Generation X experienced a new cultural development that began in the home 
initiated by their parents of the Baby Boomer Generation.  Generation X children were afforded 
more autonomy of choice and as they aged, they began making decisions like no generation 
before them.  Speaking to the surprise of the effects the home environment had on this 
generation Kosmin stated, “Many in this generation of Americans have abandoned their religious 
roots and political affiliations in adulthood. Historically and sociologically, that’s an unexpected 
                                               
575 Kosmin and Navarro-River, “The Transformation of Generation X: Shifts in Religious and Political 
Self-Identification, 1990-2008,” 12. See also, Michelle Boorstein, “Huge Religion Survey: Gen X-ers less Christian, 
Less Republican,” Washington Post, May 31, 2012.  
 
576 Ibid. 
 
577 See, Michael Hout, Andrew Greeley, and Melissa J. Wilde, “The demographic imperative in religious 
change in the United States,” American Journal of Sociology (2001) 107(2):468–500, For the importance of fertility 
rates and their influence on religious change. 
 
176 
development.”578  These changes, “religious, social, and political,” report Kosmin and Navarro-
River, are often first evident and most pronounced among the youngest cohort of American 
adults, comparing responses between 1990 and 2008 is useful for highlighting social change.”579 
Baby Boomers  
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, “By 2029, when all of the Baby Boomers will be 
65 years and over, more than 20 percent of the total U.S. population will be over the age of 
65.”580  Interestingly, even at its eventual largest number, the entire population or Baby Boomers 
is smaller than the current population of Nones, which is continuing to increase year over year; 
however, according to the Census Bureau, “By 2056, the population 65 years and over is 
projected to become larger than the population under 18 years.”581  This means the Millennial 
and Gen Z cohorts have and will continue to have significant generational influence due to their 
large population size.  
While surveys indicate a seismic shift away from identifying with religion among the 
Millennial generation, these same data suggest that it was the Baby Boomer generation where the 
slide began.  
Generally, cohorts experience an increase in religiosity later in life. A reason for this 
increased attention to religious thought and activity is proposed by Lars Tornstam as 
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“gerotranscendence” which suggests older individuals “experience a shift in meta-perspective 
from a midlife materialistic and rational vision, to a more cosmic and transcendent one, 
accompanied by an increase in life satisfaction.”582 
Baby boomers are particularly disconnected from religion. Americans born in the later 
1940s and in the 1950s—the heart of the baby boom generation—are particularly 
unlikely to hold literal views of the Bible. The across-cohort decline in attendance begins 
among baby boom cohorts. Additionally, the probability of weekly prayer is lowest 
among baby boom cohorts. In their analysis of religious disaffiliation, Hout and Fischer 
propose a 1960s legacy effect583 that leads to religious decline. The above results suggest 
that the 1960s legacy effect may be specific to those who matured in and around the 
1960s, rather than enduring across later cohorts.584 
 
Wuthnow is able to provide a succinct definition of what religious socialization aims to 
accomplish in stating, “the effects of religious socialization is that more frequent religious 
activity as a child leads to more frequent religious activity as an adult, which, in turn, is 
associated with religious conservatism.”585  But this has not been the case among the Baby 
Boomer generation.  
The religiosity of Boomers has been found to be relatively stable compared to previous 
generations where levels of religiosity increased in the twilight years of one's life.  The study by 
Silverstein and Bengston found that the majority (56%) of Boomers reported steady levels of 
religiosity over the past decade, only twenty one percent indicated an increase in religiosity with 
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sixty four percent  reporting a belief in God with high level of certainty.586  Of those that 
reported an increase in spirituality, they indicated a concern for the religious development of 
their children or grandchildren as a primary catalyst for the increased interest.587  
Additionally, Sherkat found that traditional socialization agents, such as parents and 
school, were most responsible for the religious beliefs and involvement of Baby-Boomers.588 
Similar to each subsequent generation, Boomers are no more likely to return to religion or attend 
church later in life.  Generally, the majority of Boomers report stable levels of religiosity later in 
life.  “This may be the last generation to have had such widespread exposure to religion in 
childhood and to have been active religious consumers in their earlier lives—providing another 
example of how baby-boomers are a transitional cohort, even now in their later years.”589 
Why Different Generations choose None (Barriers to Faith) 
Silverstein and Bengston predictive model of religious change among Baby Boomers 
specifies a direct relationship between early religious involvement and religious change. To this 
they explain, 
Examining the indirect effects of childhood religious attendance, we see that greater 
religious exposure early in life heightened the risk that religiosity increased over the ten-
year period by strengthening cognitive and behavioral religiosity. Similarly, greater early 
exposure lowered the risk of declining religiosity by strengthening both types of 
religiosity...Those with greater early exposure were more likely to experience religious 
decline, implying continued moderation of religious commitment in the transition to later 
life590 
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In analyzing age, period, and cohort effects on religion, Schwadel provides insights that 
suggest “the youngest cohorts are more inclined towards biblical literalism than are the 
immediately post-World War II cohorts.”591 He continues that, “While biblical literalism 
declines somewhat across periods, there appears to be a moderate resurgence in biblical 
literalism among the youngest birth cohorts.”592 Recent survey research indicates sixty one 
percent of those that identify as Christian agree with ideas rooted in New Spirituality, with fifty 
four percent  resonating with postmodernist views, another thirty six percent accepting ideas 
associated with Marxism, and twenty nine percent believing ideas based on secularism.593 This 
further confirms that not only are more individuals choosing to not identify with a religion, those 
that do choose to identify as Christian are experiencing a dilution in the content of their beliefs. 
According to Cooperative Congressional Election Study594 data the average age of 
American Nones is just over forty-three years old, squarely in the Generational X cohort. This is 
much younger than the average age of nearly fifty-two years of Protestants but still old enough to 
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have children in one of the integral generations discussed above for reversing the trend;595 
however, as Brauer acknowledges, each cohort could behave differently than their predecessors. 
Where there exist conditions and factors (cultural, economic, etc.) that serve as a catalyst for 
changes in levels in religiosity, for example, but once those “mechanisms” are set in motion, 
Brauer argues, “it is more plausible that mechanisms might start or enable a process that takes on 
its own trajectory.”596 As a result making assumptions regarding how a particular rising cohort 
will act is difficult.  
Qualifying Theories Regarding the Increase In Nones 
James White proposes three primary catalysts for the rise of the Nones, 1) Secularization 
(Christianity is losing its place as the dominant worldview), 2) Privatization (spiritual things are 
increasingly placed in the private arena), and 3) Pluralization (Individuals are confronted with 
increased ideologies and faith options - which he attributes to increased immigration).597 
Secularization and secularization theory needs to be briefly addressed and dismissed as the 
primary catalyst for the rapid growth of Nones in America. Secularization is generally viewed 
through the lens of what Swatos and Christiano term the ‘‘decline in religion thesis.”598 The 
central thesis of secularization suggests that as a society modernizes there will be a resulting, or 
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corresponding, decrease in religious belief and participation.599 This secularization perspective 
predicts that religious participation and belief decline as societies modernize.  
Secularization surely does act as a “solvent” as Stephen Dawson alleged;600 however, this 
project assumes the thorough conclusion of Simon Brauer who suggests that his evaluation of 
Voas’ data revealed that secularization is certainly at play in America, but the findings that there 
is a decrease in those who could be considered intensely religious and a corresponding increase 
in those who are not religious show that, 
These findings strengthen the plausibility that a general process of religious decline was 
at play during much of the 20th century in the United States and Europe. Certainly, these 
findings fit within secularization theory, and could be used to argue that it was abandoned 
prematurely. But this would neither be easy nor necessary. It would require a clear 
specification of what secularization means and what subtheories within the breadth of 
secularization theory should be retained.601 
 
Though secularization of American culture is not the primary justification for the 
growing lack of religious affiliation, there are several other commonly proposed reasons that 
might provide insight into this phenomenon.  Interview data from Thiesen and Wilkins-
LaFlamme confirm that “the dynamics within religious institutions are not cited as the main 
reasons in an individual’s choice to disaffiliate,” nonetheless, “once the decision is made these 
dynamics can at times reinforce it.”602  Across the sociological research, there are several reasons 
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suggested as serving as stimulants in creating a cultural environment that has made it more 
acceptable to identify as a None and to disaffiliate from the religion of their family. With at least 
one in four internet users using the internet to search for and obtain religious or spiritual 
information,603 Nick Fish, president of American Atheists suggests one contributing factor is that 
the ever-accessible internet has fueled both question asking and access to answers without the 
need to test the validity of the sources.604 With over half of what Pew calls “Religion Surfers” 
seeking information regarding other religions but the overwhelming majority (seventy four 
percent) are very active in their current faith and attend a religious service at least once per 
week.605  This suggests that the internet is not significantly contributing to the rise of Nones.  
LGBTQ Equality 
A third of Nones polled by the Public Religion Research Institute religion stated it was 
their “experience of negative religious teachings about or treatment of gay and lesbian people” 
that influenced them to leave them to leave their childhood religion.606  While there has been an 
overall increase in American Christians who accept homosexuality as normal and believe it 
should be accepted,607 and an increase in Evangelical Protestants that believe the same, there has 
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been a drastic increase in the number of Southern Baptists who believe homosexuality should be 
accepted as normal as well. While there was a seven percent increase for the entire Southern 
Baptist Convention between 2007 and 2014, the increase from thirty five percent in 2007 to fifty 
three percent in 2014 among those 18-29 years of age is the most significant increase among all 
cohorts and a sharper increase in the number Nones that believe homosexuality should be 
accepted.608  Similarly, Southern Baptists aged 18-29 are nearly twice as likely to favor same sex 
marriage than the previous cohort and their parent’s cohort.609 This data reveals the youngest 
cohorts in the Southern Baptist Convention are getting much closer to mirroring the beliefs of 
Nones.610 
Although a third of Nones claim the church’s position and teaching regarding 
homosexuality as being an influence for their unaffiliation, it is not a significant enough of a 
motive for the continued growth of Nones especially given the increasing number of Evangelical 
Christians who have become accepting of homosexuality.  
Politics 
Hout and Fischer examined three possible explanations for the rise of the Nones (those 
who report no religious affiliation, regardless of their belief or behavior). Their three 
explanations are secularization, demographics, and politics. They reject the secularization thesis 
for reasons mentioned above, particularly the persistence of religious belief in America. They 
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additionally reject demographic influence since these cannot account for such a rapid increase in 
religious unaffiliation. This leads them to conclude  politics was the primary factor. The growing 
detachment from organized religion in their view is associated with a backlash against the 
political powers of the religious right.”611 
According to Pew, the second most common reason given by Nones for their lack of 
affiliation is the position(s) taken by churches on political issues.612 Currently, Americans have 
more confidence in the presidency than in religion or the church.613  A peculiar reality given 
Burge’s analysis that the presidency of Trump may be influencing the declining numbers in 
American Evangelicalism.614  
Schwartz writing on the politicization of Evangelicalism stated that “...the overarching 
narrative of postwar (Vietnam) Evangelicalism is growing politicization.”615 A point that Baker 
and Smith take up and explain that in responding to,  
cultural shifts in morality, sexuality, and gender, the religious right politicized these 
issues and aligned themselves with the Republican Party. Political reaction against 
secularism, paradoxically, increased the numbers of the nonreligious, especially among 
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the nonreligious believers. The secular left has since become a voting bloc that agrees on 
issues of abortion, same-sex relations, and marriage.616 
 
Some data does confirm the politicization of religion in general and Evangelicalism in 
particular is a compelling catalyst for the growth of the Nones.617 Even though Evangelical’s 
traditional alliance with American politics throughout American history is viewed unfavorably 
by many, political affiliation is an identifier not a cause of unaffiliation.618 As such, the political 
involvement of Evangelicals and the alignment of traditionally biblical aims with political 
agendas has blurred the ability to distinguish the two. This could be remedied by intentional 
intellectual training through both the institutions of higher education and the family unit.  
Socio-Economic Theories  
Socio-economic theories have also been provided by some like van Ingen and Moor.  The 
central thesis in these theories is purports that, “People living in insecure conditions are expected 
to have a heightened need for religiosity that comforts and reassures them.”619  However, this 
does not seem to hold true for the American context overall. The most recent economic recession 
occurred in 2008 and there was no notable increase in religiosity or religious affiliation. In fact, 
the opposite occurred. Both the number of religious Nones continued to increase and the number 
of Evangelicals, Southern Baptists specifically, continued to decrease.  
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Exclusive Truth Claims 
Furthermore, one might think in a pluralistic, postmodern culture620 that the exclusive 
truth claims central to Evangelical Christianity could be a deterrent to some individuals, but data 
suggest this is not the case. Though exclusive claims to truth can be viewed unfavorably by 
some, it is not enough of a significant factor for those who choose to disaffiliate. However, the 
further away one moves from the religion they disaffiliated with the more exclusivity became a 
factor for choosing not to return later in life, after having children, for example.621 
 
Higher Education 
Evangelicals have long been characterized as anti-intellectual and diligent in insulating 
believers from the influences of secularism that were thought to be rampant at institutions of 
higher education.  Where high school graduates who were Christian that chose to attend a secular 
university would have their faith assaulted.622 Church historian, Mark Noll highlighted the irony 
of the idea of an intellectual Evangelicalism in quipping, the scandal of the Evangelical mind is 
that there is not much of an Evangelical mind at all.623 
The lacking Evangelical intellectual ethos existed throughout most of the twentieth 
century which led Richard Hofstadter to identify the “evangelical spirit” as one of the prime 
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sources of American anti-intellectualism.  Where a humble ignorance has been a far more noble 
human quality than a cultivated mind.624  In essence, a dumbing of the Christian mind has 
occurred to the detriment of the Evangelical church and is dissolving institutions of biblical 
higher education at an alarming rate providing an ever-decreasing number625 of available 
(credible) colleges and universities that still integrate a biblical worldview across the curriculum.  
So what of the Nones and their perception and levels of educational attainment?  The 
most recent data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study suggest that the “nothing in 
particular” category have lower levels of formal educational attainment,626 but those individuals 
that do choose to pursue higher education are more likely to be or become religiously 
unaffiliated.  Those that disaffiliated from religion have higher levels of educational attainment.  
According to General Social Survey data from 1972 to 2012 over sixty percent had completed at 
least some college compared to the over fifty percent of those who have never affiliated with 
religion having only attained a high school education or less.627  
However, by examining data from the Youth Parent Socialization Panel Study, Darnell 
and Sherkat were able to surface evidence suggesting that “fundamentalist beliefs and 
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conservative Protestant affiliation both have significant and substantial negative influences on 
educational attainment above and beyond social background factors.”628 Where the more 
religiously conservative the individual the less likely that individual would pursue higher levels 
of education.629 Additionally, and specifically, those that hold the conservative belief of the 
inerrancy of Scripture appear to also correlate to lower levels of education attainment and 
performance. 
Biblical inerrancy not only has a significant negative direct effect on educational 
attainment, but inerrancy also influences two key aspects of the educational attainment 
process: (1) Believers in the inerrancy of scripture are significantly less likely than other 
respondents to enroll in college-preparatory courses, and (2) such beliefs have a modest 
negative estimated effect on grade-point average in high school.630 
 
One Pew study on the most and least educated religious groups in America shows 
Mainline denominations among the most educated and those that identify with the Southern 
Baptist Convention ranking twenty-third out of thirty religious groups polled.  Only nineteen 
percent of Southern Baptist reported having a four-year degree (eight percentage points below 
the general U.S. public) and forty six percent having a high school diploma or less.631 This 
echoes Darnell’s and Sherkat’s affirmation regarding the negative consequences fundamentalist-
type beliefs have on educational attainment by concluding their “results have revealed that 
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fundamentalist orientations significantly retard educational attainment.”632 They continue 
regarding the negative correlation between familial religious and denominational affiliation 
arguing,  “Parents' religious orientations and denominations also influence youths' educational 
choices. Youths are less likely to take college preparatory courses if parents subscribe to 
fundamentalism.”633 Van Ingen and Moor argue from their research that “not only individual-
level but also congregational level educational attainment has a negative effect on biblical 
literalism. This mean that the erosion of religiosity is self-reinforcing (even the lower educated 
are affected, because they are surrounded by more highly educated individuals).”634  Similarly 
Darnell and Sherkat conclude that higher education levels have tended to correlate with a 
decreased view of inerrancy of Scripture which in turn prevents views of the authority and 
reliability of Scripture to be passed on to their children. They continue, “In contrast, parents from 
the South and rural areas are more likely to believe that the Bible is the inerrant word of God.”635  
Education and Religious Affiliation 
Allan Downey compiled data from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program that 
illustrated “the fraction of “Nones” is higher at universities, thirty six percent, than at four-year 
colleges, twenty six percent, mostly because more colleges than universities are religiously 
affiliated.”636 Nonetheless, the number of freshman Nones at four-year colleges has tripled in the 
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past thirty years. Not surprisingly, religious colleges are more religious, with only 17 percent 
Nones.637  
Higher education and rigorous learning is not counter-productive to religion in general or 
Christianity specifically.  In examining examples from the global context, Tong provides a 
counter argument that illustrates Singapore’s science-oriented education system and associated 
‘intellectualization’ of the population has actually facilitated a growing number of conversions to 
Christianity. Moving away from traditional Chinese ritual practices towards the more ‘rational’ 
Bible teachings of Christianity reflects a shift ‘from an unthinking and passive acceptance of 
religion’ to a religion that is believed to be more ‘systematic, logical, and relevant.’638  
So, what is the most influential factor contributing to the rapid increase in the number of 
Americans who are choosing to disaffiliate from religion in general and Evangelical Christianity 
in particular? When Pew data confirms that the primary reason Nones choose not to affiliate with 
religion is the questioning of religious teaching639 it is becoming clear that Evangelical families 
have failed in religiously socializing the next generation. Or, in other words, each generation has 
become less intentional in discipling their children which has resulted in a decreased certainty 
regarding doctrine and truth claims. 
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Religious Socialization 
According to the 2014 Religious Landscape study the overwhelming majority of Nones 
are not parents. With seventy four percent of the religiously unaffiliated having no children this 
is an increase of seven percent from 2007.640 On the other hand, the majority of Southern 
Baptists are married with only a small minority that have never been married, interestingly 
corresponding with the total number of 18-29 year old members.641 For those in the church that 
do have children, they are relying on others for spiritual development. Unfortunately, and to the 
detriment of American Evangelicalism, Barna argues, “A large majority of churched believers 
rely upon their church, rather than their family, to train their children to become spiritually 
mature.”642 In examining instances where children actually developed into mature believers 
Barna found that there had been a symbiotic (not parasitic or consumeristic) relationship between 
parents and the church that facilitated the spiritual maturation of youth, 
In situations where children became mature Christians we usually found a symbiotic 
partnership between their parents and their church,...The church encouraged parents to 
prioritize the spiritual development of their children and worked hard to equip them for 
that challenge. Parents, for their part, raised their children in the context of a faith-based 
community that provided security, belonging, spiritual and moral education, and 
accountability. Neither the parents nor the church could have done it alone.643 
 
Barna was writing in 2003. Lamentably, since his empirical exhortation to the church to 
focus on discipling the next generation Nones have increased by more than one hundred percent 
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from approximately fourteen percent in 2000 to over twenty eight percent currently.644  
Correspondingly, membership in the Southern Baptist Convention churches has decreased by 
nearly 1.4 million from 2003 to 2018 and baptisms have continued to decrease year over year 
even though there are more Southern Baptist Churches than ever.645 Thom Rainer, President and 
CEO of LifeWay, expressed regret at the ineffectiveness of the Southern Baptist Convention 
strategy in hoping new churches would equal more return on evangelistic effort, stating, “It’s 
heartbreaking to be baptizing fewer people for Christ, even though Southern Baptists have nearly 
2,900 more churches than we had a decade ago.”646 This decrease in baptisms is not a subtle leak 
as the more than one hundred twenty thousand fewer baptisms in 2018 than in 2003 clearly 
depicts a rupture in evangelistic effectiveness. The youngest two generations only comprise 
approximately thirteen percent of Southern Baptist membership647 and approximately seventy 
percent of them leave the church after graduating high school and do not return.  
The stability of the family unit is also important to the success of the religious 
socialization process. The research of Glass, Sutton, and Fitzgerald found a recurring link 
between parental divorce, geographic mobility, and changes in religious participation that 
precipitate religious switching and disaffiliation. They suggest this is particularly true for 
“Conservative Protestant youth who, overall, come from a more stable religious category. 
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Disaffiliation from religion, in particular, is characterized by changes in family structure and 
functioning, such as parental divorce and decreased religious participation, as well as lower 
involvement in church youth programs.”648  They go on to conclude that, “that religious 
switching is related to changes in social ties and opportunities, which often precede the actual 
switch.” In other words, the more stable the family environment the more likely it will be that the 
parents’ faith is successfully transmitted to the child(ren), given the parents are having 
intentional conversations regarding faith matters.649  
Brauer clearly illustrates what is occurring in the American religious landscape, “If the 
pools of parents and peers become less religious, they might instigate further decline in the 
following cohorts and generations. Finally, national religiosity moderates the effectiveness of 
parental religiosity, such that initial declines within a religious country might instigate further 
declines across cohorts.”650 Thiessen and Wilkins-LaFlamme continue the case that each 
generation will continue to become more and more unaffiliated by arguing, “While disaffiliation 
has (to this point) been an important catalyst for a growing unaffiliated segment, with each 
generation irreligious socialization will increasingly fuel the growth among religious nones more 
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so than disaffiliation.”651 The problem of declining affiliation and Evangelical belief and 
participation in each generational cohort is a direct result of parental deprioritization of 
intentional child discipleship and investing in maturing critical thinking abilities.  The situation is 
not necessarily a retention problem for Evangelicals but more so a problem with parents’ 
intentionality in transmitting Christian faith and values as Mark explains, 
a fall in young people’s religiosity may be an indication of a problem in transmission 
rather than a lack of retention. Young people, as a result, may be less religious than the 
older generation, not because of a value shift in the importance they place on religion, but 
on the value and importance that their parents and family have placed on passing it on.652 
 
This process is what has been at play in the American religious landscape generally and 
within American Evangelicalism, the Southern Baptist Convention, specifically and there 
appears to be no signs of the declines slowing unless churches begin intentionally and 
strategically investing in parents and children.  
Denominational Examination 
Amidst claims of current forms of Christianity being intellectually anemic,653 has the 
American church in fact become unable, through neglect and distraction, to effectively 
communicate how the robust tenets of the faith once for all delivered to the saints challenges 
individuals regarding how to create a better world by establishing the Kingdom of heaven here 
on earth as it is in heaven?  Perhaps the present is available for the taking. 
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In providing a robust examination of the religious beliefs of the youngest generation, 
Generation Z, David Kinnaman provides a clear diagnosis of the waning influence of 
Evangelical Christianity in America stating, “The dropout problem is, at its core, a faith-
development problem; to use religious language, it’s a disciple making problem. The church is 
not adequately preparing the next generation to follow Christ faithfully in a rapidly changing 
culture.”654 
A recent Pew survey asked religious Nones to indicate why they have chosen to 
disaffiliate from religion and the most common answer given by the majority of those who 
identified as Atheists, Agnostics, and Nothing in Particular was the questioning of religious 
teaching as the primary reason for choosing to not affiliate with a particular religion.655 This is 
striking when an overwhelming majority of all Nones (seventy eight percent) were raised in a 
religion but later chose to disaffiliate from their childhood faith.  Of these that were reared in 
religious homes that later chose to identify as None, about half indicated they no longer believe 
in the religious teachings of their childhood religion.656  
Not only are millennials less likely than older Americans to identify with a religion, but 
millennials who are religious are significantly less likely to belong to a church. Fifty-seven 
percent of religious millennials belong to a church, compared with sixty five percent or more in 
older generations.”657  Church membership and the resulting doctrinal and discipleship influence 
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of the church is decreasing with each successive generational cohort to where it has become 
woefully evident in the decreasing numbers of those in America that identify as Evangelical.  
Church Leadership 
Perhaps a telling reason for the rapid decline in church membership in many 
denominations is the traditional “come and see” mentality where church leaders think making the 
church more relevant to a new generation will attract attendees and result in a growth in 
affiliation and/or conversion.  Bishop Stacy Sauls, COO of the Episcopal Church reveals this 
lingering ineffective strategy in offering his remedy for the rapid rise of the Nones by suggesting, 
“I think one of things we're learning is that we have to give people of any age a reason to come 
these days. We can't assume they're going to come just because their parents did.”658  This “come 
and see” strategy has been assimilated by Evangelical church leadership as well with ever-
diminishing returns.659  
The importance of examining church leadership as it relates to the increase of the 
religiously unaffiliated is twofold. First, a primary reason that those in younger generations are 
giving for disaffiliating from church is echoed by historian Christian Smith, who suggests “The 
main reason the young people say they left the church was unanswered doubts and questions. 
That they had questions, they had doubts; they brought them to the church leaders and they 
                                               
658 Stacy Sauls quoted in quoted in Daniel Burke, “Religious leaders respond to the rise of the “Nones” 
Religion News Service, October 10, 2012. 
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couldn’t get answers.”660 Even secularist are acknowledging the hunger for truth and certainty 
characteristic of the younger generations. Robyn Blumner, executive director of the Richard 
Dawkins Foundation for Reason & Science, sees the change as a generational trend driven by 
millennials. "We are seeing the rise of a generation of Americans who are hungry for facts and 
curious about the world."661   
The diminishing membership numbers in the Southern Baptist Convention could be a 
result of the statement regarding the ineffectiveness of leadership, "Workers don't quit 
companies; they quit managers."  In a Gallup study regarding church leadership and declining 
service attendance it was found that those who attend religious services more frequently are more 
likely to rate their pastor as outstanding compared to those who attend less frequently. The 
study’s author Frank Newport admitted the “correlational data do raise the possibility that those 
who are staying away from church may be doing so precisely because they are less engaged by 
their church leaders than are those who attend more frequently.”662 Moreover, additional data 
reveals that those that do attend church at least semi-frequently, at least once per month, do so to 
hear sermons that teach more about Scripture or help connect religion with life (seventy six 
percent and seventy five percent, respectively).663 
                                               
660 Christian Smith, Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). 
 
661 Robyn Blumer quoted in Neil Monahan and Saeed Ahmed, “There are now as many Americans who 
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662 Frank Newport, “Church Leaders and Declining Religious Service Attendance,” Gallup, September 7, 
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Second, is the fact that Evangelical clergy are aging and with the decreasing membership 
numbers there will be fewer and fewer who will rise to fill the rapidly vacating shoes of church 
leadership. According to the 2010 FACT survey, Generally, the younger the leader, the more 
likely a congregation has grown. Leaders 35 to 39 years old are most likely to be in growing 
congregations. The problem for the Evangelical church is only fifteen percent of pastors are 
under forty years of age.664 
Barna data suggest that “adult church leaders usually have serious involvement in church 
life and training when they are young.” This means those that are currently serving in leadership 
roles within Evangelical churches experienced significant involvement in church activities as 
children, prior to the age of thirteen. Barna goes on to suggest this provides the inference that 
“the individuals who will become the church’s leaders two decades from now are probably active 
in church programs today.”  Therefore, if families with children younger than thirteen years of 
age are attending church less and those in the youngest two generations are leaving the church 
more quickly than previous cohorts it is clear that the Evangelical church is not only facing an 
emergency of declining membership but also an impending leadership crisis.  
Decreasing Membership 
American unchurched population has increased from thirty five percent in 2005 to over 
forty six percent in 2015.  It is interesting to note that sixty two percent of the unchurched self-
identify as Christian but most alarming is the twenty one percent of the unchurched population 
being born-again based on their personal theology.665 This highlights the diminished importance 
and influence of the local church in American life.  
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Evangelicals who identify as being born-again have traditionally been a persistent body 
among the American population typically holding at between twenty two percent and twenty five 
percent. Burge highlights the historical stability of the Evangelical population and the recent 
overtaking of the majority by the corresponding upswing in the number of Nones, 
The fact that Evangelicals’ share of the population remains relatively stable over the last 
decade is striking given the continued rise of the nones. Evangelicals have been able to 
replace losses as fast as they are occurring, at least for now. Recent survey evidence has 
found that nearly 95 percent of born-again Christians stayed that way from 2010 to 2014, 
compared to just 85 percent of those who said that they were Protestant but not born-
again...though they’re currently 7.5 percentage points lower than their highest share of 
the US population: 29.9 percent in 1993, just as the nones began their upswing.666 
 
It is not only the membership numbers that has been in decline among American Evangelicals.  
The traditional beliefs that characterize Evangelicalism has also been ebbing among those that 
still self-identify as Evangelical. 
 
Decreasing Evangelical Belief 
As mentioned above, the Southern Baptist Convention membership data will be 
leveraged as it has been the largest evangelical denomination in America for several decades. It 
is assumed this denominational data provides more accurate insights into the beliefs and 
behaviors of American Evangelicalism for this study.  Beneficially, since its formation in 1865, 
the Southern Baptist Convention has released an Annual Report containing data detailing the 
performance of the congregations in the Convention.  This report provides the necessary 
empirical data that reveals the crisis for Evangelicalism in America.  
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“While some young adults who leave church are rejecting their childhood faith, most are 
choosing to keep many of the beliefs they had, but with a smaller dose of church,” said 
Executive Director of LifeWay Research Scott McConnell.667 Though there are those that retain 
some of the beliefs from their childhood faith studies are finding that the Christian faith that the 
youngest generations looks very little like the robust understanding of doctrine of generations 
previous to the Boomers. David Kinnaman, in explaining data collected on those among the 
youngest generations who have left the church explained that those who identified with 
Christianity and regularly shared their faith did not possess a thoroughly Christian worldview 
themselves. He explained, “We found that the faith that they were trying to spread was, in fact, 
more akin to moralistic therapeutic deism than to historic Christianity. Few of these youth 
evangelists could identify a single portion of the Bible as the basis of their faith in Christ.”668 
Fueling this dilution of belief is the shrinking number of those that hold the Bible to be 
reliable and authoritative.  When Southern Baptists were asked if Scripture should be taken 
literally the data reveal a significant decrease from 2007-2014 in those likely to take Scripture 
literally (fifty one percent vs forty one percent).  There has been a corresponding increase during 
the same timeframe in those aged 18-29 years old that claim Scripture is “not the Word of God” 
(five percent vs fifteen percent). Significantly, young adults aged 18-29 are much less likely (-
17%) to take Scripture literally than their preceding cohort, those aged 30-49.  Nonetheless, each 
cohort is less likely than preceding cohorts to take Scripture literally.669 
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Consequently, there has been an overall decrease in the certainty of belief among 
Southern Baptists and the decrease has been increasing with each generational cohort. For 
example, there has been an eight percent decrease (ninety one percent from eighty three percent) 
in absolute certainty in the existence of God among the 18-29-year-old cohort from 2007 to 
2014. This cohort is less likely than all other cohorts to belief in God with absolute certainty (-
8%). Where an absolute certain belief in God has held relatively steady with preceding cohorts at 
or over ninety percent. Additionally, the importance of religion became less important with each 
subsequent cohort, and much less important for those aged 18-29 than all other cohorts (-9%).  
Interestingly, as the belief in heaven has experienced relatively no change from 2007 to 2014 
(eighty nine percent vs ninety percent) and has remained steady across cohorts, there has been a 
decrease in those that believe in hell among the 18-29 year cohort (ninety percent vs eighty three 
percent) during the same period. While only twelve percent of the 18-29-year-old cohort that are 
members of Southern Baptist Churches do not believe in hell, this is double the preceding (30-49 
year old) cohort which is at six percent.670 
Reasons for Decreasing Membership Numbers 
The data is clear that the beliefs of each cohort are becoming less and less Evangelical 
mirroring Jones’ conclusion that each cohort will continue to become more secular leading to 
continued membership decline in America, “Given that church membership, and religiosity in 
general, is greater among older adults, the emergence of an increasingly secular generation to 
                                               
 
670 All data collected from, Pew Research Center, “Members of the Southern Baptist Convention,” 
Religious Landscape Study, 2014. https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/religious-
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replace far more religious older generations suggests the decline in U.S. church membership 
overall will continue.”671 
Weekly Attendance in Southern Baptist churches has been declining steadily among all 
generational cohorts. Most significantly, those aged 18-29 became less likely to attend at least 
once a week from ‘07-’14 (fifty five percent vs forty nine percent).  This cohort is also less likely 
to attend than previous cohorts.  Nonetheless, the drop in overall attendance to weekly church 
services is not only characteristic of the youngest generation.  Attendance has been steadily 
declining with each successive cohort with each cohort less likely to attend weekly than 
preceding cohort.672 
Fortunately, it is not only Evangelicals that are unable to retain adherents. Agnostics and 
Nones are drastically more likely to defect from their religion to a Protestant religion than the 
other way around (forty to forty eight percent of Nones and Agnostics vs only ten percent of 
Protestants).   Burge confirms, “Americans who identify as agnostic or “nothing in particular” 
are four times more likely to change their religious affiliation than Protestants or Catholics.”673  
Over the four year period of the CCES survey data collection of the forty percent of Nones that 
changed their religion nearly twenty percent of them returned to the church and of those thirteen 
percent changed their religious preference to a Protestant religion.674 Though there are a number 
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of Nones returning to church over time, the rate at which they return is dwarfed by those that 
choose to remain unaffiliated.  Nonetheless, the fact that many Nones do return to church 
provides confident hope that something can be done about this American phenomenon.  
However, to provide a vivid illustration of the significant influence Nones can wield in the 
American culture, Burge provides the comparison, “Fully 1 in 20 Americans joined this group in 
the last 10 years. That’s the functional equivalent of every Southern Baptist in the United States 
becoming ‘nothing in particular.’”675 
In attempting to identify a cause for the shrinking Southern Baptist Convention, Mohler 
has suggested that a significant culprit behind the declining membership numbers in the Southern 
Baptist Convention is the decreased fertility rates in America.676 This, prima facie, appears to 
serve as a reasonable explanation given that if fewer adults are having children, then there will 
be fewer children to join the church as they mature. Though this is not the case among Christians 
who still have among the highest fertility rates in the nation and have children at a higher level 
than the replacement rate, second only to Muslims.677  This fact magnifies the failure of 
Evangelical parents in effectively training their children in “the way they should go.”678 
Nonetheless, an examination of the national fertility rates compared to fertility rates of the 
religiously affiliated in general and the fertility rates of those women who identify as Christian 
suggests falling fertility rates is not significantly affecting Christianity as much as it should be 
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negatively affecting the religiously unaffiliated populations. Important, there is the research by 
Hout, Greeley, and Wilde’s whose findings illustrate that variable fertility rates can dramatically 
impact societal-level religious change.679  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 U.S. Fertility Rates as measured by the CDC680 
 
 
The group declining fertility rates “should” affect more drastically than Christians is the 
religiously unaffiliated. The birth rate for this religious grouping is approximately 1.6 children 
per unaffiliated woman globally and 1.7 children per American unaffiliated woman compared to 
2.6 children per Christian woman globally and 2.2 children per woman in the United States.681 
 
 
 
                                               
679 Michael Hout, Andrew Greeley, and Melissa J. Wilde, “The demographic imperative in religious 
change in the United States,” American Journal of Sociology (2001) 107(2):468–500. 
 
680 “US birth rates drop to lowest since 1987” BBC May 17, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-
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Figure 4.2 Total Fertility Rates - Religiously Affiliated vs. Unaffiliated, 2015-2020682 
 
Additionally, Pew data suggest Christian mothers will continue to have children at a 
higher rate than the national average where they are projecting “Christian...mothers are expected 
to give birth to increasing numbers of babies through 2060.” However, again, the decreased birth 
rate should more significantly affect the religiously unaffiliated category most since, “the total 
number of births is projected to decline steadily between 2015 and 2060 for all other major 
religious groups.”  Albeit, the negative impact on natural categorical growth on the religious 
Nones only holds true if religious switching holds steady, which is not the case with those that 
were raised in Evangelical homes who have now become religiously unaffiliated.683 
Additionally, with the characteristic ebb and flow in levels of spirituality throughout life 
stages, studies have shown that individuals typically experience a peak in religiosity once they 
become parents.684 In fact, religiously affiliated women in general have more children than 
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religiously unaffiliated women.685 This means the population of Nones is growing, not by 
biological growth but by religious switching, changing from their childhood religion to no 
religion at all; a failure of the church to facilitate the transmission of the faith from the parents to 
the child(ren).  
Evolving Views of Higher Education and Anemic Biblical Higher Education 
If Evangelicalism can be synonymous, in most instances, with political conservatism686 
then the importance of higher education is on the wane among Evangelicals.687 While about half 
of Americans, both conservative and liberal, say college education is having a positive effect in 
America, recent survey data show that the number of conservatives who view higher education 
positively has plummeted to become the dominant perspective.  In 2009, fifty three percent of 
conservatives favorably viewed higher education versus thirty five percent who viewed it as 
having a negative impact in the United States.  As of 2019, those numbers have traded places 
with fifty nine percent of conservatives now perceiving colleges as having a negative effect in 
America.688 
Pair this shift in perceived value of a college degree with replaced importance on 
receiving the necessary training to secure a career that provides financial security (cite) then it is 
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easy to see why institutions of biblical higher education are in a dire predicament.  The majority 
of Americans and Evangelicals choose a college or university based on the likelihood of earning 
a degree that will provide the best odds of obtaining a career that creates a life characterized by 
financial security. Since most Americans (eighty five percent) and importantly most Evangelicals 
(sixty five percent) do not think Bible colleges adequately prepare students for careers outside of 
ministry.689 The perception is not much better for Christian universities especially regarding 
prospective parents’ perspectives.  Christian parents mirror their prospective student’(s) desire 
for job preparation and financial security as the top priority in choosing a college or university. 
Southern Baptists and Education Attainment 
Overall, Millennials and Generation Z are still interested in education. With sixty six 
percent of Generation Z and fifty two percent of Millennials indicating their top priority in life 
being finishing their education. Leaving the falling number of Evangelicals that are still 
interested in higher education generally, and biblical higher education specifically with primarily 
secular options that may or most probably serve as a catalyst for their falling away from the 
church.690  
Van Ingen and Moor’s research provides substantial evidence that “tertiary education is 
clearly the most powerful predictor of changes in church attendance over time.”691  The more 
educated one becomes, post-high school, the odds of religious switching or disaffiliation 
occurring increases.  This does not suggest that lower levels of education are synonymous with 
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unaffiliation as CCES data shows the current unaffiliated population has lower levels of 
educational attainment compared to religious populations. However, this data does suggest that 
for the religiously affiliated, the more education attained the odds of disaffiliation increase, even 
if minimally.  
The importance of this discussion is the dumbing of the Christian mind has deadened 
with greater degrees the ability of each successive generation the ability to think critically.  
Currently, more Americans trust the media692 more than the Church and those within the church 
are ever-increasingly unable to adequately articulate the very basic tenets of the Christian faith.  
Data provided by Barna confirms the predicament that only ten percent of those classified as 
born-again Christians hold a biblical worldview.  Further, an overwhelming majority (eighty one 
percent) of Southern Baptists have no college degree and perhaps more alarmingly, eighty six 
percent of the 18-29 year old cohort have no college degree.693  The shifting of America’s 
religious landscape and the undeniable absence of critical thinking skills among every generation 
pose insurmountable obstacles to a resurgence of men and women who can confidently articulate 
truth in various cultural arenas.  
Loss of Evangelistic Zeal 
Each period of resurgence, especially the Awakenings, was preceded by intense, 
concerted prayer for God to move in a new way. Perhaps the most obvious activity birthed in 
each period of increased religious devotion was a zeal for evangelism characteristic not only of 
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the preachers of the period but also of the laity. Regrettably confirming the poor prognosis of the 
Evangelical church in America, Mohler summarizes the most recent data that confirmed the 
continued declining membership as being a direct result of a loss of evangelistic zeal when 
lamenting, “The most obvious insight is that we do not care as much about reaching lost people 
as we once did…”694  
As explained in Chapter 3, the most accurate way of measuring the effectiveness of local 
congregations is by examining year over year baptismal data which should be most reflective of 
the number of conversions as a core Evangelical doctrine is “believer’s baptism” where 
conversion must precede and is a prerequisite of baptismal eligibility.  To illustrate the waning 
effectiveness of Southern Baptist congregations, Clift W. Brannon lamented in the 1995 
Southern Baptist Convention meeting that more than 10,000 Southern Baptist Churches failed to 
report at least a single baptism during the previous year.695 
The numbers have not gotten any better. The 2018 number is about fifty five percent of 
the record year for baptisms, 445,725, set in 1972. With twice as many churches in 2018 in the 
Convention than in 1944: 51,541 vs 24,165 respectively. Southern Baptist baptisms broke the 
300,000 plateau in 1948 and remained above that level every year until 2015.696  It was after 
approximately the year 2000 that the number of new churches began surpassing the number of 
baptisms each year.  The reality that there are more Southern Baptist Churches now than ever 
and fewer baptisms per year than forty years ago when there was only a fraction of the number of 
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churches aggrandizes the anemic zeal for evangelism in the American Evangelical church. The 
data illustrate the bleak reality that each successive generation has cared less about evangelism 
with each cohort engaging in evangelistic activities less than their parents’ generation. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Number of SBC Churches vs Baptisms per Year (1883-2016)697 
 
Prior to the 1960s the growth rate of the Southern Baptist Convention astronomically outpaced 
the U.S. population growth rate.698  Though membership growth percentage, year over year, had 
declined steadily since the 1960’s falling below five percent growth in 1990 to less than three 
percent in 2000, membership itself began to experience negative numerical growth more than a 
decade ago. 
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This prolonged reduced growth precipitated the forming of an Evangelism Task Force699 
in 2017 provided a compilation of recommendations at the 2018 annual meeting. Chairman of 
the task force, Adam Greenway summarized the collective ethos of the group, "The 
evangelization of the world remains our top priority as a convention of churches, and the prayer 
of all of us serving on this task force is that God will use our efforts to help bring us together by 
renewing our passion for and increasing our effectiveness in bringing people to Christ,"700The 
Task Force provided a list of twelve affirmations and denials precisely defining what evangelism 
is and is not and a list of eight recommendations for how Southern Baptist churches could 
accomplish the aim of increasing converts and baptisms. Two recommendations in particular 
speak to the revisited necessity of evangelizing the next generation and the responsibility of the 
individual, parents, and churches to do so, recommendation 8a and 8b state, 
A) All parents, church leaders, pastors, and denominational entities renew with great 
urgency the priority of evangelizing the next generations, adapting our methodology 
without changing our theology.  B) God-called evangelists be utilized as a wonderful 
asset in evangelistic endeavors of various kinds, since while all Christians are called to be 
personal evangelists, God has always given some individuals unique giftings with respect 
to evangelism.701 
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The renewed focus on intentional evangelism to the next generations via urgent 
involvement of the family is reminiscent of the The Annual Report for the 1980 Southern Baptist 
Convention which outlined three primary projects for the Convention as a whole to focus on 
accomplishing by 1985. One of the three primary projects was to strengthen families through two 
primary methods: 1). Opening the Word together, which consisted of a three year project to 
enlist church families in daily Bible study and family worship at home. 2) Marriage: Growing in 
Oneness, which consisted of a two year project to strengthen husband/wife relationships and 
bring Christian enrichment to family life.702   
Task force member Doug Munton admitted, “We know that we need a fresh wave of 
evangelistic passion, but we also need the presence and power of God.”703 Still, some 
experienced in matters concerning the Southern Baptist Convention believe the efforts and 
recommendations will do very little to “move the needle on SBC baptism numbers.”704 This 
proposal in 1980 was much more robust of an exhortation for the heightened involvement of the 
family to evangelize and disciple the next generation than the subpoint dedicated to it by the 
2017 Evangelism Task Force. However, the focused strategy in proposed in 1980 failed to 
produce any lasting fruit. In fact, the vine has continued to wither. “Only disciples who are 
training, and training others, to follow the narrow Way of Christ will stay the course- and our 
churches need help to make such disciples.”705 
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Recent Barna data show that Generation Z teens receive the most spiritual guidance and 
encouragement from their mothers in six categories.706  Interestingly, it was the father and 
grandparents more so than siblings, friends, other relatives, and other non-relatives who provided 
the most guidance and encouragement second to the maternal influence.  In five of the six 
categories it was the grandparents that provided more guidance and encouragement than the 
fathers.707  An individual’s worldview is typically set by the time they reach the age of thirteen as 
Barna highlights the significance of this reality, 
In essence, what you believe by the time you are 13 is what you will die believing. Of 
course, there are many individuals who go through life-changing experiences in which 
their beliefs are altered, or instances in which a concentrated body of religious teaching 
changes one or more core beliefs. However, most people’s minds are made up and they 
believe they know what they need to know spiritually by age 13. Their focus in absorbing 
religious teaching after that age is to gain reassurance and confirmation of their existing 
beliefs rather than to glean new insights that will redefine their foundations.708 
 
Echoed by Collins-Mayo “if they are not religiously inclined in their youth, they are unlikely to 
become so in later years.709 
The conclusive fact is Christian women are continuing to have children at a higher than 
national rate and those children are not being successfully evangelized by the family or the 
church. These children have and are continuing to disaffiliate from the Christianity of their 
                                               
706 1) Encourages me to go to church 2) Encourages me in other ways 3) Sets an example 4) Talks with me 
about God’s forgiveness 5) Teaches me about the Bible 6) Teaches me about tradition. 
 
707 Barna Research Group, “Households of Faith: The rituals and relationships that turn a home into a 
sacred space,” (Barna: 2019). 
 
708 George Barna, Transforming Your Children into Spiritual Champions, (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 
2003), 33. 
 
709 Sylvia Collins-Mayo, ‘The Meaning and Inheritance of Anglican Identity amongst Young People,” in 
Contemporary Issues in the Worldwide Anglican Communion, ed. Abby Day (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016), 21-37, 21. 
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family and/or childhood and are not returning as they reach adulthood as previous generations 
have.710 
According to Thiessen and Wilkins-LaFlamme disaffiliation is most frequently, 
linked back to a family context where each generation progressively became less 
religious and as a result religion was not that salient during one’s upbringing (even if one 
was exposed to religious belief/practice for a period of time), and  often comes to fruition 
when the individual becomes more independent in mind and body from the original 
family household (when religion becomes seen as a choice, when intellectual 
disagreements arise with religion, when the individual enters into contact with less 
religious friends, and with life transitions).711 
 
America appears to be following the same trajectory as the UK regarding parental interest 
in passing on their faith to their children.  When asked whether they would want their children 
“to hold the same beliefs about whether or not there is a God or Higher Power as me when they 
are older”, less than a third (thirty one percent) of British parents agreed, and nearly twice as 
many (fifty nine percent) disagreed. Passing on faith was not a priority, and this translated into 
parents’ answers when asked whether it was important “to actively pass on beliefs about whether 
or not there is a God or Higher Power to [their] children” – the same proportion (thirty percent) 
saying it was important, compared with twice that number (sixty percent) saying that children 
should make up their own minds on this topic “independently of their parents”712 
                                               
710 See, Merril Silverstein and Vern L. Bengtson, “Return to Religion? Predictors of Religious Change 
among Baby-Boomers in their Transition to Later Life,” Population Ageing (2018) 11:9, “While we expect 
early religious exposure to be related to current religious activities and beliefs, it may be that 
those who were less religious in childhood are more likely to become more religious between 
midlife and later life.” 
 
711 Thiessen and Wilkins-LaFlamme, ““Becoming a Religious None: Irreligious Socialization and 
Disaffiliation,” 77. 
 
712 Olwyn Mark, Passing on the Faith, (London: Theos, 2017) 7. 
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However, those that attended religious services regularly were much more likely to want 
to pass on their faith to their children.  The same balance was seen when the data were analyzed 
by attendance: regular attenders713 were most likely to want to pass their beliefs on (seventy-
seven), non-attenders hardly at all (fifteen percent). Insight can be gained here regarding the 
importance of intentionality, or lack thereof, of parents regarding intentionally engaging their 
children in discussions of matters of faith. Data show that more than two thirds of all parents said 
that they would feel “confident” in having a conversation on the subject with their children, and 
the same proportion (sixty nine percent) said they would feel “comfortable” in doing so. It was 
simply that the subject rarely came up, with only forty percent of parents saying they had had a 
conversation with the aim of passing on their beliefs about whether there is a God or Higher 
Power with their children – although again the more seriously the parents took their faith, the 
more likely they were to have spoken about it.714  It is clear, intensity of belief of the parents and 
their intentionality in passing on the faith has clear correlations to the levels of spirituality and 
beliefs of those children as they reach adulthood. Where, “adults who say religion was an 
important part of their life growing up are more likely to say they now have the same religious 
affiliation as their parents.”715 
This being the case, it is imperative that the American Evangelical Church begin focusing 
efforts and discipleship action in evangelizing and discipling the youngest two generations for 
any hope of stopping the religious bleed and cultivating a fertile environment capable of 
                                               
713 Defined as “Once a week or more often” or “2-3 times a month.” 
 
714 Mark, Passing on the Faith, 8 
 
715 Alan Cooperman, Gregory A. Smith, and Anna Schiller, “One-in-Five U.S. Adults Were Raised in 
Interfaith Homes” Pew Research Center, Oct. 26, 2016. 
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producing resurgence. This is a significantly consequential responsibility that should not be 
pawned off on the church, however.  Evangelizing and discipling children is the primary 
responsibility of the parent. And, when this is done intentionally and effectively, albeit not 
necessarily dependent upon but in partnership with a local church, children (successive 
generations) are more likely to stay engaged with the faith that was passed on from their family. 
As Mark affirmed, “despite the perceived strength of other social and cultural forces, ‘faith’s’ 
most effective ‘not-so-secret’ weapon in passing on beliefs and practices to the next generation 
remains parents.”716  
Chapter Summary 
It is clear from the research presented here that the current state of American Christianity 
experienced by contemporary generations is in dire straits compared to previous periods of 
American religious history.  The rapid increase of Nones and the corresponding decrease in those 
that identify as Evangelical as evidenced by the rapidly diminishing membership and baptism 
numbers in the Southern Baptist Convention should cause concern that these trend lines might 
continue growing further apart with the population of Nones continuing to increase and the 
number of Evangelicals in America continues to dwindle.   
The population of Nones in America has outgrown the number of Evangelicals in 
America in the last five years.717 Likewise the rate of growth among the None population has 
significantly outpaced those that are identifying as Evangelical. The problem for Evangelicals is 
                                               
716 Ibid., 13. 
 
717 Neil Monahan and Saeed Ahmed, “There are now as many Americans who claim no religion as there 
are evangelicals and Catholics, a survey finds,” CNN, April 26, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/13/us/no-
religion-largest-group-first-time-usa-trnd/index.html Summarizing Ryan P. Burge’s analysis of 2018 General Social 
Survey data available found in, https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/pages/show?page=gss%2Fhelp_variables Compared 
to the Pew 2014 Religious Landscape study Pew Research Center, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” 
May 12, 2015.  
 
217 
the rapid increase in those with no religious affiliation is not only dramatically outpacing the 
growth of those that identify with Evangelicalism, it is apparent the increase of Nones is ignoring 
generational lines.  Indeed, though the increase in those that self-identify as Evangelical is 
greatest among those younger than 40 years of age (from seventeen percent to twenty one 
percent from 1972 to 2018 years)718 that increase is negligible compared to the over one third of 
those in the Millennial and Generation Z cohorts that have no religious affiliation.  There is also 
a two-fold issue surrounding effective Evangelical leadership in the coming years. Not only are 
there fewer clergy in the pipeline being trained to lead Evangelical churches,719 those that are 
being trained and released to lead churches are failing to provide the answers to the questions 
attendees are asking.720  
Reminiscent of Decker’s proclamation that the Nones are “winning,” Evangelicalism is 
rapidly losing influence, relevancy, and interest in each subsequent generational cohort. Though 
there are several hypotheses proposed by sociologist for this seemingly recent phenomenon such 
as it being a natural result of the secularization of the American culture, the intermingling of 
politics and religion, higher education attainment, etc. an examination of the data from the 
Southern Baptist Convention provides insight into the waning appeal of Evangelical ethos among 
each subsequent cohort. Moreover, even though Christians, and Evangelicals specifically have 
higher fertility rates compared to the religiously unaffiliated population that biological growth is 
                                               
718  Ryan P. Burge, “Plenty of the ‘Nones’ Actually Head Back to Church,” Christianity Today, February 6 
2018.  
 
719  Aaron Earls, “How Old are America’s Pastors?” LifeWay: Facts & Trends, March 7, 2017. 
 
720 Christian Smith, Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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not translating into conversions to Evangelicalism. This confirms that Evangelicals have failed, 
and it appears are continuing to fail at successfully passing on the faith to their children.  
As a result of a loss of evangelistic zeal, fledgling evangelistic efforts, and a diminishing 
emphasis and interest in biblical higher education it is clear that Evangelical numbers will 
continue to decline.  Consequently, if the recent surge in those that are choosing to identify as 
religiously unaffiliated continues to increase with the same speed as has been experienced since 
the last decade of the twentieth century the population of Nones in America will be significantly 
larger than the population of those that identify as Evangelical.721 
In this course of this chapter the research presented is vital because there have been 
periods of significant religious disinterest throughout American religious history; however, and 
most importantly, religious zeal has rebounded time and time again. What has been presented 
here highlights the necessity for parents and Evangelical churches to partner in a concerted effort 
to religiously socialize the next generational cohorts albeit this is no small undertaking. To 
successfully reverse the current trend Evangelicals must be calculated in their efforts to 
rigorously train the next cohort of leaders and intent in reaching and training families (mothers 
and fathers) with the knowledge to be able to effectively pass on the faith and answer the 
questions of the next generation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
721 Concluded from Ryan Burge’s analysis of GSS data from 1972 to 2018 that reveals the population of 
Nones has now surpassed the number of those that identify as Evangelical in America. See, Ryan P. Burge, “Plenty 
of the ‘Nones’ Actually Head Back to Church,” Christianity Today, February 6 2018.  
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If the average church should suddenly take seriously the notion that every lay member man or 
woman is really a minister of Christ, we could have something like a revolution in a very short 
time. - Elton Trueblood 
 
Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 
The objective of this project has been to evaluate the major periods of American religious 
history for the purpose of identifying similar periods of religious disinterest and what, if any, 
characteristics were present that facilitated, encouraged, or resulted in religious resurgence.  This 
historical survey served as the plumb against which the current rapid increase of the religiously 
unaffiliated could be evaluated in context to ideally suggest if a reversal of the current trend and 
a resurgence in American Evangelicalism is possible.  As explained in Chapter 1 the aim of this 
project has not been to provide answers to “why” there has been a recent surge in the number of 
Americans that are choosing to identify as religiously unaffiliated. Instead, the aim has been to 
examine past periods of high and low religious interest in America which includes the present, 
rapid increase of religiously unaffiliated to conclude whether a resurgence is possible. As a result 
of this examination, it has been seen that there have been other periods of high and low Christian 
affiliation in American religious history.  Christianity in America has always shown a resiliency 
with each ebb reversing into a high tide of religious interest and evangelistic zeal resulting in 
growing numbers. Corresponding to those surges were increased primacy given to the preaching 
of the gospel, the authority of Scripture, rigorous biblical education and training, and missionary 
fervor which has more often than not resulted in civil engagement with the hopes of transforming 
society.  
The research presented here reveals that there have indeed been other periods in 
American religious history where there was a significantly low interest in Evangelical 
expressions of Christianity.  One such period was the religiously dispassionate in Colonial 
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America.  Though the London Company launched for the New World in 1607 to propagate the 
Christian religion those that followed the New World had more worldly aspirations, even the 
clergy.  Chapter 2 highlighted estimates that showed only ten percent of Americans were church 
members in 1776. From there, America experienced a significant increase in membership growth 
during the nineteenth century that lasted until the late twentieth century.  Adherents increased 
from approximately ten percent at the beginning of the nineteenth century to over half of 
America being religiously affiliated at the turn of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, the 
importance of religion was significant to the founding of the new nation though religious 
affiliation was minimal allowing for significant evangelistic efforts through missions to the new 
frontier and intentional biblical education through formal education and distribution of literature. 
This two headed approach obtained its desired results in exponentially increasing the number of 
churches and qualified clergy in the young nation. With each surge in the intensity of interest in 
Christianity there was a corresponding increased interest in higher education for training minds 
to go out and accomplish the Great Commission. Additionally, an increase in evangelistic fervor 
to the unreached i.e. Indians, Blacks, unchurched resulted from the primacy of preaching in local 
congregations leading to larger events. Not the other way around.  In other words, the emphasis 
was on the responsibility of the local church not large events. 
There have been other periods where interest in religion and Christian, evangelistic zeal 
has waned but as explained early in this project, religion in America, particularly Evangelical 
forms of Christianity has been persistent even though intense religiosity is currently declining.  
The cause of great ebbs in religious interest and affiliation throughout the history of 
American Christianity has not necessarily been the secularization of culture, but it has been the 
secularization of the Church.  After the Church experiences a great period of resurgence it has 
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tended to establish and institutionalize organizations aimed at institutionalizing the primary 
facets of the resurgence in attempt to secure the moral reform of society. Then, the Church 
abdicated its responsibility to preach the gospel to the individual for the conversion of the 
individual so the individual can multiply that new life in the family primarily and society 
secondarily.  This responsibility tends (often but not always) to be abdicated through the process 
of politicization with hopes that Christian values may be threaded into the fabric of society 
through legislation.  As a result of this abdicated responsibility, there is a diminished importance 
of the local church and a corresponding diminishing of the authority and reliability of Scripture 
to speak to the whole life of the individual.  Finally, there is a diminished confidence or certainty 
in religion in general and Evangelical expressions of Christianity specifically.  
Regarding the current increase in religious Nones, those that have never affiliated with a 
religion in their lifetime have not consistently grown as a share of the unaffiliated population. In 
fact, the greatest growth in the never affiliated relative to the disaffiliated occurred prior to 2000. 
After 2000, the percentage of respondents who were never affiliated leveled off, whereas the 
percent who were disaffiliated has grown substantially.  This means that the primary threat to 
Evangelicalism is not the population growth of those who have never affiliated with a religion 
from either being raised in a non-religious home. Instead, the threat is from those who are 
leaving Evangelical churches as a result of ineffective religious socialization and parents 
allowing their children the autonomy to choose to construct their own religious identity.  
Currently, disaffiliation is the most common contributor to the increasing number of 
Nones.  As highlighted throughout this project, those that are choosing no religious affiliation are 
primarily the ones who were reared in religious homes. This confirms the primary mechanism 
for this ebb in religious interest is the Evangelical church’s failure of familial religious 
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socialization and abandonment of emphasizing the preaching of the gospel, rigorous education 
which sharpens critical thinking skills and results in more certain beliefs.  
The results of intentional religious socialization by successfully passing on the faith to 
the next generation produces a healthier culture for the gospel to be received.  Conclusive 
evidence has been provided indicating those that disaffiliate from their religion report the poorest 
mental health and well-being.  This data is significant because it parallels what is occurring with 
American Evangelicalism contributing to the growing population of Nones. The None population 
is currently growing primarily through religious switching, or disaffiliation, and America has 
never experienced such low levels of mental health and resulting negative, often catastrophic, 
consequences.   
The current population of those that have no religious affiliation has now surpassed the 
number of those that identify as Evangelical presenting interestingly precarious scenarios 
regarding political ramifications which leads to discussions regarding the sanctity of life, 
abortion, LBGTQ rights, etc. Also, of concern with this rapidly growing population is the quality 
of mental health among those with no religious affiliation generally and an ambiguous Christian 
affiliation especially. There is good news however, Nones are drastically more likely to defect 
from their religion to a Protestant religion than the other way around (forty to forty eight percent 
of Nones and Agnostics vs only ten percent of Protestants).  Though the population of those that 
identify with Evangelicalism is shrinking as a result of religious switching and many of those 
becoming religious Nones, hope for the American Evangelical church is not lost.  
Evangelicalism can rebound but it will not survive by relying on current methods which have 
resulted in a weakened, almost unrecognizable orthodox theology where currently only dismal 
number of the adult born-again possess a biblical worldview. 
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The opening chapter of this project asked what needs to happen with(in) the American 
church to prevent further apostasy and initiate a period of resurgence of Evangelical American 
Christian affiliation? The research presented speaks to the necessity for the Evangelical church to 
once again dedicate its efforts to clearly communicating biblical doctrine and the necessity of 
developing critical thinking skills among Evangelicals.  This informed thinking must come from 
rigorously trained clergy who can sufficiently transmit that faith once and for all delivered to the 
saints through means of intentional discipleship to parishioners and parents so that they can in 
turn model that faith for the next generation.  There has been an apparent failure of the church in 
intentionally training parents and exhorting them of the necessity of “training” their children in 
the way they should go or they will depart from it, which is exactly what has been occurring in 
America for the past two decades.  
 The alignment of Evangelical convictions with political agendas has created a symbiotic 
relationship between the church and state that has caused produced a church that has become 
indiscernible from Republican values.  The Evangelical church must cease to abdicate its 
responsibility to the American government for the transformation of society. 
Instead of aiming to influence the morality of American society through electing 
individuals who construct and communicate campaigns that most closely align with ever-shifting 
Evangelical convictions, the Evangelical church should begin to communicate once again the 
necessity of a rigorous education, developing critical thinking skills, and a life devoted to the 
pursuit of life-long learning. This would allow the church to raise up learned, influential disciples 
who know how to critically think and how to strategically communicate and apply the gospel in 
any cultural context.  
224 
The research provided here brings the Evangelical to consider whether or not the current 
trend is simply a natural result of a secularizing culture and is the trend irreversible?  If all things 
continue as they have been in the Evangelical community generally and the Southern Baptist 
Convention specifically then, yes, the continued rapid decline of American Evangelicalism is 
indeed inevitable. Nonetheless, as this research has highlighted, though there is a rapid decline in 
religiosity generally and Evangelical expressions of American Christianity specifically, as 
American religious history has evidenced, reversal of religious disinterest is not only possible but 
perhaps, probable. The data and the analysis provided throughout this project suggest that there 
is not only a possibility of reversing the current trend of a rapidly shrinking population of 
Evangelicals, but the reversal is probable as history has shown, but how Evangelical churches are 
training families must change. 
 The alignment of Evangelical convictions with political agendas has created a symbiotic 
relationship between the church and state that has caused produced a church that has become 
indiscernible from Republican values.  The Evangelical church must cease to abdicate its 
responsibility to the American government for the transformation of society. 
It must commit itself to the preaching the gospel for the conversion of the individual for 
the multiplication of that transformational message. This commitment would be a correction of 
current trends among Evangelical churches to devote considerable resources to production and 
audio-visual effects to enhance the church experience.  As mentioned above, this preoccupation 
with entertainment-style church service is pushing younger generations away because they are 
not receiving adequate answers to the questions and uncertainties they carry with them.  
As presented above, each subsequent American generational cohort is becoming less 
religious and each Evangelical generational cohort is becoming less certain of their beliefs and 
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increasingly less able to accurately communicate traditional doctrines of the Evangelical faith.  
With the Evangelical church becoming increasingly uncertain of their beliefs there is a 
corresponding increase in mental health issues with each American generational cohort in 
general and Evangelical generational cohort specifically.  If there is to be hope for a future 
resurgence of Evangelical influence in America, the church must let go of current approaches 
and examine its current operation in light of its historical existence.   
There is an additional area of further research this research project would like to suggest. 
This project did not set out to provide a detailed explanation of the mechanisms that will create a 
resurgence among American Evangelicalism. Nonetheless, to be clear, mechanisms such as 
prayer, rigorous teaching of Christian doctrine, a high view of the authority of Scripture, 
certainty of belief, and evangelistic zeal have been present immediately prior to, during, and 
immediately following each major resurgence in American Evangelicalism. One area of research 
that is greatly needed is further investigation into the process of religious socialization in the 
home especially throughout Evangelical history. 
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